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Posts Tagged ‘Watergate’

Mañana 27 de mayo de 2023, Henry A. Kissinger cumplirá cien años de vida. Tal efemeride ha provocado una gran atención mediática y académica. Y no es para menos, pues Kissinger es una de las figuras más controversiales  de la historia de Estados Unidos. Por ocho años dirigió la politica  exterior estadounidense, primero como asesor de seguridad nacional de Nixon, y luego como Secretario de Estado de Ford. Sobrevivió inmacualado al escandalo de Watergate para convertirse en una figura venerada por muchos, que le consideran un gran hombre de Estado. Sin embargo, tras esa imagen se esconden sombras muy tenebrosas que llevan a muchos a denunciarle como uno de los peores criminales de guerra de la Historia. Quienes así le describen le acusan de ser responsable –directo o indirecto– de la muerte de millones personas. Entre las víctimas de su real politik y su maquiavelismo, destacan millones de camboyanos, masacrados durante cuatro años de bombardeos ilegales. Pero la lista es más extensa e incluye a vietnamitas, angoleños, chilenos, argentinos, timorenses, sahuaries y, especialmente, estadounidenses. A esto últimos los sacrificó alargando innecesariamente el conflicto indochino en el que la arrogancia imperial  atrapó a Estados Unidos por más de dos décadas.

Uno de los analistas más críticos de la figura de Kissinger es el historiador Greg Grandin. En este artículo publicado en la revista The Nation, Grandin desmitifica la figura de Kissinger, recordándonos el triste papel que éste jugó saboteando un acuerdo de paz que pudo haber acabado con la guerra de Vietnam en 1968. Grandin también examina actuación de Kissinger en el proceso que culminó en  el escándalo Watergate, cuestionando la idea generalizada de que el Secretario de Estado no tuvo nada que ver con los crímenes que llevaron a la destrucción de su jefe Richard M. Nixon.

Grandin nos retrata a Kissinger como un personaje siniestro y manipulador, dispuesto a todo por llegar y mantenerse en el poder.

El Dr. Grandin es profesor de historia en la Universidad de Yale y autor, entre otros trabajos, de Kissinger’s Shadow The Long Reach of America’s Most Controversial Statesman (McMillan, 2015).


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 Richard M. Nixon, Henry Kissinger y el Coronel Alexander M. Haig Jr., 1972.

A sus 100 años Kissinger sigue si enfrentar la justicia

Greg Gradin

The Nation   25 de mayo de 2023

Henry Kissinger debería haber caído con el resto de ellos: Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, Dean y Nixon. Sus huellas dactilares estaban por todo Watergate. Sin embargo, sobrevivió en gran medida manipulando a la prensa. Hasta 1968, Kissinger había sido Republicano del grupo de Nelson Rockefeller, aunque también se desempeñó como asesor del Departamento de Estado en la administración Johnson. Kissinger quedó atónito por la derrota de Rockefeller ante Richard Nixon en las primarias; según los periodistas Marvin y Bernard Kalb, “lloró”. Kissinger creía que Nixon era “el más peligroso, de todos los hombres que se postulaban a la presidencia”. Sin embargo, no pasó mucho tiempo antes de que Kissinger entrara en contacto con la gente de Nixon, ofreciendo usar sus contactos en la Casa Blanca de Johnson para filtrar información sobre las conversaciones de paz con Vietnam del Norte. Todavía profesor de Harvard, trató directamente con el asesor de política exterior de Nixon, Richard V. Allen, quien en una entrevista concedida al University of Virginia Miller Center dijo que Kissinger, “por su cuenta”, se ofreció a transmitir información que había recibido de un asistente que asistía a las conversaciones de paz. Allen describió a Kissinger como actuando muy de capa y espada, llamándolo desde teléfonos públicos y hablando en alemán para informar sobre lo que había sucedido durante las conversaciones.

A finales de octubre, Kissinger le informó a la campaña de Nixon: “En París están descorchando el champán”. Horas más tarde, el presidente Johnson suspendió los bombardeos. Un acuerdo de paz podría haber empujado la candidatura presidencial de Hubert Humphrey, quien se estaba acercando a Nixon en las encuestas, a la cima. La gente de Nixon actuó rápidamente: instaron a los vietnamitas del sur a descarrilar las conversaciones.

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A través de escuchas telefónicas e interceptaciones, el presidente Johnson se enteró de que la campaña de Nixon le estaba diciendo a los vietnamitas del sur “que esperaran hasta después de las elecciones”. Si la Casa Blanca hubiera hecho pública esta información, la indignación pudo haber inclinado la elección a favor de Humphrey. Pero Johnson dudó. “Esto es traición”, dijo, citado en el excelente libro de Ken Hughes Chasing Shadows: The Nixon Tapes, the Chennault Affair, and the Origins of Watergate, “sacudiría al mundo”.

Johnson permaneció en silencio. Nixon ganó. La guerra continuó.

Esa October Surprise (sorpresa de octubre) inició una cadena de eventos que conducirían a la caída de Nixon.  Kissinger, que había sido nombrado Asesor de Seguridad Nacional, aconsejó a Nixon que ordenara el bombardeo de Camboya para presionar a Hanoi a regresar a la mesa de negociaciones. Nixon y Kissinger estaban desesperados por reanudar las conversaciones que habían ayudado a sabotear, y su desesperación se manifestó en ferocidad. “’Salvaje’ era una palabra que se usaba una y otra vez” para discutir lo que había que hacer en el sudeste asiático, recordó uno de los ayudantes de Kissinger. Bombardear Camboya (un país con el que Estados Unidos no estaba en guerra), lo que eventualmente rompería el país y conduciría al surgimiento de los Jemeres Rojos, era ilegal. Así que tenía que hacerse en secreto. La presión para mantenerlo en secreto extendió la paranoia dentro de la administración, lo que llevó a Kissinger y Nixon a pedirle a J. Edgar Hoover que interviniera los teléfonos de los funcionarios de la administración. La filtración de los Papeles del Pentágono de Daniel Ellsberg hizo que Kissinger entrara en pánico. Temía que, dado que Ellsberg tenía acceso a los periódicos, también podría saber lo que Kissinger estaba haciendo en Camboya.

El lunes 14 de junio de 1971, el día después de que The New York Times publicara su primera historia sobre los Papeles del Pentágono, Kissinger explotó, gritando: “Esto destruirá totalmente la credibilidad estadounidense para siempre … Destruirá nuestra capacidad de conducir la política exterior con confianza. Ningún gobierno extranjero volverá a confiar en nosotros”.

“Sin el estímulo de Henry”, escribió John Ehrlichman en sus memorias, Witness to Power, “el presidente y el resto de nosotros podríamos haber llegado a la conclusión de que los documentos eran un problema de Lyndon Johnson, no nuestro”. Kissinger “avivó la llama de Richard Nixon al rojo vivo”.

¿Por qué? Kissinger acababa de comenzar las negociaciones para restablecer las relaciones con China y temía que el escándalo pudiera sabotearlas. Haciendo clave su actuación para despertar los resentimientos de Nixon, describió a Ellsberg como inteligente, subversivo, promiscuo, perverso y privilegiado: “Ahora se ha casado con una chica muy rica”, le dijo Kissinger a Nixon. Comenzaron a animarse mutuamente”, recordó Bob Haldeman (citado en la biografía de Kissinger de Walter Isaacson), “hasta que ambos estaban en un frenesí”. Si Ellsberg sale ileso, Kissinger le dijo a Nixon, “muestra que usted es un débil, señor presidente”, lo que llevó a Nixon a establecer los Plumbers (los Plomeros), la unidad clandestina que realizaba escuchas y robos, incluso en la sede del Comité Nacional Demócrata en el Complejo Watergate.

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Rockefeller, Ford y Kissinger 

Seymour Hersh, Bob Woodward y Carl Bernstein presentaron historias que apuntaban a Kissinger como parte de la primera ronda de escuchas telefónicas ilegales, establecidas por la Casa Blanca en la primavera de 1969 para mantener en secreto su bombardeo de Camboya.

Aterrizando en Austria de camino a Oriente Medio en junio de 1974 y descubriendo que la prensa había publicado más historias y editoriales poco halagadores sobre él, Kissinger celebró una conferencia de prensa improvisada y amenazó con renunciar. Fue a todas luces una fanfarronada. “Cuando se escriba el récord”, dijo, aparentemente al borde de las lágrimas, “se podrá recordar que tal vez se salvaron algunas vidas y tal vez algunas madres pueden descansar más tranquilas, pero eso se lo dejo a la historia. Lo que no dejaré a la historia es una discusión sobre mi honor público”.

El truco funcionó. “Parecía totalmente auténtico”, dijo la revista New York. Como si retrocedieran ante su propia tenacidad repentina al exponer los crímenes de Nixon, los reporteros y presentadores de noticias se unieron en torno a Kissinger. Mientras que el resto de la Casa Blanca se reveló como un grupo de matones, Kissinger siguió siendo alguien en quien Estados Unidos podía creer. “Estábamos medio convencidos de que nada estaba más allá de la capacidad de este hombre notable”, dijo Ted Koppel de ABC News en un documental de 1974, describiendo a Kissinger como “el hombre más admirado de Estados Unidos”. Era, agregó Koppel, “lo mejor que teníamos”.

Ahora sabemos mucho más sobre los otros crímenes de Kissinger, el inmenso sufrimiento que causó durante sus años como funcionario público. Dio luz verde a golpes de estado y permitió genocidios. Les dijo a los dictadores que hicieran sus asesinatos y torturas rápidamente, vendió a los kurdos y dirigió la operación fallida para secuestrar al general chileno Ren. Schneider (con la esperanza de descarrilar la toma de posesión del presidente Salvador Allende), que resultó en el asesinato de Schneider. Su giro posterior a Vietnam hacia el Medio Oriente dejó a esa región en caos, preparando el escenario para las crisis que continúan afligiendo a la humanidad.

Kissinger's ShadowSin embargo, sabemos poco sobre lo que vino después, durante sus cuatro décadas de trabajo con Kissinger Associates. La “lista de clientes” de la firma ha sido uno de los documentos más buscados en Washington desde al menos 1989, cuando el senador Jesse Helms exigió sin éxito verla antes de considerar confirmar a Lawrence Eagleburger (un protegido y empleado de Kissinger Associates) como Subsecretario de Estado. Más tarde, Kissinger renunció como presidente de la Comisión 9/11 en lugar de entregar la lista para su revisión pública. Kissinger Associates fue uno de los primeros actores en la ola de privatizaciones que tuvo lugar después del final de la Guerra Fría, en la antigua Unión Soviética, Europa del Este y América Latina, ayudando a crear una nueva clase oligárquica internacional. Kissinger había utilizado los contactos que hizo como funcionario público para fundar una de las empresas más lucrativas del mundo. Luego, habiendo escapado de la mancha de Watergate, utilizó su reputación como sabio de la política exterior para influir en el debate público, en beneficio, podemos suponer, de sus clientes. Kissinger fue un entusiasta defensor de ambas Guerras del Golfo, y trabajó estrechamente con el presidente Clinton para impulsar el TLCAN a través del Congreso. La firma también hizo un libro sobre las políticas implementadas por Kissinger. En 1975, como secretario de Estado, Kissinger ayudó a Union Carbide a establecer su planta química en Bhopal, trabajando con el gobierno indio y asegurando fondos de los Estados Unidos. Después del desastre de la fuga química de la planta en 1984, Kissinger Associates representó a Union Carbide, negociando un miserable acuerdo extrajudicial para las víctimas de la fuga, que causó casi 4,000 muertes inmediatas y expuso a otro medio millón de personas a gases tóxicos. Hace unos años, mucha fanfarria asistió a la donación de Kissinger de sus documentos públicos a Yale. Pero nunca sabremos la mayor parte de lo que su empresa ha estado haciendo en Rusia, China, India, Medio Oriente y otros lugares. Se llevará esos secretos con él cuando se vaya.

Traducido por Norberto Barreto Velázquez

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Los días 30 de abril y 1 de mayo de 2021, la Universidad de Massachussets-Amherst celebró una conferencia virtual para conmemorar los cincuenta años de la publicación de los famosos Pentagon Papers (Papeles del Pentágono). Esta colección de documentos sobre la intervención de Estados Unidos en Indochina entre 1945 y 1967, fue creada a instancias del entonces Secretario de Defensa Robert McNamara. Filtrados por un funcionario del Pentágono llamado Daniel Ellsberg al New York Times en 1971, los documentos dejaban claro cómo el gobierno estadounidense había mentido sistemáticamente sobre el desarrollo de la guerra en Vietnam tanto al público como al Congreso de Estados Unidos. Tan controversial era el contenido de estos documentos que Richard M. Nixon buscó bloquear su publicación, lo que fue evitado por una decisión histórica de la Corte Suprema en junio de 1972, reafirmando la libertad de prensa en Estados Unidos.

La conferencia celebrada por UMASS-Armherts, titulada Truth, Dissent, & the Legacy of Daniel Ellsberg,  reunió a un grupo de historiadores, periodistas, activistas y «whistleblowers», quienes exploraron temas que han ocupado una parte importante en la vida Ellsberg: la guerra de Vietnam, las armas nucleares, la resistencia antibélica, los Papeles del Pentágono, Watergate, el «whistleblowing» y las guerras del siglo XXI.

En el panel plenario participaron Ellsberg y Edward Snowden, y fue moderado por la periodista Amy Goodman.

Todas las conferencias están disponlbles de forma gratuita en la página del Ellsberg Archive Project.

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El David Bruce Centre for American Studies de la Keele University en Inglaterra, acaba de anunicar el inicio de su ciclo de conferencias virtuales.  Estas son completamente gratuitas y abordarán temas muy diversos de la historia estadouidense. Entre ellas destaca, dado el contexto electoral actual, la charla que dictará el Dr. Adam Fairclough sobre la elección de 1876, tal vez la más controversial en la historia de Estados Unidos. Comparto con mis lectores el programa de este ciclo de conferencias.


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David Bruce Centre for American Studies Seminar Programme

Semester 1, 2020/21

October 14, 2020

Dr Patrick Andelic, Northumbria University

‘We Came Here To Take the Bastille’: The Watergate Babies and the Democratic Party in Congress after 1974

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November 4, 2020

Dr Rebecca Macklin, Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at the Penn Program in Environmental Humanities and Bruce Centre Research Fellow

Relationality as Decolonial Method: Reading Resistance Across Native American and South African Literatures

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November 18, 2020

Prof. Adam Fairclough. Leiden University (Emeritus)

Parade of Perjurers: The Potter Committee and the Stolen Elections of 1876

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 November 25, 2020

Dr Maria Flood, Keele University

‘The film we’ve been waiting for’: Audience, Emotion, and Black Boyhood iMoonlight (2016)

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Unless otherwise stated, seminars are held virtually on Microsoft Teams at 2.15pm.  If you wish to attend a seminar, please use the hyperlink under each speaker’s paper title, or contact the DBC director, Dr David Ballantyne (d.t.ballantyne@keele.ac.uk).

 

 

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impeachmentEl actual proceso de residenciamiento del Presidente Donald J. Trump ha provocado una serie de interrogantes no sólo políticas, sino también históricas. Debe recordarse que en más de doscientos años de historia de la república estadounidense, esta es la tercera vez que un residente de la Casa Blanca es residenciado (el triste honor lo comparten Adrew Johnson y William J. (Bill) Clinton).

El residenciamento de Trump contiene un elemento innovador, pues las acusaciones en su contra provienen de un informe redactado por un agente de inteligencia, preocupado por el comportamiento del Presidente y sus implicancias para la seguridad nacional de los Estados Unidos. Las denuncias de este whistle-blower (informante) podrían costarle la presidencia al magnate neoyorquino.

En el siguiente texto, la periodista Olivia B. Waxman analiza el origen de esta frase y el papel que han jugado los informantes en la historia estadounidense.


Before the Trump Impeachment Inquiry, These Were American History’s Most Famous Whistle-Blowers

Olivia B. Waxman

The episode that now has President Donald Trump staring down a House impeachment inquiry began, as many important moments in American history have, with a whistle-blower.

A U.S. intelligence official has accused Trump of urging Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to seek out evidence of wrongdoing on the part of former Vice President Joe Biden, the frontrunner to face Trump in the 2020 presidential election. The claim relates to calls that took place in July and August, and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Michael Atkinson alerted House Intelligence Committee chair Adam Schiff about the complaint on Sept. 9.

Trump has called the conversation he had with Zelensky a “very friendly and totally appropriate call,” but as Director of National Intelligence Joseph Maguire testifies before the House Intelligence Committee on Thursday, the whistle-blower’s complaint has been made public — and it will be up to lawmakers to decide if they agree.

Trump-Zelensky

While the whistle-blower’s identity is still not publicly known, he or she has been praised in the court of public opinion. Former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe hailed the decision to bring the complaint as an act of “incredible courage.”

America’s history with whistle-blowers is as old as the country itself, but the popular idea that they are courageous hasn’t meant whistle-blowing isn’t still risky, says Tom Mueller, author of Crisis of Conscience: Whistleblowing in an Age of Fraud, out Oct. 1. And in the intelligence community, where sharing secrets is a loaded idea, whistle-blowing is even more complicated.

The origins of the term “whistle-blower” are murky — one theory holds that it’s a reference to the whistle blown by British policemen when they saw foul play, and another says it’s a sports reference to the whistles blown by referees — but the principle dates back to medieval England by way of Roman law. Central to the existence of whistle-blowers is the concept that sometimes individuals, not governments or law-enforcement, need to be the ones who raise the alarm about wrongdoing.

At a time when there was no national police force, people who noticed transgressions could report them to the King’s representatives, under what was known as the qui tam provision. (That name comes from the phrase Qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, meaning “He who sues on behalf of our Lord the King and on his own behalf.”) To incentivize this kind of whistle-blowing, and in recognition of the negative social consequences that might come with it, the government made it a lucrative proposition: if a conviction followed, the person who did the reporting got some of the bounty. The earliest known example of the application of qui tam is King Wihtred of Kent’s 695 declaration: “If a freeman works during the forbidden time [i.e., the Sabbath], he shall forfeit his healsfang [i.e., pay a fine in lieu of imprisonment], and the man who informs against him shall have half the fine, and [the profits arising from] the labor.”

Esek Hopkins

Esek Hopkins

These English provisions about whistle-blowing carried over to the British colonies in North America. The federal government, even in its early stages, recognized whistle-blowing and the need to alert Congress as soon as possible about wrongdoings by people working with or for the government. On March 25, 1777, Marine captain John Grannis told the Continental Congress that he and nine other sailors saw the commander-in-chief of the continental navy, Esek Hopkins, treating British prisoners inhumanely aboard the USS Warren, and that the commander would refer to Congress as “a pack of damned fools.” On July 30, 1778, legislation was passed declaring that anyone who served the U.S. had the duty to tell Congress as soon as possible about any “misconduct, frauds or misdemeanors” committed by others in government service.

But the major case that shaped American whistle-blower law came during the Civil War. The rush to outfit the troops for war led to shortages of horses, wool and gunpowder — and a rush for companies to make money by selling shoddy goods to the needy Union Army. New York Congressman and abolitionist Charles H. Van Wyck questioned hundreds of witnesses to such fraud, putting together a report that led to the 1863 passage of the False Claims Act. The law established fines for contractors who cheated that system, and said that a whistle-blower who started a False Claims suit — the person this law termed “a relator” — would get 50% of the money if the case was successful.

“It has this qui tam provision that allows an individual, a private citizen, to become a private attorney general and actually prosecute the case on behalf of the ordinary people,” says Mueller.

The law was nicknamed “Lincoln’s Law” after President Abraham Lincoln said he hoped it would empower a different kind of army of “citizen soldiers,” or whistle-blowers, to keep a watchful eye. This law is still on the books.

Defense contractors succeeded in weakening the False Claims Act during World War II, claiming it would hold up the production of matériel — but during the 1960s and 1970s, as trust in government plummeted, several high-profile whistle-blowers, both within and outside government, reminded Americans just how much of a key role whistle-blowers could play.

Ernest Fitzgerald testified that Lockheed Martin was overcharging the government by billions of dollars. Frank Serpico exposed bribery in the NYPD. Karen Silkwood, who was killed in a car crash en route to deliver documents in the case, exposed hazardous conditions at the Kerr-McGee plutonium plant in Crescent, Okla. Daniel Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers, secret documents revealing that the government was mismanaging the Vietnam War and lying about it, to the New York Times. And of course, the Watergate informant known as “Deep Throat,” Mark Felt, helped bring down Richard Nixon’s presidency.

Mark Felt

Mark Felt

Hollywood movies about whistle-blower cases, such as 1976’s All the President’s Men and Meryl Streep’s 1983 turn in Silkwood, further increased awareness and public respect for whistle-blowers.

Reacting to sweetheart deals being cut between the government and defense contractors at the height of the Cold War, Congress strengthened the False Claims Act in 1986. Penalties for making false claims were increased, requiring offenders to pay triple what they overcharged the Treasury. Since then, over $60 billion in ill-gotten tax dollars have been returned to the Treasury via whistle-blower complaints filed through the law.

While the False Claims Act mostly pertains to people in the private sector who work with the government, it’s been more complicated for people in the intelligence and national security field to come forward. The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protections Act of 1998 established the process that the whistle-blower who raised concerns about Trump’s call with the Ukrainian president went through, in that he filed a complaint that was routed to the U.S. Inspector General’s office.

However, despite having “protections” in the name, people who work at national security agencies who have gone through this process have not always felt as if this process is a secure one for them. For example, in 2002, Tom Drake and Bill Binney were part of a group that reported to the Inspector General’s office concerns that government efforts to monitor Americans’ Internet activity would invade their privacy. When news came out related to their allegations, the FBI raided their houses.

Tom Mueller interviewed about 200 whistle-blowers for his book and found that the “overwhelming majority” haven’t been able to work again because they were blackballed in their industries; perhaps the most famous recent American whistle-blower, Edward Snowden, is still in exile in Moscow. “It’s career suicide,” he says, arguing the treatment of whistle-blowers in real life is more of how society views them, versus the praise they receive at a distance or on a screen. He argues there’s a two-faced attitude towards whistle-blowers in American society.

“We have a completely dual attitude,” he says. “We applaud them in the theater but we go home and allow industries and governments to destroy them, their careers, their health, their lives.”

And yet their influence is undeniable.

Cynthia Cooper

Cynthia Cooper

TIME made three whistle-blowers Person of the Year for 2002 — WorldCom accountant Cynthia Cooper and Enron executive Sherron Watkins for exposing corporate fraud, and FBI agent Coleen Rowley for her memo to then FBI Director Robert Mueller about the mishandling of security threat warnings before 9/11 — for risking everything “to bring us badly needed word of trouble inside crucial institutions” and because they believed that the truth is one thing that must not be moved off the books, and for stepping in to make sure that it wasn’t.”

“We shouldn’t need a special word, some weird legal status, for doing the right thing, for doing our jobs. The fact that we have that [term] is a bad sign. Whistle-blowing is democracy,” Tom Mueller says. “It’s freedom of speech. It’s independence of conscience — the kinds of things the framers had in mind.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Saturday Night Massacre

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Watergate’s most lasting sin: Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, and the pardon that made us all cynics

Rick Perlstein

Salon.com   September 8, 2014

Ronald Reagan, left, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford, far right, pose with George Bush in the Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace in 1990. (AP Photo/Barry Thumma) (Credit: Associated Press)

Ronald Reagan, left, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford, far right, pose with George Bush in the Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace in 1990. (AP Photo/Barry Thumma) (Credit: Associated Press)

When you’ve published a book about Watergate, your phone rings off the hook in the days leading up to Aug. 9, 2014, the 40th anniversary of Richard Nixon’s resignation. But my phone’s been quiet this week — even though the event that took place almost exactly one month later, on Sept. 8, 1974, is the one that really changed the world. It’s still changing the world 40 years later.

Gerald Ford had announced upon acceding to the highest office in the land, “Our Constitution works; our great republic is a government of laws and not men. Here the people rule.” For the sentiment, he reaped a harvest of gratitude. The very existence of this new presidency, everyone said, proved that “the system worked.”

Then, four Sundays later, 11:05 a.m., when many Americans would have, like Ford, just returned from church — in the mood, he hoped, for mercy — Ford proceeded to read, then sign, a proclamation announcing that pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, he was granting “a full, free, and absolute pardon unto Richard Nixon for all offenses against the United States which he, Richard Nixon, committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period from January 20 through August 9, 1974.”

It was an enormously unpopular act. Ford’s approval rating declined from 71 to 49 percent, the most precipitous in history. This pardon was proof, the people said, that the system didn’t work — America was still crooked. Suspicions were widespread that it was the fruit of a dirty deal between Nixon and Ford: the presidency in exchange for the pardon. “The son of a bitch pardoned the son of a bitch,” was how Carl Bernstein broke the news Bob Woodward on the phone.

Since then, judgment on the pardon has reversed 180 degrees. First Woodward, then Bernstein, came to conclude there had been no deal, and that this was instead an extraordinarily noble act: Ford “realized intuitively that the country had to get beyond Nixon.” After Ford died in 2006, Peggy Noonan went even further. She said Ford “threw himself on a grenade to protect the country from shame.”

They’re wrong. For political elites took away a dangerous lesson from the Ford pardon — our true shame: All it takes is the incantation of magic words like “stability” and “confidence” and “consensus” in order to inure yourself from accountability for just about any malfeasance

In 1975 the Senate and House empaneled committees to investigate the CIA, FBI and, later, the NSA after it was discovered these agencies had operated unethically and illegally. The House committee, under Rep. Otis Pike, who died last year in obscurity, discovered not merely that the CIA was out of control, but that it was incompetent — for instance, predicting Mideast peace the week before the Yom Kippur War broke out. Frank Church’s Senate committee, meanwhile, proved the NSA was illegally gathering the telegraph traffic of American citizens, without even top executives of the telegraph companies being aware of it.

But, in the spirit of the Nixon pardon, the idea of holding elite institutions to reckoning had fallen out of favor. At the height of the intelligence investigations Washington Post’s publisher Katharine Graham complained of the media’s tendency to “see a conspiracy and cover-up in everything.” Sen. J. William Fulbright said “these are not the kind of truths we need most right now,” that the nation demanded “restored stability and confidence” instead. The CIA had no trouble promptly drumming up a disingenuous propaganda campaign that all but neutered reform. And, 39 years later, these institutions are still largely broken, and still almost entirely unaccountable.

Follow the thread a little more than a decade later. Ronald Reagan’s administration contravened law and its own solemn pledges by selling hundreds of thousands of missiles to Iran in an attempt to free hostages held in Lebanon. The president’s own diaries revealed that he approved the action; he lied about that in a press conference. The deal didn’t even work; Hezbollah just took more hostages. Then profits were diverted to the Nicaraguan Contras in direct violation of congressional statute. But instead of a Watergate-style Senate investigation (the one in 1973 heard witnesses live on TV for over five months and produced 26 volumes of reports), Iran-Contra was investigated by a panel convened by Reagan himself and led by a political ally, Sen. John Tower; at subsequent congressional hearings, deliberately limited in scope, the star witness, Oliver North, testifying under immunity, bragged of destroying thousands of pages of evidence.

Six administration officials, including former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, were indicted by a special prosecutor. But one month before leaving office, President George H.W. Bush — who did not testify in congressional hearings about his own involvement in the affair as vice president, because the Democratic chairman, Sen. Daniel Inouye, wished to spare him embarrassment — pardoned them all.

Just like 40 years ago today, a longing for consensus over messy conflict, for elite comity instead of accountability, “stability and confidence” instead of justice, trumped all.

Meanwhile, the congressional minority report on Iran-Contra, drafted by then-Rep. Richard Cheney, all but rejected the very notion of congressional oversight over the executive branch — and Cheney, as George W. Bush’s vice president, literally took Iran-Contra as the subject for a “lessons learned” workshop on how to put such a foreign policy into practice.

Note, of course, that Cheney had once been top deputy in Gerald Ford’s White House. The Nixon pardon had to have been a lesson learned for him, too — future administrations would let the Bush administration get away with things like illegally spying on Americans, and starting a war on false pretenses, scot-free. And he was right: Following his 2008 election, President Obama announced “that we need to look forward as opposed to looking backward.”

Comity over accountability. Denialism instead of risking national “shame.” In 2001, the John F. Kennedy Library awarded Ford its Profile in Courage award for the pardon decision. But the idea that “too big to fail” institutions are too fragile to handle honest reckoning with the truth is not courage. It is civic cowardice. Better, much better, that we keep the faith: that our Constitution can work, that our great republic is a government of laws and not men, and that here, the people rule.

Rick Perlstein is the author of «The Invisible Bridge,» «Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America» and «Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus»

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The Two Legacies of Richard Nixon that Shaped the Modern Republican Party

HNN    August 17, 2014

 

The fortieth anniversary of Richard Nixon’s resignation from the presidency last week passed without much attention to the question of the former president’s historical significance and his role in the history of the modern Republican party. Twenty years after his death, it is apparent that Nixon shaped the political world in which we now live, and the last fifty years of the twentieth century are properly seen as The Age of Nixon. In race relations and the fundamental beliefs of the modern Republican party, Nixon was a more consequential historical figure than Ronald Reagan.

In the 1950s, Nixon was sympathetic to African-American aspirations and was someone who impressed Martin Luther King with his understanding of the civil rights impulse. The 1960 election changed all that as black voters helped put John Kennedy in the White House. Convinced that the election had been stolen from him, Nixon said of African-American support of Democrats, “it’s a bought vote and it isn’t bought by civil rights.” From there, even though his administration enforced civil rights laws, it was a short step to the Southern Strategy that turned the states of the Confederacy from Democratic to Republican over the next three decades.  Nixon, through aides like Pat Buchanan, reinforced the Republican commitment to white voters that underpins so much of the Republican opposition to President Obama.

As Nixon told a friend after the 1960 election, “we won, but they stole it from us.”  Contrary to the portrait of patriotic self-denial and deference to the election of John F. Kennedy that Nixon later proffered, he and the Republicans were quite prepared to contest Kennedy’s success until they knew there was no case that would withstand scrutiny. Yet the lesson that Nixon took away from 1960 was not that politics was like war, in which victory justifies all.

In that insight lay the roots of Watergate. Presidents could not, in Nixon’s mind commit illegal acts. Faced with a Democratic Party whose tactics impaired its dubious legitimacy, the Republicans should stop at nothing to achieve and maintain power. Entering the White House in January 1969, Nixon saw himself surrounded by enemies bent on his political annihilation. It was only right in such a dangerous political environment to meet fire with fire, criminality with criminality, dirty tricks with similar tactics.

The Watergate generation saw in Nixon’s methods violations of the Constitution that led to his resignation. But in time the assumption grew among Republicans that Nixon had been right all along. Nixon might believe that Democrats had more fun than Republicans did, and for a time he toyed with the idea of a new political party. In that he emulated Dwight D. Eisenhower and Modern Republicanism. Yet in his heart of hearts Nixon believed that the Democrats were the Other in American politics, a criminal enterprise that abused the rules of partisan behavior for selfish ends. They did not deserve fair play, which was only for suckers in public life.

The lesson stuck. Watergate had not been a moment of constitutional truth. Impeachment was a tactic that Republicans could deploy, first against Bill Clinton, and now against President Obama. Nixon taught that only Republicans had a true commitment to American values and therefore the only viable and defensive claim on fundamental legitimacy in American life. In the universe of Richard Nixon, only the winning side had the luxury of moral values. Commitment to democratic practices was only a sham that the true political sophisticates adhered to only at their peril. His disciples abound. They restrict voting of minorities, they filibuster everything, they gerrymander with abandon, they deny medical care even though people die as a result.

Nixon famously invoked a sign he had seen while campaigning, “Bring us together,” it read. It made for good rhetoric, but in his career he was the architect of two policies that are still tearing the country apart. His belief that politics is actually war demands perpetual battle with unconditional surrender as the only sensible goal at hand, whereas his fealty to the southern strategy, which dictates the exclusion of fast-growing minorities, questions the very survivability of his own party. These are the dilemmas that the United States now contemplates as it ponders the legacy of Richard Milhous Nixon.

Lewis L. Gould, visiting distinguished professor at Monmouth College, is the author of «The Republicans: A History of the Grand Old Party,» which the Oxford University Press will publish next month.

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Why Pardoning Nixon Wasn’t Good for America

HNN  August 8, 2014

This excerpt was adapted from the foreword to Smoking Gun, The Nation on Watergate, 1952 – 2010 (eBookNation, August 4, 2014), written by former US Representative Elizabeth Holtzman. The former Congresswoman served on the House Judiciary Committee and voted to impeach Nixon; you can download the new e-book, a unique real-time history from the pages of The Nation magazine on the rise and fall of Richard Nixon — and the consequences for American democracy — to read instantly on your tablet, e-reader, smartphone or computer. It is also available as a paperback (coming October 2014).

 

If Watergate is a story of accountability, President Gerald Ford’s pardon of Nixon is a story of presidential immunity. Here The Nation was especially spot-on, comprehending the sinister significance of the pardon right from the start.

Issued before any prosecution of Nixon had commenced, and without any acknowledgment of guilt on Nixon’s part, Ford’s pardon created a dual system of justice—one for ordinary Americans and another for the President. (Ford’s excuse that Nixon had “suffered enough” could have been applied, of course, to any person whose criminal activities had been exposed.) Unlike its persistence in tackling Watergate, Congress backed away from any serious investigation of the pardon. We will thus probably never know whether Nixon and his lieutenant Ford made a secret deal over the pardon—-in which Nixon would resign promptly and Ford would pardon him, not only shielding the President from prosecution, but limiting the Republican Party’s electoral losses at the polls in November.

Sadly, Watergate did not deter other Presidents from abusing their power. From Ronald Reagan and the Iran/Contra scandal to the present, Presidents have used the mantra of national security to ignore the Constitution. Worse, Ford’s pardon has grown into a principle of impunity for Presidents. It is not simply that Presidents are now viewed as safe from prosecution; they cannot even be investigated. No investigation has examined the presidential deceptions that drove us into the Iraq War, or the presidential authorizations of warrantless wiretapping in violation of law, or the possible criminal liability of former President George W. Bush and other top administration officials for violating laws on torture. Neither Congress nor the courts have taken the Watergate example to heart and stood firmly against presidential crimes or serious misconduct. Instead of remembering that Nixon cynically invoked “national security” to conceal ordinary crimes having nothing to do with the country’s welfare, they cower at the term, allowing Presidents to broaden their powers enormously.

Lack of government accountability runs directly contrary to the Constitution. The framers understood the threat that a strong executive would pose to our democracy; they knew because they had themselves overthrown a king and were careful students of history. To preserve our democracy, we need to rediscover the meaning of presidential accountability. One good way to start is to understand what went right—and wrong—in Watergate. For that effort, this volume of The Nation’s coverage of the subject is a useful resource.

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