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Archive for the ‘Guerra Fría’ Category

arbannsmU.S. Covert Intervention in Chile: Planning to Block Allende Began Long before September 1970 Election

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 470

May 23, 2014

For more information contact:
Peter Kornbluh 202/374-7281 or peter.kornbluh@gmail.com

 

battleOfChileWashington, DC, May 23, 2014 – Covert U.S. planning to block the democratic election of Salvador Allende in Chile began weeks before his September 4, 1970, victory, according to just declassified minutes of an August 19, 1970, meeting of the high-level interagency committee known as the Special Review Group, chaired by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. “Kissinger asked that the plan be as precise as possible and include what orders would be given September 5, to whom, and in what way,” as the summary recorded Kissinger’s instructions to CIA Director Richard Helms. “Kissinger said we should present to the President an action plan to prevent [the Chilean Congress from ratifying] an Allende victory…and noted that the President may decide to move even if we do not recommend it.”

The document is one of a compendium of some 366 records released by the State Department as part of its Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series. The much-delayed collection, titled “Chile: 1969-1973,” addresses Richard Nixon’s and Kissinger’s efforts to destabilize the democratically elected Socialist government of Salvador Allende, and the U.S.-supported coup that brought General Augusto Pinochet to power in 1973. The controversial volume was edited by two former officials of the State Department’s Office of the Historian, James Siekmeier and James McElveen.

“This collection represents a substantive step forward in opening the historical record on U.S. intervention in Chile,” said Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Chile documentation project at the National Security Archive, and is the author of The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. Kornbluh called on the State Department to continue to pursue the declassification of all relevant records on the U.S. role in Chile, including all records of CIA contacts with the Chilean military leading up to the September 11, 1973, coup; CIA funding for the truckers’ strike as part of the “destabilization” campaign, and CIA intelligence on the executions of two U.S. citizens in the wake of the military takeover, Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi.

The FRUS series is scheduled to release an electronic supplement of additional records in the fall, and to publish another volume,Chile, 1973-1976, next year. “The next volume could advance the historical record on CIA support for the Chilean secret police, DINA, CIA knowledge of Operation Condor, and Pinochet’s act of international terrorism in Washington D.C. that killed Orlando Letelier and Ronni Karpen Moffitt,” Kornbluh suggested.

In the aftermath of General Augusto Pinochet’s arrest in October 1998, the National Security Archive, along with victims of the Pinochet regime, led a campaign to press the Clinton administration to declassify the still-secret documents on Chile, the coup and the repression that followed. Some 23,000 NSC, State Department, Defense Department and CIA records were released. Some of those have been included in the new FRUS collection which contains a set of meeting memoranda of the “40 Committee” — an interagency group chaired by Henry Kissinger which oversaw covert operations in Chile, as well as dozens of formerly secret cables, including CIA communications.

The release of the records comes amidst renewed debate over the CIA role in supporting the military coup in Chile. The forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs contains an article by former CIA operative Jack Devine, “What Really Happened in Chile: the CIA, the Coup Against Allende, and the Rise of Pinochet,” which reveals that intelligence he obtained on September 9, 1973, alerted President Nixon in advance to the timing of the coup. “I sent CIA headquarters in Langley a special type of top-secret cable known as a CRITIC, which takes priority over all other cables and goes directly to the highest levels of government. President Richard Nixon and other top U.S. policymakers received it immediately. ‘A coup attempt will be initiated on 11 September,’ the cable read.”

Nevertheless, Devine asserts that the CIA “did not plot with the Chilean military to overthrow Allende in 1973.”

However, according to a transcript of the first phone conversation between Kissinger and Nixon following the coup, when the President asked if “our hand” showed in the coup, Kissinger explained that “we didn’t do it,” in terms of direct participation in the military actions: “I mean we helped them,” Kissinger continued. “[deleted word] created the conditions as great as possible.”

The Kissinger-Nixon transcript is reproduced in the 2013 edition of The Pinochet File.

Read the FRUS volume here

 

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arbannsm

CIA SUCCESSFULLY CONCEALS BAY OF PIGS HISTORY

National Security Archives   May 21, 2014

 

bayopigsThumbWashington, DC, May 21, 2014 – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit yesterday joined the CIA’s cover-up of its Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961 by ruling that a 30-year-old volume of the CIA’s draft “official history” could be withheld from the public under the “deliberative process” privilege, even though four of the five volumes have previously been released with no harm either to national security or any government deliberation.

“The D.C. Circuit’s decision throws a burqa over the bureaucracy,” said Tom Blanton, director of the National Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org), the plaintiff in the case. “Presidents only get 12 years after they leave office to withhold their deliberations,” commented Blanton, “and the Federal Reserve Board releases its verbatim transcripts after five years. But here the D.C. Circuit has given the CIA’s historical office immortality for its drafts, because, as the CIA argues, those drafts might ‘confuse the public.'”

“Applied to the contents of the National Archives of the United States, this decision would withdraw from the shelves more than half of what’s there,” Blanton concluded.

The 2-1 decision, authored by Judge Brett Kavanaugh (a George W. Bush appointee and co-author of the Kenneth Starr report that published extensive details of the Monica Lewinsky affair), agreed with Justice Department and CIA lawyers that because the history volume was a “pre-decisional and deliberative” draft, its release would “expose an agency’s decision making process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions.”

This language refers to the fifth exemption (known as b-5) in the Freedom of Information Act. The Kavanaugh opinion received its second and majority vote from Reagan appointee Stephen F. Williams, who has senior status on the court.

bayopigsOn the 50th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 2011, the National Security Archive’s Cuba project director, Peter Kornbluh, requested, through the FOIA, the complete release of “The Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation” — a massive, five-volume study compiled by a CIA staff historian, Jack Pfeiffer, in the 1970s and early 1980s. Volume III had already been released under the Kennedy Assassination Records Act; and a censored version of Volume IV had been declassified years earlier pursuant to a request by Pfeiffer himself.

The Archive’s FOIA request pried loose Volumes I and II of the draft history, along with a less-redacted version of Volume IV, but the CIA refused to release Volume V, so the Archive filed suit under FOIA in 2012, represented by the expert FOIA litigator, David Sobel. In May 2012, U.S. District Judge Gladys Kessler held that Volume V was covered by the deliberative process privilege, and refused to order any segregation of “non-deliberative” material, as required by FOIA.

The Archive appealed the lower court’s decision, and with representation from the distinguished firm of Skadden Arps Meagher Slate & Flom, brought the case to the D.C. Circuit, with oral argument in December 2013. The National Coalition for History, including the American Historical Association and other historical and archival professional organizations, joined the case with anamicus curiae brief authored by the Jones Day law firm arguing for release of the volume.

Titled “CIA’s Internal Investigation of the Bay of Pigs Operation,” Volume V apparently contains Pfeiffer’s aggressive defense of the CIA against a hard-hitting 1961 internal review, written by the agency’s own Inspector General, which held the CIA singularly responsible for the poor assumptions, faulty planning and incompetence that led to the quick defeat of the paramilitary exile brigade by Fidel Castro’s military at the Bahia de Cochinos between April 17 and April 20, 1961.

The Archive obtained under FOIA and published the IG Report in 1998. The CIA has admitted in court papers that the Pfeiffer study contains “a polemic of recriminations against CIA officers who later criticized the operation,” as well as against other Kennedy administration officials who Pfeiffer contended were responsible for this foreign policy disaster.

In the dissenting opinion from the D.C. Circuit’s 2-1 decision yesterday, Judge Judith Rogers (appointed by Bill Clinton) identified multiple contradictions in the CIA’s legal arguments. Judge Rogers pointed out that the CIA had failed to justify why release of Volume V would “lead to public confusion” when CIA had already released Volumes I-IV. She noted that neither the CIA nor the majority court opinion had explained “why release of the draft of Volume V ‘would expose an agency’s decision making process,'” and discourage future internal deliberations within the CIA’s historical office any more than release of the previous four volumes had done.

Prior to yesterday’s decision, the Obama administration had bragged that reducing the government’s invocation of the b-5 exemption was proof of the impact of the President’s Day One commitment to a “presumption of disclosure.” Instead, the bureaucracy has actually increased in the last two years its use of the b-5 exemption, which current White House counselor John Podesta once characterized as the “withhold if you want to” exemption.

The majority opinion also left two openings for transparency advocates. It invites Congress to set a time limit for applying the b-5 exemption, as Congress has done in the Presidential Records Act. Second, it concludes that any “factual material” contained in the draft should be reachable through Freedom of Information requests.

 

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Donald T. Critchlow

It seems that everyone in Hollywood is on the political Left. “Seems” is the operative word here, because there are actually Republicans in pictures, at least according to this website. (NB: I have no idea whether the folks who created this list know what they’re talking about, so beware.) Nonetheless, it’s pretty certain that most–the vast majority?– of Hollywood-types are on the Left.

But it wasn’t always so, as Donald T. Critchlow shows in his fascinating book When Hollywood Was Right: How Movie Stars, Studio Moguls, and Big Business Remade American Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2013). There was a time–the 1940s and 1950s–when Conservatives were an important and very vocal faction in Hollywood. This group emerged out of opposition to the New Deal and found their issue in anti-Communism. They were, truth be told, never terribly numerous. But they made up for their small numbers by their political savvy and, ultimately, their ability to produce skillful, viable political candidates. One of them, of course, was Ronald Reagan, who proved to be very skillful and very viable indeed. It’s a remarkable and largely forgotten story. Listen in.

This interview is brought to you by Cambridge University Press.

Listen here.

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(Image: Library of Congress)

Obama: Ike Redivivus?

by Victor Davis Hanson

National Review Online March 11, 2014
In critique of the George W. Bush administration, and in praise of the perceived foreign-policy restraint of Obama’s first five years in the White House, a persistent myth has arisen that Obama is reminiscent of Eisenhower — in the sense of being a president who kept America out of other nations’ affairs and did not waste blood and treasure chasing imaginary enemies.

Doris Kearns Goodwin, Andrew Bacevich, Fareed Zakaria (“Why Barack Is like Ike”), and a host of others have made such romantic, but quite misleading, arguments about the good old days under the man they consider the last good Republican president.

Ike was no doubt a superb president. Yet while he could be sober and judicious in deploying American forces abroad, he was hardly the non-interventionist of our present fantasies, who is so frequently used and abused to score partisan political points.

There is a strange disconnect about Eisenhower’s supposed policy of restraint, especially in reference to the Middle East, and his liberal use of the CIA in covert operations. While romanticizing Ike, we often deplore the 1953 coup in Iran and the role of the CIA, but seem to forget that it was Ike who ordered the CIA intervention that helped to lead to the ouster of Mossadegh and to bring the Shah to absolute power. Ike thought that he saw threats to Western oil supplies, believed that Mossadegh was both unstable and a closet Communist, sensed the covert hand of the Soviet Union at work, was won over by the arguments of British oil politics, and therefore simply decided Mossadegh should go — and he did.

Ike likewise ordered the CIA-orchestrated removal of the leaders of Guatemala and the Congo. He bequeathed to JFK the plans for the Bay of Pigs invasion, which had been born on the former’s watch. His bare-faced lie that a U-2 spy plane had not been shot down in Russia did terrible damage to U.S. credibility at the time.

The Eisenhower administration formulated the domino theory, and Ike was quite logically the first U.S. president to insert American advisers into Southeast Asia, a move followed by a formal SEATO defense treaty to protect most of Southeast Asia from Communist aggression — one of the most interventionist commitments of the entire Cold War, which ended with over 58,000 Americans dead in Vietnam and helicopters fleeing from the rooftop of the U.S. embassy in Saigon.

Eisenhower’s “New Look” foreign policy of placing greater reliance on threats to use nuclear weapons, unleashing the CIA, and crafting new entangling alliances may have fulfilled its short-term aims of curbing the politically unpopular and costly use of conventional American troops overseas. Its long-term ramifications, however, became all too clear in the 1960s and 1970s. Mostly, Ike turned to reliance on nuke-rattling because of campaign promises to curb spending and balance the budget by cutting conventional defense forces — which earned him the furor of Generals Omar Bradley, Douglas MacArthur, and Matthew Ridgway.

In many ways, Eisenhower’s Mideast policy lapsed into incoherency, notably in the loud condemnation of the 1956 British-French operations in Suez (after Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal), which otherwise might have weakened or toppled Nasser. This stance of Eisenhower’s (who was up for reelection) may have also contradicted prior tacit assurances to the British that the U.S. would in fact look the other way.

The unexpected American opposition eroded transatlantic relations for years as well as helped to topple the Eden government in Britain. Somehow all at once the U.S. found itself humiliating its two closest allies, empowering Nasser, and throwing its lot in with the Soviet Union and the oil blackmailers of Saudi Arabia — with ramifications for the ensuing decades.

Yet just two years later, Ike ordered 15,000 troops into Lebanon to prevent a coup and the establishment of an anti-Western government — precisely those anti-American forces that had been emboldened by the recent Suez victory of the pan-Arabist Nasser. We forget that Ike was nominated not just in opposition to the non-interventionist policies of Robert Taft, but also as an antidote to the purportedly milk-toast Truman administration, which had supposedly failed to confront global Communism and thereby “lost” much of Asia.

Eisenhower gave wonderful speeches about the need to curtail costly conventional forces and to avoid overseas commitments, but much of his defense strategy was predicated on a certain inflexible and dangerous reliance on nuclear brinksmanship. In 1952 he ran to the right of the departing Harry Truman on the Korean War, and unleashed Nixon to make the argument of Democratic neo-appeasement in failing to get China out of Korea. Yet when he assumed office, Eisenhower soon learned that hinting at the use of nuclear weapons did not change the deadlock near the 38th Parallel. Over 3,400 casualties (including perhaps over 800 dead) were incurred during the Eisenhower administration’s first six months. Yet the July 1953 ceasefire ended the war with roughly the same battlefield positions as when Ike entered office. Pork Chop Hill — long before John Kerry’s baleful notion about the last man to die in Vietnam — became emblematic of a futile battle on the eve of a negotiated stalemate.

Ike’s occasional opportunism certainly turned off more gifted field generals like Matthew Ridgway, who found it ironic that candidate Ike had cited a lack of American resolve to finish the Korean War with an American victory, only to institutionalize Ridgway’s much-criticized but understandable restraint after his near-miraculous restoration of South Korea. In addition, Ridgway deplored the dangerous false economy of believing that postwar conventional forces could be pruned while the U.S. could rely instead on threatening the use of nuclear weapons. He almost alone foresaw rightly that an emerging concept of mutually assured destruction would make the conventional Army and Marines as essential as ever.

As a footnote, Eisenhower helped to marginalize the career of Ridgway, the most gifted U.S. battlefield commander of his era. Ike bore grudges and was petty enough to write, quite untruthfully, that General James Van Fleet, not Ridgway, had recaptured Seoul — even though the former had not even yet arrived in the Korean theater. That unnecessary snub was reminiscent of another to his former patron George Marshall during the campaign of 1952. Ridgway, remember, would later talk Eisenhower out of putting more advisers into Vietnam.

The problem with the Obama administration is not that it does or does not intervene, given the differing contours of each crisis, but rather that it persists in giving loud sermons that bear no relationship to the actions that do or do not follow: red lines in Syria followed by Hamlet-like deliberations and acceptance of Putin’s bogus WMD removal plan; flip-flop-flip in Egypt; in Libya, lead from behind followed by Benghazi and chaos; deadlines and sanctions to no deadlines and no sanctions with Iran; reset reset with Russia; constant public scapegoating of his predecessors, especially Bush; missile defense and then no missile defense in Eastern Europe; Guantanamo, renditions, drones, and preventive detentions all bad in 2008 and apparently essential in 2009; civilian trials for terrorists and then not; and Orwellian new terms like overseas contingency operations, workplace violence, man-caused disasters, a secular Muslim Brotherhood, jihad as a personal journey, and a chief NASA mission being outreach to Muslims. We forget that the non-interventionist policies of Jimmy Carter abruptly ended with his bellicose “Carter Doctrine” — birthed after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, American hostages were taken in Tehran and Khomeinists had taken power, China went into Vietnam, and Communist insurgencies swept Central America.

As for Dwight Eisenhower, of course he was an admirable and successful president who squared the circle of trying to contain expansionary Soviet and Chinese Communism at a time when the postwar American public was rightly tired of war, while balancing three budgets, building infrastructure, attempting to deal with civil rights, and promoting economic growth. Yet the Republican Ike continued for six months the identical Korean War policies of his unpopular Democratic predecessor Harry Truman, and helped to lay the foundation for the Vietnam interventions of his successors, Democrats John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. That the initial blow-ups in Korea and Vietnam bookended his own administration may have been a matter of luck, given his own similar interventionist Cold War policies.

Bush was probably no Ike (few are), and certainly Obama is not either. But to score contemporary political points against one and for the other by reinventing Eisenhower into a model non-interventionist is a complete distortion of history. So should we laugh or cry at the fantasies offered by Andrew Bacevich? He writes: “Remember the disorder that followed the Korean War? It was called the Eisenhower era, when budgets balanced, jobs were plentiful and no American soldiers died in needless wars.”

In fact, the post–Korean War “Eisenhower era” was characterized by only three balanced budgets (in at least one case with some budget gimmickry) out of the remaining seven Eisenhower years. In 1958 the unemployment rate spiked at over 7 percent for a steady six months. Bacevich’s simplistic notion that “jobs were plentiful” best applies to the first six months of 1953, when Ike entered office and, for the only time during his entire tenure, the jobless rate was below 3 percent — coinciding roughly with the last six months of fighting the Korean War. This was an age, remember, when we had not yet seen the West German, South Korean, and Japanese democratic and economic miracles (all eventually due to U.S. interventions and occupations), China and Russia were in ruins, Western Europe was still recovering from the war, Britain had gone on a nationalizing binge, and for a brief time the U.S. was largely resupplying the world, and mostly alone — almost entirely with its own oil, gas, and coal. Eisenhower’s term was characterized by intervention in Lebanon, fighting for stalemate in Korea, CIA-led coups and assassinations, the insertion of military advisers into Vietnam, new anti-Communist treaty entanglements to protect Southeast Asian countries, a complete falling out with our European allies, abject lies about spy flights over the Soviet Union, serial nuclear saber-rattling, and Curtis LeMay’s nuclear-armed overflights of the Soviet Union — in other words, the not-so-abnormal stuff of a Cold War presidency.

And the idea that, to quote from Doris Kearns Goodwin, Eisenhower “could then take enormous pride in the fact that not a single soldier had died in combat during his time” is, well, unhinged.

National Review Online contributor Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the author, most recently, of The Savior Generals

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The New Yorker    JANUARY 23, 2014

dr-strangelove-still-580.jpg

This month marks the fiftieth anniversary of Stanley Kubrick’s black comedy about nuclear weapons, “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.” Released on January 29, 1964, the film caused a good deal of controversy. Its plot suggested that a mentally deranged American general could order a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, without consulting the President. One reviewer described the film as “dangerous … an evil thing about an evil thing.” Another compared it to Soviet propaganda. Although “Strangelove” was clearly a farce, with the comedian Peter Sellers playing three roles, it was criticized for being implausible. An expert at the Institute for Strategic Studies called the events in the film “impossible on a dozen counts.” A former Deputy Secretary of Defense dismissed the idea that someone could authorize the use of a nuclear weapon without the President’s approval: “Nothing, in fact, could be further from the truth.” (See a compendium of clips from the film.) When “Fail-Safe”—a Hollywood thriller with a similar plot, directed by Sidney Lumet—opened, later that year, it was criticized in much the same way. “The incidents in ‘Fail-Safe’ are deliberate lies!” General Curtis LeMay, the Air Force chief of staff, said. “Nothing like that could happen.” The first casualty of every war is the truth—and the Cold War was no exception to that dictum. Half a century after Kubrick’s mad general, Jack D. Ripper, launched a nuclear strike on the Soviets to defend the purity of “our precious bodily fluids” from Communist subversion, we now know that American officers did indeed have the ability to start a Third World War on their own. And despite the introduction of rigorous safeguards in the years since then, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation hasn’t been completely eliminated.

The command and control of nuclear weapons has long been plagued by an “always/never” dilemma. The administrative and technological systems that are necessary to insure that nuclear weapons are always available for use in wartime may be quite different from those necessary to guarantee that such weapons can never be used, without proper authorization, in peacetime. During the nineteen-fifties and sixties, the “always” in American war planning was given far greater precedence than the “never.” Through two terms in office, beginning in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower struggled with this dilemma. He wanted to retain Presidential control of nuclear weapons while defending America and its allies from attack. But, in a crisis, those two goals might prove contradictory, raising all sorts of difficult questions. What if Soviet bombers were en route to the United States but the President somehow couldn’t be reached? What if Soviet tanks were rolling into West Germany but a communications breakdown prevented NATOofficers from contacting the White House? What if the President were killed during a surprise attack on Washington, D.C., along with the rest of the nation’s civilian leadership? Who would order a nuclear retaliation then?

With great reluctance, Eisenhower agreed to let American officers use their nuclear weapons, in an emergency, if there were no time or no means to contact the President. Air Force pilots were allowed to fire their nuclear anti-aircraft rockets to shoot down Soviet bombers heading toward the United States. And about half a dozen high-level American commanders were allowed to use far more powerful nuclear weapons, without contacting the White House first, when their forces were under attack and “the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead.” Eisenhower worried that providing that sort of authorization in advance could make it possible for someone to do “something foolish down the chain of command” and start an all-out nuclear war. But the alternative—allowing an attack on the United States to go unanswered or NATO forces to be overrun—seemed a lot worse. Aware that his decision might create public unease about who really controlled America’s nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower insisted that his delegation of Presidential authority be kept secret. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he confessed to being “very fearful of having written papers on this matter.”

President John F. Kennedy was surprised to learn, just a few weeks after taking office, about this secret delegation of power. “A subordinate commander faced with a substantial military action,” Kennedy was told in a top-secret memo, “could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you.” Kennedy and his national-security advisers were shocked not only by the wide latitude given to American officers but also by the loose custody of the roughly three thousand American nuclear weapons stored in Europe. Few of the weapons had locks on them. Anyone who got hold of them could detonate them. And there was little to prevent NATO officers from Turkey, Holland, Italy, Great Britain, and Germany from using them without the approval of the United States.

In December, 1960, fifteen members of Congress serving on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had toured NATO bases to investigate how American nuclear weapons were being deployed. They found that the weapons—some of them about a hundred times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima—were routinely guarded, transported, and handled by foreign military personnel. American control of the weapons was practically nonexistent. Harold Agnew, a Los Alamos physicist who accompanied the group, was especially concerned to see German pilots sitting in German planes that were decorated with Iron Crosses—and carrying American atomic bombs. Agnew, in his own words, “nearly wet his pants” when he realized that a lone American sentry with a rifle was all that prevented someone from taking off in one of those planes and bombing the Soviet Union.

* * *

The Kennedy Administration soon decided to put locking devices inside NATO’s nuclear weapons. The coded electromechanical switches, known as “permissive action links” (PALs), would be placed on the arming lines. The weapons would be inoperable without the proper code—and that code would be shared with NATO allies only when the White House was prepared to fight the Soviets. The American military didn’t like the idea of these coded switches, fearing that mechanical devices installed to improve weapon safety would diminish weapon reliability. A top-secret State Department memo summarized the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961: “all is well with the atomic stockpile program and there is no need for any changes.”

After a crash program to develop the new control technology, during the mid-nineteen-sixties, permissive action links were finally placed inside most of the nuclear weapons deployed by NATO forces. But Kennedy’s directive applied only to the NATO arsenal. For years, the Air Force and the Navy blocked attempts to add coded switches to the weapons solely in their custody. During a national emergency, they argued, the consequences of not receiving the proper code from the White House might be disastrous. And locked weapons might play into the hands of Communist saboteurs. “The very existence of the lock capability,” a top Air Force general claimed, “would create a fail-disable potential for knowledgeable agents to ‘dud’ the entire Minuteman [missile] force.” The Joint Chiefs thought that strict military discipline was the best safeguard against an unauthorized nuclear strike. A two-man rule was instituted to make it more difficult for someone to use a nuclear weapon without permission. And a new screening program, the Human Reliability Program, was created to stop people with emotional, psychological, and substance-abuse problems from gaining access to nuclear weapons.

Despite public assurances that everything was fully under control, in the winter of 1964, while “Dr. Strangelove” was playing in theatres and being condemned as Soviet propaganda, there was nothing to prevent an American bomber crew or missile launch crew from using their weapons against the Soviets. Kubrick had researched the subject for years, consulted experts, and worked closely with a former R.A.F. pilot, Peter George, on the screenplay of the film. George’s novel about the risk of accidental nuclear war, “Red Alert,” was the source for most of “Strangelove” ’s plot. Unbeknownst to both Kubrick and George, a top official at the Department of Defense had already sent a copy of “Red Alert” to every member of the Pentagon’s Scientific Advisory Committee for Ballistic Missiles. At the Pentagon, the book was taken seriously as a cautionary tale about what might go wrong. Even Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara privately worried that an accident, a mistake, or a rogue American officer could start a nuclear war.

Coded switches to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons were finally added to the control systems of American missiles and bombers in the early nineteen-seventies. The Air Force was not pleased, and considered the new security measures to be an insult, a lack of confidence in its personnel. Although the Air Force now denies this claim, according to more than one source I contacted, the code necessary to launch a missile was set to be the same at every Minuteman site: 00000000.

* * *

The early permissive action links were rudimentary. Placed in NATO weapons during the nineteen-sixties and known as Category A PALs, the switches relied on a split four-digit code, with ten thousand possible combinations. If the United States went to war, two people would be necessary to unlock a nuclear weapon, each of them provided with half the code. Category A PALs were useful mainly to delay unauthorized use, to buy time after a weapon had been taken or to thwart an individual psychotic hoping to cause a large explosion. A skilled technician could open a stolen weapon and unlock it within a few hours. Today’s Category D PALs, installed in the Air Force’s hydrogen bombs, are more sophisticated. They require a six-digit code, with a million possible combinations, and have a limited-try feature that disables a weapon when the wrong code is repeatedly entered.

The Air Force’s land-based Minuteman III missiles and the Navy’s submarine-based Trident II missiles now require an eight-digit code—which is no longer 00000000—in order to be launched. The Minuteman crews receive the code via underground cables or an aboveground radio antenna. Sending the launch code to submarines deep underwater presents a greater challenge. Trident submarines contain two safes. One holds the keys necessary to launch a missile; the other holds the combination to the safe with the keys; and the combination to the safe holding the combination must be transmitted to the sub by very-low-frequency or extremely-low-frequency radio. In a pinch, if Washington, D.C., has been destroyed and the launch code doesn’t arrive, the sub’s crew can open the safes with a blowtorch.

The security measures now used to control America’s nuclear weapons are a vast improvement over those of 1964. But, like all human endeavors, they are inherently flawed. The Department of Defense’s Personnel Reliability Program is supposed to keep people with serious emotional or psychological issues away from nuclear weapons—and yet two of the nation’s top nuclear commanders were recently removed from their posts. Neither appears to be the sort of calm, stable person you want with a finger on the button. In fact, their misbehavior seems straight out of “Strangelove.”

Vice Admiral Tim Giardina, the second-highest-ranking officer at the U.S. Strategic Command—the organization responsible for all of America’s nuclear forces—-was investigated last summer for allegedly using counterfeit gambling chips at the Horseshoe Casino in Council Bluffs, Iowa. According to the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, “a significant monetary amount” of counterfeit chips was involved. Giardina was relieved of his command on October 3, 2013. A few days later, Major General Michael Carey, the Air Force commander in charge of America’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, was fired for conduct “unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.” According to a report by the Inspector General of the Air Force, Carey had consumed too much alcohol during an official trip to Russia, behaved rudely toward Russian officers, spent time with “suspect” young foreign women in Moscow, loudly discussed sensitive information in a public hotel lounge there, and drunkenly pleaded to get onstage and sing with a Beatles cover band at La Cantina, a Mexican restaurant near Red Square. Despite his requests, the band wouldn’t let Carey onstage to sing or to play the guitar.

While drinking beer in the executive lounge at Moscow’s Marriott Aurora during that visit, General Carey made an admission with serious public-policy implications. He off-handedly told a delegation of U.S. national-security officials that his missile-launch officers have the “worst morale in the Air Force.” Recent events suggest that may be true. In the spring of 2013, nineteen launch officers at Minot Air Force base in North Dakota were decertified for violating safety rules and poor discipline. In August, 2013, the entire missile wing at Malmstrom Air Force base in Montana failed its safety inspection. Last week, the Air Force revealed that thirty-four launch officers at Malmstrom had been decertified for cheating on proficiency exams—and that at least three launch officers are being investigated for illegal drug use. The findings of a report by the RAND Corporation, leaked to the A.P., were equally disturbing. The study found that the rates of spousal abuse and court martials among Air Force personnel with nuclear responsibilities are much higher than those among people with other jobs in the Air Force. “We don’t care if things go properly,” a launch officer told RAND. “We just don’t want to get in trouble.”

The most unlikely and absurd plot element in “Strangelove” is the existence of a Soviet “Doomsday Machine.” The device would trigger itself, automatically, if the Soviet Union were attacked with nuclear weapons. It was meant to be the ultimate deterrent, a threat to destroy the world in order to prevent an American nuclear strike. But the failure of the Soviets to tell the United States about the contraption defeats its purpose and, at the end of the film, inadvertently causes a nuclear Armageddon. “The whole point of the Doomsday Machine is lost,” Dr. Strangelove, the President’s science adviser, explains to the Soviet Ambassador, “if you keep it a secret!”

A decade after the release of “Strangelove,” the Soviet Union began work on the Perimeter system—-a network of sensors and computers that could allow junior military officials to launch missiles without oversight from the Soviet leadership. Perhaps nobody at the Kremlin had seen the film. Completed in 1985, the system was known as the Dead Hand. Once it was activated, Perimeter would order the launch of long-range missiles at the United States if it detected nuclear detonations on Soviet soil and Soviet leaders couldn’t be reached. Like the Doomsday Machine in “Strangelove,” Perimeter was kept secret from the United States; its existence was not revealed until years after the Cold War ended.

In retrospect, Kubrick’s black comedy provided a far more accurate description of the dangers inherent in nuclear command-and-control systems than the ones that the American people got from the White House, the Pentagon, and the mainstream media.

“This is absolute madness, Ambassador,” President Merkin Muffley says in the film, after being told about the Soviets’ automated retaliatory system. “Why should you build such a thing?” Fifty years later, that question remains unanswered, and “Strangelove” seems all the more brilliant, bleak, and terrifyingly on the mark.

You can read Eric Schlosser’s guide to the long-secret documents that help explain the risks America took with its nuclear arsenal, and watch and read his deconstruction of clips from “Dr. Strangelove” and from a little-seen film about permissive action links.

Eric Schlosser is the author of “Command and Control.”

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La América de John F. Kennedy

Por: Julián Casanova

El país  | 21 de noviembre de 2013

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John F. Kennedy y su esposa, Jackie, en Dallas momentos antes del magnicidio. / ken features

Lo escribió Martin Luther King en su autobiografía: “Aunque la pregunta “¿Quién mató al presidente Kennedy?” es importante, la pregunta “¿Qué lo mató”? es más importante”.

En realidad, 1963 fue un año de numerosos asesinatos políticos en Estados Unidos, la mayoría de dirigentes negros. Y en esa década fue asesinado Malcolm X, en Harlem, Nueva York, el 21 de febrero de 1965, por uno de sus antiguos seguidores, en un momento en el que estaba rompiendo con los líderes más radicales de su movimiento. El 4 de abril de 1968, en el balcón de su habitación del hotel Loraine, en Memphis, Tennessee, un solo disparo acabó con la vida de Martin Luther King. Dos meses más tarde, el 6 de junio, tras un discurso triunfante en California en su campaña para ganar la candidatura por el Partido Demócrata, otro asesino se llevó la del senador Robert F. Kennedy. “No votaré”, declaró un negro neoyorquino en una encuesta: “Matan a todos los hombres buenos que tenemos”.

Todo ocurrió de forma muy rápida, en una década de protestas masivas y de desobediencia civil que precedió al asesinato de JFK. Estados Unidos era entonces la primera potencia militar y económica del mundo, en la que, sin embargo, prevalecía todavía el racismo, una herencia de la esclavitud que esa sociedad tan rica y democrática no había sabido eliminar. Millones de norteamericanos de otras razas diferentes a la blanca se topaban en la vida cotidiana con una aguda discriminación en el trabajo, en la educación, en la política y en la concesión de los derechos legales.

Montgomery, Alabama, la antigua capital de la Confederación durante la guerra civil de los años sesenta del siglo XIX, a donde se trasladó Luther King en octubre de 1954 para ocupar su primer trabajo como pastor y predicador de la iglesia baptista, constituía un excelente ejemplo de cómo la vida de los negros estaba gobernada por los arbitrarios caprichos y voluntades del poder blanco. La mayoría de sus 50.000 habitantes negros trabajaban como criados al servicio de la comunidad blanca, compuesta por 70.000 habitantes, y apenas 2.000 de ellos podían ejercer el derecho al voto en las elecciones. Allí, en Montgomery, en esa pequeña ciudad del sur profundo, donde nada parecía moverse, comenzaron a cambiar las cosas el 1 de diciembre de 1955.

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Rosa Parks, en un autubús de Montgomery. / AP

Ese día por la tarde, Rosa Parks, una costurera de 42 años, cogió el autobús desde el trabajo a casa, se sentó en los asientos reservados por la ley a los blancos y cuando el conductor le ordenó levantarse para cedérselo a un hombre blanco que estaba de pie, se negó. Dijo no porque, tal y como lo recordaba después Martin Luther King, no aguantaba más humillaciones y eso es lo que le pedía “su sentido de dignidad y autoestima”. Rosa Parks fue detenida y comenzó un boicot espontáneo a ese sistema segregacionista que regía en los autobuses de la ciudad. Uno de sus promotores, E.D. Nixon, pidió al joven pastor baptista, casi nuevo en la ciudad, que se uniera a la protesta. Y ese fue el bautismo de Martin Luther King como líder del movimiento de los derechos civiles. Unos días después, en una iglesia abarrotada de gente, King avanzó hacia el púlpito y comenzó “el discurso más decisivo” de su vida. Y les dijo que estaban allí porque eran ciudadanos norteamericanos y amaban la democracia, que la raza negra estaba ya harta “de ser pisoteada por el pie de hierro de la opresión”, que estaban dispuestos a luchar y combatir “hasta que la justicia corra como el agua”.

Los trece meses que duró el boicot alumbraron un nuevo movimiento social. Aunque sus dirigentes fueron predicadores negros y después estudiantes universitarios, su auténtica fuerza surgió de la capacidad de movilizar a decenas de miles de trabajadores negros. Una minoría racial, dominada y casi invisible, lideró un amplio repertorio de protestas –boicots, marchas a las cárceles, ocupaciones pacíficas de edificios…- que puso al descubierto la hipocresía del segregacionismo y abrió el camino a una cultura cívica más democrática. La conquista del voto por los negros sería, según percibió desde el principio Martin Luther King, “la llave para la solución completa del problema del sur”.

Pero la libertad y la dignidad para millones de negros no podía ganarse sin un desafío fundamental a la distribución existente del poder. La estrategia de desobediencia civil no violenta, predicada y puesta en práctica por Martin Luther King hasta su muerte, encontró muchos obstáculos.

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Luther King se dirige a los asistentes a la Marcha de Washington el 28 de agosto de 1963. / france press

A John Fitzgerald Kennedy, ganador de las elecciones presidenciales de noviembre de 1960, el reconocimiento de los derechos civiles le creó numerosos problemas con los congresistas blancos del sur y trató por todos los medios de evitar que se convirtiera en el tema dominante de la política nacional. No lo consiguió, porque antes de que fuera asesinado en Dallas, Texas, el 22 de noviembre de 1963, el movimiento se había extendido a las ciudades más importantes del norte del país y había protagonizado una multitudinaria marcha a Washington en agosto de ese año, la manifestación política más importante de la historia de Estados Unidos.

No fue todo un camino de rosas. La batalla contra el racismo se llenó de rencores y odios, dejando cientos de muertos y miles de heridos. La violencia racial no era una fenómeno nuevo en la sociedad norteamericana. Pero hasta el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, esa violencia había sido protagonizada por grupos de blancos armados que atacaban a los negros y por el Ku Klux Klan, la organización terrorista establecida en el sur precisamente para impedir la concesión de derechos legales a los ciudadanos negros. En los disturbios de los años sesenta, por el contrario, muchos negros respondieron a la discriminación y a la represión policial con asaltos a las propiedades de los blancos, incendios y saqueos. Las versiones oficiales y muchos periódicos culparon de la violencia y de los derramamientos de sangre a pequeños grupos de agitadores radicales, aunque posteriores investigaciones revelaron que la mayoría de las víctimas fueron negros que murieron por los disparos de las fuerzas gubernamentales.

Con tanta violencia, la estrategia pacífica de Martin Luther King parecía tambalearse. Y frente a ella surgieron nuevos dirigentes negros con visiones alternativas. El más carismático fue un hombre llamado Malcolm X, que había visto de niño cómo el Ku Klux Klan incendiaba su casa y mataba a su padre, un predicador baptista, y que se había convertido al islamismo después de una larga estancia en prisión. Criticó el movimiento a favor de los derechos civiles, despreció la estrategia de la no violencia y sostuvo una agria disputa con Martin Luther King, al que llamó “traidor al pueblo negro”. King deploró su “oratoria demagógica” y dijo estar convencido de que era ese racismo tan enfermo y profundo el que alimentaba figuras como Malcolm X. Cuando éste fue asesinado, King recordó de nuevo que “la violencia y el odio sólo engendran violencia y odio”.

Los negros sabían muy bien qué eran los asesinatos políticos. Cuando subió al poder, John F. Kennedy no conocía a muchos negros. Pero tuvo que abordar el problema, el más acuciante de la sociedad estadounidense. Hubo dos Kennedys, como también recordó Luther King. El presionado y acuciado, durante sus dos primeros años de mandato, por la incertidumbre causada por la dura campaña electoral y su escaso margen de victoria sobre Richard Nixon en 1960; y el que tuvo el coraje, desde 1963, de convertirse en un defensor de los derechos civiles.

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Marines cruzando un río en Vietnam el 30 de octubre de 1968. / agencia keystone

Pero si todos esos conflictos sobre los derechos civiles revelaban algunas de las enfermedades de aquella sociedad, la política exterior, desde la crisis de los misiles en Cuba hasta la guerra de Vietnam, sacó a la superficie las tensiones inherentes a los esfuerzos de Kennedy por manejar el imperio. Kennedy decidió demostrar al mundo el poder estadounidense y comenzó a convertir a Vietnam en el territorio idóneo para destruir al enemigo. Kennedy no lo vio, pero la guerra que siguió a su muerte fue el desastre más grande de la historia de Estados Unidos en el siglo XX.

“Hemos creado una atmósfera en la que la violencia y el odio se han convertido en pasatiempos populares”, escribió Luther King en el epitafio que le dedicó al presidente. El asesinato de Kennedy no sólo mató a un hombre, sino a un montón de “ilusiones”. Cuando se conoció su muerte, en muchos sitios, en medio del duelo general, se escuchó la Dance of the Blessed Spirits. Cuando asesinaron a Luther King, casi cinco años después, la rabia y la violencia se propagaron en forma de disturbios por más de un centenar de ciudades, el final amargo de una era de sueños y esperanzas. Lo dijo su padre, el predicador baptista que le había inculcado los valores de la dignidad y de la justicia: “Fue el odio en esta tierra el que me quitó a mi hijo”.

, catedrático de Historia Contemporánea de la Universidad de Zaragoza, defiende, como Eric J. Hobsbawm, que los historiadores son “los ‘recordadores’ profesionales de lo que los ciudadanos desean olvidar”. Es autor de una veintena de libros sobre anarquismo, Guerra Civil y siglo XX.

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Otros punto de vista sobre JFK

Joseph Nye

El país, 20 de noviembre de 2013

El 22 de noviembre se cumplirán 50 años del asesinato del presidente John F. Kennedy. Fue uno de esos acontecimientos tan estremecedores, que las personas que lo vivieron se acuerdan dónde estaban cuando supieron la noticia. Yo estaba bajando del tren en Nairobi cuando vi el dramático encabezado. Kennedy tenía tan solo 46 años cuando Lee Harvey Oswald lo asesinó en Dallas. Oswald era un ex marino descontento que había desertado a la Unión Soviética. Aunque su vida estuvo llena de enfermedades, Kennedy proyectaba una imagen de juventud y vigor, que hicieron más dramática y patética su muerte.

El martirio de Kennedy hizo que muchos estadounidenses lo elevaran al nivel de grandes presidentes, como George Washington y Abraham Lincoln, pero los historiadores son más reservados en sus evaluaciones. Sus críticos hacen referencia a su conducta sexual a veces imprudente, a su escaso récord legislativo y a su incapacidad para ser congruente con sus palabras. Si bien Kennedy hablaba de derechos civiles, reducciones de los impuestos y de la pobreza; fue su sucesor, Lyndon Johnson, el que utilizó la condición de mártir de Kennedy –aunado a sus muy superiores habilidades políticas– para pasar leyes históricas sobre estos temas.

En una encuesta de 2009 de especialistas sobre 65 presidentes estadounidenses JKF es considerado el sexto más importante, mientras que en una encuesta reciente realizada por expertos británicos en política estadounidense, Kennedy obtiene el lugar quince. Estas clasificaciones son sobresalientes para un presidente que estuvo en el cargo menos de tres años. Sin embargo, ¿qué logró verdaderamente Kennedy y cuán diferente habría sido la historia si hubiera sobrevivido?

En mi libro, Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era, clasifico los presidentes en dos categorías: aquellos que fueron transformadores en la definición de sus objetivos, que actuaron con gran visión en cuanto a importantes cambios; y los líderes operativos, que se centran sobre todo en aspectos “prácticos”, para garantizar que todo marchaba sobre ruedas (y correctamente). Como era un activista y con grandes dones de comunicación con un estilo inspirador, Kennedy parecía ser un presidente transformador. Su campaña en 1960 se desarrolló bajo la promesa de “hacer que el país avance de nuevo”.

En su discurso de toma de posesión, Kennedy llamó a hacer esfuerzos (“No hay que preguntarse qué puede hacer el país por mí, sino que puedo hacer yo por mi país”). Creó programas como el Cuerpo de Paz y la Alianza para el Progreso para América Latina; además, preparó a su país para enviar al hombre a la luna a finales de los años sesenta. Sin embargo, a pesar de su activismo y retórica, Kennedy tenía una personalidad más precavida que ideológica. Como señaló el historiador de presidentes, Fred Greenstein, “Kennedy tenía muy poca perspectiva global.”

En lugar de criticar a Kennedy por no cumplir lo que dijo, deberíamos agradecerle que en situaciones difíciles actuaba con prudencia y sentido práctico y no de forma ideológica y transformadora. Su logro más importante durante su breve mandato fue el manejo de la crisis de los misiles de Cuba en 1962, y apaciguamiento de lo que fue probablemente el episodio más peligroso desde el comienzo de la era nuclear.

Sin duda se puede culpar a Kennedy por el desastre de la invasión a Bahía de Cochinos en Cuba y la subsiguiente Operación Mangosta, el esfuerzo encubierto de la CIA contra el régimen de Castro, que hizo pensar a la Unión Soviética de que su aliado estaba bajo amenaza. Sin embargo, Kennedy aprendió de su derrota en Bahía de Cochinos y creó un procedimiento detallado para controlar la crisis que vino después de que la Unión Soviética emplazara misiles nucleares en Cuba.

Muchos de los asesores de Kennedy, así como líderes militares de los Estados Unidos, querían una invasión y un ataque aéreo, que ahora sabemos podrían haber hecho que los comandantes soviéticos en el terreno usaran sus armas nucleares tácticas. En cambio, Kennedy ganó tiempo y mantuvo abiertas sus opciones mientras negociaba una solución para la crisis con el líder soviético, Nikita Khrushchev. A juzgar por los duros comentarios del vicepresidente de la época, Lyndon Johnson, el resultado habría sido mucho peor si Kennedy no hubiera sido el presidente.

Además, Kennedy también aprendió de la crisis cubana de misiles: el 10 de junio de 1963 dio un discurso destinado a apaciguar las tensiones de la Guerra Fría. Señaló, “hablo de paz, por lo tanto, como el fin racional necesario del ser humano racional”. Si bien una visión presidencial de paz no era nueva, Kennedy le dio seguimiento mediante la negociación del primer acuerdo de control de armas nucleares, el Tratado de prohibición parcial de los ensayos nucleares.

La gran pregunta sin respuesta sobre la presidencia de Kennedy y cómo su asesinato afectó la política exterior estadounidense, es ¿qué habría hecho él en cuanto a la guerra en Vietnam? Cuando Kennedy llegó a la presidencia los Estados Unidos había algunos cientos de asesores en Vietnam del sur; pero ese número aumentó a 16.000. Johnson finalmente incrementó las tropas estadounidenses a más de 500.000.

Muchos partidarios de Kennedy sostienen que él nunca habría cometido ese error. Aunque respaldó un golpe para sustituir al presidente de Vietnam del sur, Ngo Dinh Diem, y dejó a Johnson una situación deteriorada y un grupo de asesores que recomendaban no retirarse. Algunos seguidores fervientes de Kennedy –por ejemplo, el historiador Arthur Schlesinger, y el asesor de discursos de Kennedy, Theodore Sorensen– han señalado que Kennedy planeaba retirarse de Vietnam después de ganar la reelección en 1964, y sostenían que había comentado su plan al senador, Mike Mansfield. No obstante, los escépticos mencionan que Kennedy siempre habló públicamente de la necesidad de permanecer en Vietnam. La pregunta sigue abierta.

En mi opinión, Kennedy fue un buen presidente pero no extraordinario. Lo que lo distinguía no era solo su habilidad para inspirar a otros, sino su cautela cuando se trataba de tomar decisiones complejas de política exterior. Tuvimos la suerte de que tuviera más sentido práctico que transformador en lo que se refiere a política exterior. Para nuestra mala suerte lo perdimos tras solo mil días.

Joseph S. Nye es profesor de la Universidad de Harvard y autor de Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era.

Traducción de Kena Nequiz

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