Feeds:
Entradas
Comentarios

Struggle and Progress

Eric Foner on the abolitionists, Reconstruction, and winning “freedom” from the Right.

W. E. B. Du Bois

W. E. B. Du Bois

No living historian has done more to shape our understanding of the American Civil War era than Eric Foner. A rare scholar who is both prominent outside the historical community and esteemed within it, over the course of a fifty-year career Foner has acquired virtually every award, tribute, and professional honor available to a historian in the United States.

Yet the true measure of his legacy lies not in accolades but influence. Foner’s most important books have transformed the way we see — and the way we teach — the origins of the Civil War, the significance of slave emancipation, and the politics of postwar Reconstruction.

Foner grew up in a New York family equally devoted to historical scholarship and left-wing politics. His father, Jack, and his uncle, Philip, both taught history at City College before they were dismissed and blacklisted as Communists.

For the elder Foners, a radical approach to US history involved placing the black freedom struggle at center stage. “In the 1930s,” Eric later wrote, “the Communist party was the only predominantly white organization to make fighting racism central to its political program.” It was no coincidence that the family was friendly with W. E. B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson, or that Philip Foner’s five-volume selection of Frederick Douglass’s writings and speeches, which he completed while on the blacklist, was the first collected edition of its kind.

Foner’s family background has produced occasional clumsy efforts at red-baiting, including a 2002 National Review essay which denounced him as a Soviet sympathizer and “left-wing polemicist.” In reality, Foner’s own contemporary political interventions have generally remained within the American liberal mainstream. Yet it would not be unfair to credit his Old Left upbringing with a major influence on his scholarly career.

Foner’s first book, Free Soil, Free Labor, and Free Men (1970), which remains the standard work on the rise of the Republican Party, showed how antebellum Republicans were not merely critics of slavery, but exponents of a powerful political-economic ideology of their own. His most celebrated book, Reconstruction (1988), provided a synthesis that decisively rejected the racist folklore that had informed popular and scholarly treatments of the post–Civil War period for much of the twentieth century.

In these and other works, a central theme in Foner’s scholarship has been the contested terrain of freedom in American history. (This is no less true of his most recent book, Gateway to Freedom, on the antebellum underground railroad.) The Civil War era, in his view, represented a revolutionary clash of political ideas and forces — a period that unmade and then remade American society. The revolution, of course, remained unfinished — but it was a revolution nonetheless.

Three Jacobin contributors sat down with Foner to discuss the achievements and failures of Reconstruction, how to reclaim the idea of freedom from the Right, whether the antislavery movement has any lessons for the contemporary left, and why Karl Rove is one of his biggest fans.

So what’s this story we’ve heard about an argument you had with your eighth-grade history teacher about Reconstruction?

This was a long time ago, probably 1957 or ’58 — it was tenth or eleventh grade. And yeah, it was American History class, in Long Beach, Long Island, and the teacher was basically giving us the old, traditional Birth of a Nation view of Reconstruction. She said theReconstruction Act of 1867, which gave the right to vote to black men in the South, was the worst law in all American history.

So I raised my hand and I said, “I don’t agree with you, Mrs. Berryman, I think the Alien and Sedition Acts were worse.” I don’t know where I got that from. And she said, “Alright, Eric, if you don’t like the way I’m teaching, you come in tomorrow and you give a lecture on Reconstruction.” Which I did — my father was a historian, Du Bois was a friend of the family, we had Black Reconstruction at home. So we used that.

I came in and I gave my presentation, and at the end of the class the teacher says, “All right, we’re now going to have a vote as to who’s right: me or Eric.” Well, she won by a landslide, let’s put it that way.

When would you say high school students started learning a new way of seeing Reconstruction?

Maybe the 1970s, or even after that. Of course, Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction had been out there since 1935, but it was ignored in the mainstream [white] universities. It was taught in the black colleges. In the black colleges you had a different view of Reconstruction, but that was totally sealed off from the larger academic world.

But I think a real turning point was in 1965, when Kenneth Stampp published this book called The Era of Reconstruction, which was not a very detailed research book but it gave a more positive view of Reconstruction. And because of the civil rights revolution, people wanted a different history. People were talking about the “New Abolitionists,” the “Second Reconstruction.” Little by little people started chipping away.

So in the seventies there was a lot of scholarship being done, but exactly when it got into the high schools I don’t know. Maybe the eighties. You’d have to look at the textbooks for that.

Today I think all the textbooks are good, but I still find, wherever I talk about this, that there are plenty of people — and not just the older ones — who say, “All I know about Reconstruction is corruption, carpetbaggers.”

The main thing is that people know next to nothing about Reconstruction. And what they do know is just not correct. I mean, just basic myths. People say, “They gave the right to vote to blacks but they disenfranchised all the whites.” Well, that’s completely untrue, they did not disenfranchise all whites. But people think that’s a known fact.

What percentage were actually disenfranchised?

A tiny percent. The people disenfranchised were people who held during office before the Civil War. Nobody knows how many that was. It might have been 8,000, 10,000, nobody knows, but it was not all whites. Your average Confederate veteran was not disenfranchised.

Oh, and the idea that all the blacks in office were illiterate and ignorant, also a total myth — we could go on about this but the point is, there are still a lot of misconceptions. I’m hoping that with the 150th anniversary of Reconstruction coming up there will be a little more interest.

There’s a 2011 Pew Poll showing that Americans still don’t even agree on the cause of the Civil War. There’s a plurality saying it was “states’ rights,” rather than slavery — and it’s not a North-South divide, either.

Yes, I see that all the time. It isn’t regional. The thing is, it’s an index of cynicism about political life. Which is totally understandable. The idea that anyone could do anything for an idealistic reason, or that you can believe anything that politicians say . . .

You look at our own world, with politics today, it’s easy to say, “Hey, it must have been just a bunch of Northern capitalists trying to control the South,” or “It was just states’ rights.” Whenever I lecture, someone raises the issue of states’ rights, and the thing I like to say is: “Yes, you’re right, the South believed in states’ rights. And the right they were interested in was the right to own slaves.” And that was a right created by state law, so naturally they wanted to protect states’ rights.

And then I say, if that was really the issue, then explain the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 to me — which was a federal law, probably the most powerful federal law before the Civil War in terms of overriding local judicial procedures, overriding local law enforcement. Federal troops, federal marshals, going into states, you think that’s a reflection of states’ rights? No.

When it came to vigorous federal action in defense of slavery, the South was perfectly happy to go that route. So they did not dogmatically believe in states’ rights . . .

Just look at the Mississippi Declaration of Secession. Or Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens’s “Cornerstone Speech.” One thing I admire about these guys is that they didn’t beat about the bush. They were very candid. “We are seceding because the future of slavery is in danger.”

After the war, the myth developed that everybody had already agreed that slavery needed to go.

Yes, slavery got washed out of the writing on the war. But it didn’t happen in a straight line. When it comes to the Civil War, what historians write is a reflection of the world they are living in at the moment.

During World War II there was an upsurge in people seeing the Civil War through its lens, through the fight against fascism and the knowledge that entrenched evil is not going to go away without violence. So in that period they saw slavery as the root of it.

But later you get a post-Vietnam thing, which was a little more cynical. I think even today we’re in a post-Iraq moment, where the idea is basically, “War is hell and politicians justify it with all this rhetoric which has no meaning, so how can you believe anything anyone says?”

My view on this is Du Bois’s, actually. Sometimes the “neo-abolitionist” historians get a little too gung-ho for war, the glorifying of the war. I agree with Du Bois, who says that war is murder, chaos, anarchy. But sometimes good comes out of it. I don’t think it’s a good thing that all these people got killed in the Civil War. I’m not glorifying it and waving the flag for it. But what I’m saying is that I’ve never seen a peaceful scenario for the abolition of slavery in this country.

Now, a lot of people say it would have died out as a result of being uneconomical. How do you know that? When would it have died out? It was plenty economical before the Civil War, why would it suddenly die out?

People say, “Oh, well Brazil abolished slavery.” Brazil abolished slavery partially because we abolished slavery. Do you think Brazil would have abolished slavery if we hadn’t? I think political economy is very important here. The clash of two fundamentally different societies with two fundamentally different labor systems is what’s going on, in my opinion.

Do you think it makes sense to talk about the Civil War and Reconstruction as a “bourgeois revolution”?

I tend not to use terminology like that, which I feel is an insider terminology. I try to write as clearly and accessibly as possible. So I understand what it means to call it a bourgeois revolution, and there are a lot of ways one could say it is. But I don’t think you would find that phrase in my writings.

But I do call it a revolution. I call the Civil War the Second American Revolution, as historian Charles Beard did, and as abolitionist Wendell Phillips did. But the Revolution is the destruction of slavery, that’s the revolutionary quality. That’s Du Bois’s point.

Jacobin-Series-3bdd91b95cfc219305403acaa1630163

I call it a capitalist revolution. I don’t know if that’s the same thing as a bourgeois revolution. It destroys a system that is both capitalist and non-capitalist in ways that are quite difficult to explain, but the consequence of the Civil War is capitalist hegemony throughout the entire United States.

But that’s not the cause of the Civil War, because the capitalists were perfectly happy with the slave South. They made a lot of money off the slave South and there was no reason for them to go to war. But theconsequence of the war was certainly the hegemony of Northern industry and finance throughout the entire country.

American Jacobins

I wanted to talk about Karl Rove, who is apparently a big fan of your book Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, on antebellum Republican ideology.

He said he learned how to build a political coalition from that book.

A student came up to me one year and said, “You might not approve of this, but I’ve got an internship in the White House working for Karl Rove this summer.” I said I don’t disapprove, they need all the help they can get down there. He said, “I’m glad you feel that way,” and he whipped out his copy of my Reconstruction book and said, “Mr Rove asked if I could get you to sign this for him.”

I think this kind of thing scares off the young contemporary left, because they see the legacy of antislavery being claimed by this vicious capitalist force.

Anything can be claimed by anyone! I mean, Glenn Beck held his civil rights rally a little while ago.

The National Review does something on Frederick Douglass from time to time.

We shouldn’t allow them to take possession of these struggles. By the way, Obama absorbs all of this into his narrative of American history, obviously, and what’s objectionable about all this — from Obama’s vision of American history to Karl Rove’s — is that they see all these things as struggles within a stable system, so to speak.

Instead of denying, like the Right used to, that we’ve ever had inequality in this country, the Right says, “Well of course slavery was horrible, but we abolished it. We abolished slavery.” We! We! Who’s this “we,” you know?

And then they say, “Jim Crow, it was terrible.” No one’s defending Jim Crow anymore. We had a great civil rights struggle, Martin Luther King is a hero to everybody left, right and center, but it’s a defanged Martin Luther King. Martin Luther King is the guy who gets up at the Lincoln Memorial and, you know, says one sentence — I want my children to be judged by the content of their character — and that’s Martin Luther King. You don’t get the King who spoke out against the Vietnam War, or the Poor People’s Campaign King.

King was a radical guy. King said that the Civil Rights Movement was a fundamental challenge to American values. The people who absorb it into a feel-good thing now say it was an expression of basic American values. In other words, there is a stable thing called Americanism which all these struggles are just improving all the time.

So I can see how people can be cynical about the appropriation of that, but I don’t think we should let it be appropriated. I wrote a book about the history of the idea of freedom, and then shortly thereafter George W. Bush took control of the idea of freedom for the War in Iraq. Operation Iraqi Freedom — freedom, freedom, freedom, that’s all it was. It turned a lot of people off the idea of freedom.

Obama doesn’t even talk about freedom much, except when he’s going to war. Freedom is the last refuge when they want to go to war.

I don’t think we should cede freedom to the Right. Absolutely not. We should not concede the common sense idea of freedom. In my book there are many other concepts of freedom equally embedded in the American tradition, which have a lot more to do with equality and economic rights, which we should insist on. It’s not just owning a gun and getting the government off your back.

So yes, I can understand that people look back at the abolitionist movement and say, first, “Well, the whites were racist.” Well some of them were racist, no question about it. But hey, they were willing to put themselves on the line to end slavery, so what else do you want?

This is a pseudo-politics, a psycho-politics, that says people ought to be loving each other. That’s not what politics is, people loving each other. It’s people acting together, even if they don’t love each other, for a common purpose. If you’re going out to a labor picket line, are they all loving each other, the people on that picket line? Probably not. But they have a common self-interest that they’re pursuing.

Then they say, “It didn’t succeed. They abolished slavery, but racism is permanent, and another form of slavery came in.” Of course, terrible injustice came in. But it wasn’t slavery. I think that’s a very cynical view of social change — that if you don’t get utopia nothing has happened.

There’s a related myth that emancipation happened, but immediately it was replaced by Jim Crow. But in reality there was a long period between Reconstruction and complete black disenfranchisement, and across the late nineteenth century there were all these struggles in the South, with whites and blacks acting together.

You’re absolutely right, it didn’t just end in 1877. There was Radical Reconstruction, which I think was a very idealistic effort to, as Du Bois said, create democracy. Du Bois’s subtitle talks about “the part which black folk played in the attempt to reconstruct democracy in America.” It’s not about black people, it’s about democracy — are we going to have a democracy in this country or not?

But then there was a generation at least which was kind of inchoate, as you say. There was a tendency towards more and more racism, but there were also struggles like the Readjusters in Virginia, the Populists of course, and other things. It’s not until around 1900 that Jim Crow, which is a shorthand for comprehensive white supremacy in the South, comes in.

The struggle is the story. I don’t think we should romanticize it, but the idea that racism is permanent and there’s nothing you can say or do and that’s it — that’s a totally unhistorical way of thinking about it.

Among other things, it’s a story of attempts at interracial cooperation from below, which ultimately failed by 1900. It’s sometimes argued that the political failure of Reconstruction in the South was due to the fact that Republican support among Unionist whites, which was significant at the beginning, seemed to have disappeared or diminished by 1877. Why do you think that happened?

That’s one of the reasons for the failure of Reconstruction — it’s one reason. Of course, there were some states where they never had any white support, like South Carolina and maybe a couple of other places. Louisiana had very, very little.

The problem of getting poor white support was very difficult and was exacerbated by the difference between the Northern Republican Party and the Southern Republican Party. In some of these states, like North Carolina or Georgia, there were poor whites, Unionists, and so on, who were interested in supporting the Republicans for economic advantages like debtor’s relief.

But the Northern Republican Party was not interested in supporting them. They rejected Georgia’s Constitution because it suspended the collection of debts, and they said, “Hey, I’m sorry, you guys have got to pay your debts.” It’s like Greece, they were acting like Angela Merkel.

I actually think the failure of Reconstruction was not solely or even primarily on that basis. Rather, you have to go to the federal level and look at what was basically a failure to enforce the law. There were these constitutional amendments — the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth — but you get a withdrawal from enforcement after a while, and that reflected changes in Northern society — political, economic, and intellectual. And without a willingness to enforce the law, the power structure in the South — the economic power structure — is going to take over eventually.

It’s possible to imagine continued federal intervention — not, you know, military intervention for forty years, but enough to make it clear that these laws will be enforced. Like what happened in the Civil Rights Movement. There was a social movement, but there was also the National Guard, federal courts, other things just making it clear to people, not that they have to love each other, but that they have to act in certain ways and they can’t act in other ways. That if people act in ways that are in violation of federal law, they will be punished. And if that becomes clear, then people eventually abide by the law.

This is the point where Karl Rove’s attempt at appropriation fails, because when you’re looking at that moment, where Northern support dries up and people are beginning to doubt the effort to enforce the law, they have exactly the same kinds of concerns that Karl Rove has, that the Republican Party today has.

Yes, exactly. Rove would probably say this was an outside imposition on the South and therefore whites were never going to accept it. Maybe there’s some truth to that. But as you said, there were the Populists, the Readjusters, there were grounds for white militancy in the South all through this period, which occasionally come to the fore and helped work out things with blacks. But they were usually overturned by violence.

So you go back to the question: are you going to allow political violence to determine elections and political power in this country? If you are, that’s what’s going to happen. And if not, you’re going to need federal intervention to prevent it. I think the national story of Reconstruction and its failure is very important, not just the local story.

Of course, there’s an old argument about corruption in the Reconstruction state governments, but newer scholarship has looked more closely at the problem of state government revenue, and the new property taxes imposed after the war.

Yes, these state governments faced a real Catch‑22. Before the war, state revenue was basically from the tax on slaves, not on landed property. Planters could accumulate large tracts of property and not be taxed on it, but be taxed on their slaves instead. And this left the poorer whites not paying taxes on their land. Most people owned land, but they didn’t pay taxes.

This was a weird fiscal system, where it’s the tax on slaves that’s supporting the government, but it does allow a lot of fiscal autonomy to poorer areas. After the Civil War, there are no more slaves, so no more tax! It becomes a general property tax. That’s bad for the planters, but it’s also bad for the poorer whites, who are now paying a tax on their land they didn’t have to before.

So that becomes a big problem. These governments are setting up school systems, and they’re now serving a doubled citizenry where blacks are now suddenly getting benefits from the government as well as whites, but the fiscal resources are very, very weak. And that’s why they were issuing bonds that were deteriorating in value. And you get corruption out of that.

But even the way you posed the question, which pops up in a lot of this literature, shows the hold of modern day politics: corruption and taxation are thrown into the same bag. But taxation is not corruption! This notion that levying taxes is bad is part of this critique of Reconstruction.

But surely if these are poor farmers who want schools, and you raise taxes to build these school systems and stuff — if it had been done well, wouldn’t they ultimately have benefited from it?

The immediate problem was that they couldn’t get debtor’s relief. They were all in debt. The Republican Party was divided, because a lot of Republicans — including black Republicans — thought they shouldn’t alienate planters too much. They wanted to get the planters into the Republican Party.

So it was very hard to have a radical party, to have a populist party, because the local parties were dependent on the Northern Republican Party, which more and more was the party of industry and sound finance. It was a political coalition that was very difficult to maintain. It was a coalition between the poorest people in the country and the richest people in the country!

And then there was the need for cotton. That’s one of the reasons they didn’t distribute land to the former slaves: because they thought they’d have to grow cotton. The problem is, there was actually an overproduction of cotton after the war, because the British had encouraged cotton in India and Egypt during the war. There’s a lot more supply in the world than there had been before because the Civil War had cut it off.

The thing is, the agricultural system in the South was not a racial system. It affected blacks more severely but there were more white sharecroppers than black in every census. The crop lien system (which left indebted farmers dependent on cash crops) forced people to grow cotton. So yes, the expansion of cotton production was in the white areas, and that was very detrimental to them because the price was falling throughout this whole period. There was overproduction, so growing cotton was a losing game.

So here you get into total counterfactual fantasy: if they had changed the whole credit system — if, if, if! That’s what the Populists called for [in the 1890s]. Get out of dependence on merchants and banks. Let the government be the one who loans the money to the farmers. It didn’t happen, of course. (Now it happens, but that’s with agribusiness, that’s a different story.) So there are a million problems.

I don’t think Reconstruction in its utopian phase could have succeeded, but I don’t think it’s crazy to imagine more modest kinds of success which would have made the shift over to Jim Crow more difficult.

What do you think about land redistribution, as a counterfactual?

Well, in an agricultural society it’s a lot better to have land than to not have land. Would it have been a panacea for everything? No. The credit system, you’d have had to change that too, because land is not the only scarce resource. It certainly would have given blacks more bargaining power in the system, but it was not the end-all, be-all answer. Most white farmers owned land after the war, but they were losing it through this whole period.

To me, the key thing wouldn’t necessarily have been the direct benefits to African Americans, which were significant but still limited. I’m thinking of the political dynamic. Because that’s the divide that arose later on, the poor whites who owned land and poor blacks who owned nothing. Steven Hahn called them the “propertyless poor.”

Though a lot of whites are losing their property too.

But you know, you can take that even farther. To Thaddeus Stevens, the biggest thing this would have accomplished was to destroy the planter class. Take away their land and they’re gone, and that would have changed the whole political configuration of the South.

I mean, he wanted to sell it to Northerners too.

Forty acres to the blacks and then sell the rest. Then you’ve got a whole different society. That’s a great counterfactual. Blacks would have ended up at the bottom of the economic ladder anyway because they lacked resources, but the whole system would have looked very different.

Okay, let’s do counterfactuals. But let’s say in 1867 blacks get the right to vote, and there’s a general white uprising in the South and you have to send the Army back in. Then people might have said, fuck these guys! This is impossible, we’re gonna take their land away again. Crisis creates that kind of radicalism.

In the dominant discourse, the American Revolution was very moderate, it was legalistic, and that’s good because it was relatively peaceful, unlike the French Revolution. Yet it left slavery in place. And then even the Second American Revolution ended up so moderate and legalistic that it prevented them from doing a lot of radical things — the kind of things you’d imagine the French Jacobins doing had they been in the United States.

Well you know, Georges Clemenceau was here after the war and he was reporting for a French newspaper. He called Thaddeus Stevens the Robespierre of the Second American Revolution. So he saw what was going on.

But on the other hand, the abolition of slavery seems so normal and inevitable in retrospect, yet it was an incredibly radical act. Especially the uncompensated abolition of slavery, the liquidation of what was by far the largest concentration of property in the country — slaves. No compensation was a pretty radical thing. I guess you’re right, it wasn’t radical enough, but it was certainly pretty radical for the nineteenth century.

Lessons for Today’s Radicals

What if some young socialist came up to you and asked, “Is there anything here, in antislavery and Reconstruction, that’s useful for an anti-capitalist, socialist project?”

Yes! First of all though — the abolitionist movement was not an anticapitalist movement.

But it was a radical movement.

Yes, it was a radical movement. The abolitionists show you that a very small group of people can accomplish a lot by changing the discourse of the country. After the Civil War, everybody claimed to have been an abolitionist. But they weren’t!

There weren’t a whole lot of abolitionists before the war. There were a few beleaguered individuals scattered about, in upstate New York, for example. There were only a couple dozen abolitionists in New York City!

Now, there was a free black community, they were very militant, and you could say they were abolitionists, but I’m talking about the organized abolitionist movement. That was very small. Nonetheless, they managed to actually accomplish quite a bit. They pioneered the use of the media of that time — the steam press, the telegraph, the petitions, the traveling speakers — to change public discourse. If you want to learn something from the abolitionists, that’s what you learn. The first thing to do is intervene in public discourse.

And the Occupy movement — success, failure, gone, still around, whatever you want to think about it — it changed the public discourse. It put this question of the 1 percent and the 99 percent, inequality, on the national agenda. That doesn’t mean they’re going to do much about it in Washington, but it is now part of our consciousness, just as by 1840 the abolitionist movement put the issue of slavery on the agenda in a way it had not been. Now, it took twenty years for anything to happen, but I think that’s something to learn from them, how they managed to do that.

Here’s the point. I am a believer in the abolitionist concept — that the role of radicals is to stand outside of the political system. The abolitionists said, “I am not putting forward a plan for abolition, because if I put forward a plan, people are just going to be debating my plan. ‘Oh, it’s going to be two years, five years, seven years.’ No: I’m putting forward the moral imperative of dealing with slavery.” And if people are convinced of that, then politicians will come up with a plan to do it. That means politicians are eventually going to pick up those ideas and use them in other ways and turn them into political strategies.

A guy like Lincoln was not a radical abolitionist by any stretch of the imagination. He was a moderate. And yet by the 1850s Lincoln understood that abolitionists were part of — to use a Karl Rove term — his “base.” Lincoln understood that you don’t win by just appealing to your base, but no politician is going to kick his base out and say “I don’t want to deal with these guys.”

So yes, there are some radical guys in the party, like Joshua Giddings, like Salmon P. Chase. But you know, Giddings represented one very unique district. He was like Bernie Sanders. Not too many Giddingses are going to get elected.

Then how do you interpret the debate among abolitionists, like the split that eventually happened between William Lloyd Garrison and Frederick Douglass?

You know, this is where I differ from the tradition I grew up in. I don’t believe there is one true party line that every movement has to have. The Maoist view is better: let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred tactics bloom. Let some people go into politics and other people not go into politics, let some people work above ground and others not. You know, you have the Underground Railroad, you have people working illegally, but you also have people working totally legally and openly. There’s no one correct tactic. The more different tactics you have, the better.

I totally agree with that, but in some ways, Garrison was making the argument that you started out with just now: let’s just stand out and say what’s right. And Douglass said, look, at a certain point, you have to intervene.

But Douglass’s concept of politics is still politics as agitation. He doesn’t support the Republican Party. He supports the Radical Abolition party which gets twenty votes! But the point of that is just to get the idea out there. Politics is another venue for getting your idea out there.

But the idea is out there! In your most recent book, you quote Charles Sumner talking about the “anti-slavery enterprise” as an inclusive movement. Isn’t the striking thing about this moment in American politics the fact that even though they’re at each other’s throats, they’re working towards a common goal? Even though Douglass is trashing Lincoln in his editorials, fundamentally they still build through the Republican Party. This is the real radical moment, in the mid 1850s — when the Republican Party, the antislavery party, wins control of the North. Just a few years earlier that was unimaginable.

No, you’re right. Yes, I make this argument, but I think one should not homogenize things. Douglass and Wendell Phillips are trying to get rid of Lincoln in 1864! They nominate John C. Frémont to run instead. Lincoln and the abolitionists have this odd, interesting relationship. It’s partly symbiotic, it’s partly antagonistic, but these guys are not holding Lincoln’s coat by any means.

Very good historians make very big mistakes talking about this because they look at Douglass’s speeches about Lincoln. But Douglass is a very shrewd guy. He understands you’ve got to get Lincoln on your side, especially after the Civil War. So suddenly Lincoln is the guy who we were all really wrong to criticize, and he was actually a believer in racial justice. By the 1870s he’s trying to invoke Lincoln to get people’s support for Reconstruction.

But as you said, this is politics, right? It’s not about loving each other — it’s about changing the world.

Absolutely. But even though there’s an antislavery enterprise, I still think there’s a fundamental difference between abolitionists and the politicians. I mean, I hope that people on the Left do not just throw up their hands and say, “Well, there’s nobody you can trust.” It’s politics! You make deals. But I also believe that this is the luxury of an intellectual with a full-time job, so I don’t have to worry about it.

But I think radicals shouldn’t be involved in the day to day business of politics. I’m on the board of the Nation, which is not as radical asJacobin, but in our current political climate it’s to the left of the mainstream, let’s put it that way. A lot of our editorial board meetings are about: “Oh God, should we support Hillary? Should we support Obama?” and I say, “Hell no, that’s not even what we should be talking about! We should not be getting involved in Democratic Party internal battles. That’s not what our job is.”

Our job is to put out new ideas, different ideas, pressure people, and I don’t care fundamentally if Obama or Hillary gets the nomination in 2008. Sure I have an opinion about it but I don’t think that’s our job to worry about it. All of this maneuvering, “Oh, what do we do in this or that election.” We are not politicians. Politicians do it better.

In 1864 Lincoln absolutely outmaneuvered these guys, because they weren’t politicians. I mean they put up John C. Frémont. Who the hell is that? Lincoln controlled the machinery.

But there had to be a point at which people with abolitionist views decided that they were going to involve themselves in the process — even if it was the [1848–54] Free Soil Party, or something like that. There was a process of coalition-building in which people who didn’t like each other, who thought they were too radical, or not radical enough, worked together on a common project. It was anti-sectarian, or non-sectarian.

I agree with you. On the other hand, Douglass welcomed the Free Soil Party because its politicians were moving toward antislavery. He didnot welcome the [1840–44] Liberty Party — even though it was more radical than Free Soil — because that was abolitionists moving towards politics. He thought that was a deterioration of the abolitionist statement.

I’m giving you a rigid kind of view of what radicalism is, when what I actually believe is that people should be doing everything at the same time. There is no one correct way. If people want to work in the Democratic Party, let ’em. There are good people in the party, in some places, running.

I’m certainly happy de Blasio was elected here. De Blasio is not Thad Stevens but he’s certainly an improvement on what we’ve had. And I think that’s great. But I don’t think the role of radicals is to just jump on board and say de Blasio’s our man.

Maybe a good example is Thaddeus Stevens. He’s a party man, he’s a politician, but he’s certainly as much an abolitionist as anybody, and more of a racial egalitarian than a lot of people on the Left then.

Even than a lot of Underground Railroad types.

Absolutely. But Thaddeus Stevens is central in the political system. He doesn’t control the Congress, but he’s important. He’s almost like John Boehner today. He’s a key guy in the House of Representatives. So Stevens is another way of looking at it. He’s an abolitionist using a position of power in the political system.

But Stevens also knows how to compromise. He sees what you can get and he takes it. On the Fourteenth Amendment, Charles Sumner initially says he won’t accept it because it recognizes the power of the state to disenfranchise people — it punishes states in terms of numbers of their members in Congress if they don’t allow blacks to vote, but it still allows the possibility of doing it.

Stevens says, “Hey, this is a step toward what we want and we have to do it. It’s imperfect, but we’ve got to take it.”

Same thing with Frederick Douglass on the Emancipation Proclamation: “This is one step.”

One of my numerous differences with President Obama is that a few years ago he went to a college and he was chatting with some students, and he was complaining about liberals criticizing him, and he said, if these guys were around when Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, they would have said it’s no good. And I said, wait a minute, the abolitionists didn’t say it was no good! They said it was great, but you’ve got to do more!

I guess why we’re so interested in this juncture between abolitionists and Republicans is just that we’re wondering about the process. You have a situation where Wendell Phillips is invited to the White House in 1862. Thinking about it, that’s like, what, the equivalent of Noam Chomsky being invited to the White House by Obama? That would never happen — it seems impossible for Obama even to say anything about the 99 percent.

I wrote my book about Lincoln, and I wouldn’t say it was written for Obama but I had hoped Obama would read it. Because it’s about exactly how a political figure and a social movement can somehow, not exactly coordinate with each other, but influence one another.

I would like to see Obama inviting the equivalent of Frederick Douglass today, whoever that is, to the White House and listening to him and talking to him about things, asking his advice about things. Lincoln didn’t care when these guys came in and criticized him, he was perfectly happy to learn something from them.

Obama isn’t like that. He’s very thin-skinned. He doesn’t like differences of opinion within his own party. I think that’s a serious flaw. I think for Jacobin — and I say this to the Nation — the number one thing is to put out a different worldview than the dominant one today.

I think the financial crisis has cracked open the old consensus. I read two newspapers in the morning, over breakfast, the New York Timesand the Financial Times. I don’t read them online, I get them delivered to my door, the old-fashioned way. The Financial Times is more radical than the New York Times! You read the Financial Timeson the fiscal crisis, the financial system, they’re up in arms that no banker has gone to jail, about the austerity program. The Financial Times tells you what’s actually happening, it’s amazing.

My point is that the consensus has cracked open, and therefore publications like Jacobin have to put forward an alternative point of view, and worldview, an alternative vision.

The problem is the abolitionists had a vision. It was a society without slavery and with equality for all. And that’s what they put out, but I don’t think they had any concept of what abolition would mean economically, what would be the implications for the country. Yes, they wanted the South to be like the North — more farms, little towns.

But the funny thing is, in New England the factory system was very powerful in the 1840s and the abolitionists didn’t look in their own backyard and say, “What about Irish laborers in the factories?” That’s why I say their vision was basically a moral one.

So let’s talk a little about the vision of the Republican Party. The early GOP brought together both ex-Whigs and ex-Democrats, but the majority had been lifelong Whigs. It was almost sort of an offshoot of the Whigs. The traditional view is that the Whigs were basically elitists. But in the context of the time wasn’t there something historically progressive about their kind of bourgeois liberalism?

You’re right. Of course the Whigs were very skeptical of democracy. In the 1830s, you have the Jacksonians who seem to represent a popular politics of democracy, and yet they’re anti-Indian, they’re racist. Then you have the Whigs who seem to be more forward-looking, but they’re capitalists.

But the guys who come to the fore are the ones who combine things. Lincoln and Seward are more small-d democratic Whigs who see that you can’t run in this country in the 1830s in favor of the elite and say, “Vote for me, I’m for the elite.” Although some Whigs tried. So you get these democratic Whigs who have this forward-looking economic view, but also have a mass politics, which many Whigs are not that comfortable with.

Lincoln’s got the economic progress, free-labor notion, but not the kind of elite finance capitalist thing. Going into Reconstruction, Thaddeus Stevens is actually into inflation, greenbacks. Guys like him have this vision of uplifting everybody through money and credit, low-interest rates. Every man his own capitalist, but without big capitalists out there.

Seward is a very interesting guy, because he tries to get the Whig party to appeal to immigrants. But the Whigs were very nativist, and that’s part of the reason he didn’t get the nomination in 1860. The Know-Nothings didn’t like Seward because when he was governor twenty years before he’d tried to get public money for Catholic schools.

What I meant by the question about the Whigs is that, the way I see it, the Democrats, in addition to their racism, represented a very agrarian, decentralized, yet small-d democratic vision that was opposed to improvement of society through collective means. That’s a very American thing in the sense that Europe, where the suffrage was restricted, really had no equivalent of the Democratic Party.

You’re right. Because in Europe the Industrial Revolution happened before democracy came in. People were excluded as a class and that encouraged class consciousness because people were excluded from the political system as a class. The labor struggle and the political struggle were interconnected with each other. That’s the point ofE. P. Thompson’s book on the English working class. That book is about politics as much as labor, it’s about the struggle for the vote for working-class people.

I think the fundamental thing is that in the US in the nineteenth century, the mainstream of radicalism is based on individual autonomy, equality, and small property. Whether it’s a homestead thing, or even the Knights of Labor later. That’s what the Socialist Party breaks with — the idea that small property will solve capitalism. They say you’ve got to find a more collective solution to this.

Eventually the free labor ideology dies out. But in the nineteenth century the free-labor ideology was the source of much of American radicalism, and there’s no point in going back and saying, “Hey, they shouldn’t have thought that, they should have been socialists.”

That’s the peculiarity of this 1850s moment, isn’t it? This free-labor vision develops that bequeaths industrial capitalism and laissez faire, but at the same time it’s inchoate, it’s undetermined, and labor struggles can come out of it too. And that’s how Lincoln in the 1850s could say nobody should remain a wage earner for life.

But there is no real connection between that and socialism, and indeed there were plenty of socialists then and later, who said, “This is retrograde, this idea of small property being the essence of freedom. It’s a barrier against a collective view of society.” To say that today, however, is unhistorical anyway, because socialism was not on the agenda in 1850.

One thing about free labor is that when it emerges in the fifties, conservative elites in the South had no hesitancy finding anticapitalism in antislavery. They talked about Red Republicans and Black Republicans. They thought the way the antislavery people fundamentally challenged property was dangerous, that it cracked the egg.

The abolitionists always insisted they were not attacking property. They were attacking property in man as an illegitimate thing. Of course, others picked this up, and radical laborites called themselves the new abolitionists later on. When Thaddeus Stevens was proposing confiscating land in the South, there were Northern Republicans who said, “Wait a minute! The Irish are going to start talking about confiscating factories.” Even then they said, slavery was different, it was not legitimate property.

Let’s put it this way: after the Civil War, the free-labor vision becomes the essence of a radical labor critique of the Industrial Revolution.

Yet it also becomes the seed of right-wing laissez-faire . . .

Yes, free labor cracks up on class lines. The labor movement in the twentieth century — it’s not just rhetoric when they said, “We’re the new abolitionists.” Because the free-labor ideal was now under assault.

What we should be talking about is maybe the old Socialist Party, before World War I, Debsian socialism. Because what they had, which the abolitionists didn’t quite have, was an umbrella under which all sorts of groups could find a common ground, whether it’s birth control advocates, labor activists, anti-monopolists, and socialists, people like Debs who had a vision of socialism.

The idea of socialism they had was kind of a vague one, and of course the great historical fallacy is to view it back through the lens of World War I and the Russian Revolution. But before that, this was a large umbrella radical movement, with all sorts of people with very specific aims who could get together.

Today one of our problems is we have a lot of movements going on and they’re sympathetic to one another but they don’t seem to connect with one another. Whether it’s antiracist movements, gay movements, environmentalist — they all seem kind of fragmented. Whereas the Socialist Party, they all came together. You had Emma Goldman in there, you had Debs, you had municipal reformers, Jane Addams, progressives — it was part of the political dynamic of the country.

Even though in 1912 Debs got his million votes — 6 percent, that’s not a hell of a lot — but we’d take it now. But I think that’s a different model than the abolitionist model.

Maybe part of the reason they were able to have this unity with all these different causes was that it was a socialist party, which meant that even though their ideas were vague, what gave form to them was this idea of a different kind of society. People could invest their hopes in that.

Whereas today, with all the various struggles, we don’t have that, there’s no clear alternative.

Well, maybe we need a new word. Socialism unfortunately has gotten a bad name in this country.

It’s pretty popular with our generation, if you believe polls.

Good! If people are willing to talk about socialism, I think that’s gre

Did the Founding Fathers Believe In American Exceptionalism?

 by Sheldon Stern 

HNN August 14, 2015

In a recent critique of the highly controversial 2015 College Board APUSH revision, Stanley Kurtz of the Ethics and Public Policy Center, faulted the document for its failure to highlight “American exceptionalism,” which he defined as “America’s sense of principled mission, its unique blending of religious and democratic commitment, its characteristic emphasis on local government, the high cultural esteem in which economic enterprise is held, and America’s distinctive respect for individual liberty.”[1]

The idea of “American exceptionalism” has, in fact, become a political hot potato—reflexively embraced on the right and passionately denounced on the left. Perhaps we can gain some valuable insight into the historical merits of this concept by turning to one of the most underappreciated, but arguably the most brilliant of the Revolutionary generation, John Adams.

Adams was confident that the new United States was on the cusp of a brilliant future. But he did not believe that Americans, as a people, were exempt from the flaws and faults of other nations and peoples. “There is no special Providence for Americans … and their nature is the same with that of others. …We are not a chosen people … and we must and we shall go the way of all earth.” Americans, he warned, were not immune to the hubris, greed, and foolishness of the rest of mankind.[2]  He was convinced that negative rather than benign forces had largely shaped—and would continue to shape—human political behavior; and Americans were no exception.

In fact, Adams shared the prevailing view of human nature in the late 18th century: people, especially in the political sphere, were believed to be driven by irrational motives and corrupt passions. Vanity, prejudice and the desire for personal gain were the real motive forces in political behavior. Human beings would therefore appear unlikely to construct an orderly and stable political system.  The framers of the Constitution embraced this view of human nature and endeavored to construct a system to neutralize the problem.  The essence of their solution was to channel this inherently flawed human material into productive ends by balancing harmful things against one another.  The theory of counterpoise (stressed by James Madison in the Federalist Papers) argued that negative human traits could be harnessed and counterbalanced to create a workable and mutually beneficial system. This is the philosophical principle behind the practical implementation of checks and balances in the Constitution.

Americans, Adams believed, were neither unique nor exceptional. Local and representative political institutions, religious freedom and diversity, and a respect for personal liberty and entrepreneurship did not spring full blown from a special gift of (or to) the American people, but were instead essentially the product of an unanticipated set of historical circumstances in which the fledgling nation originated and developed: its remoteness from central political and religious authority in Britain and Europe; its great size and abundant natural resources; its relative lack of inherited and rigid legal, class and social barriers (excluding Native Americans and forcibly imported Africans).

Distinctive socio/political, geographic and economic circumstances enabled the American colonies to gradually develop institutions which, as it turned out, would have a far-reaching impact on the ideas and values of the rest of mankind. “American exceptionalism,” far from being the result of inherent superiority, was largely an unanticipated consequence of historical time and place. Nonetheless, understanding this historical context does not make this “exceptionalism” any less real or any less genuinely revolutionary.

[1] “Sorry, Still No American Exceptionalism in APUSH,” Stanley Kurtz, National Review, August 3, 2015.

[2] Joseph J. Ellis, Passionate Sage: The Character and Legacy of John Adams, 1993, 106-07

Dr. Stern is the author of numerous articles and “Averting ‘the Final Failure’: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings” (2003), “The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis” (2005), and “The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths vs. Reality” (2012), all in the Stanford University Press Nuclear Age Series. He was Historian at the Kennedy Library from 1977 to 2000.

Refresher Course: How Bad Was the Corruption in Warren Harding’s Administration? This Bad.

by Rick Shenkman

HNN August 13, 2015

«Warren G Harding-Harris & Ewing» by Harris & Ewing

The name Teapot Dome refers to a tract in Wyoming under which there lay a large pool of oil, one of the giant oil fields of the time.  It is because of the euphony of the name — which alludes to a giant sandstone rock formation that dominates the site and once looked like a teapot but no longer does, alas — that we tend to remember Teapot Dome as a scandal involving oil.  There was much more to it than that, however.  To Americans who lived through it Teapot Dome referred to a long litany of unsavory events involving fraud, intimidation, several overlapping cover-ups, bribes, blackmail, and even sex.  Teapot Dome had it all.

The first whiff of scandal rose up from the Veterans Bureau like the malodorous stench at a badly run pig farm.  Warren Harding, who was president, set up the bureau to handle the claims coming in from the wounded veterans of World War I.  Harding looked with pride upon his creation, which consolidated some half a dozen malfunctioning agencies, and had the biggest budget in the government.  It was one of the accomplishments for which he hoped to be remembered.  Unfortunately, he made the mistake of putting his old drinking buddy Charlie Forbes in charge.  There is a wonderful description of Forbes as a «pursy, rufous, convivial, highly energized individual, full of snappy stories and insinuating gossip boisterous in mirth and fellowship» that suggests why Harding fell for him.  But he shouldn’t have. Forbes was a thief. After he got Harding to give him control of the warehouses where the government stored hospital sheets, pajamas and gauze, among other items purchased for World War I, Forbes arranged for the sale of the stuff at rock bottom prices to a Boston firm run by friends.  It was the deal of a lifetime and it could make you rich.  The company was allowed to buy goods that were worth more than $5 million on the open market for $600,000.  Forbes, of course, took a cut.  He made off even better when he got into the hospital-building business.  Hospitals were needed to take care of wounded vets.  Under a deal with one of his contractors, he received a $50,000 kickback for every hospital that was built.

Harding himself was no paragon of virtue.  Rumors trailed him.  One was that as a newspaper publisher before he got into politics he had colluded with other publishers to rig the bids on county printing contracts so that all of them got a «little slice of the profits.»  The rumor was true.  As a politician he hung around with unsavory people and repeatedly cheated on his wife.  He had a baby with a mistress, Nan Britton, shortly before he became president and enjoyed carnal relations with her in a White House closet.  But he never took responsibility for the child.  In his will he left Nan nothing.  As president he recklessly bought half a million dollars in stocks on margin based on a tip that came through the president of Bethlehem Steel. (The stock plummeted, resulting in a margin call of over $100,000.)  But he considered himself basically honest and as president tried to do the right thing — or told himself he did.  When he found out about Forbes he was furious and heartsick.  «The next afternoon,» Harding’s biographer Francis Russell reports,

a visitor to the White House with an appointment to see the President was directed by mistake to the second floor.  As he approached the Red Room he heard a voice hoarse with anger and on entering saw Harding throttling a man against the wall as he shouted:  «You yellow rat!  You double-crossing bastard!  If you ever …»  Whirling about at the visitor’s approach, Harding loosed his grip and the released man staggered away, his face blotched and distorted.   «I am sorry,» Harding said curtly to his visitor.  «You have an appointment.  Come into the next room.»  On leaving the White House, the visitor asked the doorman who it was who had just gone out after he had come in, and the doorman replied:  «Colonel Forbes of the Veterans Bureau.»

Harding let Forbes flee to Europe, where he resigned.

The story of the oil scandal that is closely identified with Teapot Dome revolves around the man Harding installed to run the interior department:  Senator Albert Bacon Fall. By profession Fall was a New Mexico rancher.  He liked to wear string ties and a broad hat and he looked like a Teddy Roosevelt Rough Rider, which was appropriate, as he had been one. A large walrus mustache hung loosley over his mouth like Yosemite Sam’s adding (to modern eyes) a somewhat comical touch to his appearance.  But there was nothing funny about Albert Fall and you didn’t toy with him.  Once he drove a New Mexico newspaper that was publishing unfavorable articles about him into bankruptcy by having a bank call in a note and pressuring advertisers to stop running ads.  The president had absolute confidence in him.  «If Albert Fall isn’t an honest man,» he told one associate, «I’m not fit to be president of the United States.»  But Fall proved to have as little integrity as Charlie Forbes.

The scandal that led to Fall’s fall from grace began with the project he thought would be what he would be remembered for (to the extent that secretaries of the interior are ever remembered for anything).  It was an ingenious idea and it involved the Navy, which was in the process of switching its ships from coal to oil.  The switch, which had started before the war, was going well thanks to years of careful planning.  Officials had been so careful that they had even purchased huge tracts of land in California and Wyoming that were known to contain large supplies of oil so that their ships would never find themselves stranded for lack of oil.  Three of the biggest reserves were Elk Hills (Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 1) and Buena Vista (Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 2), which were located in the San Joaquin Valley south of Sacramento, and Teapot Dome (Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 3), which lay just north of Caspar, Wyoming. There was just one problem.  The next likely war was expected to be with Japan and that meant the ships would need accessible oil tanks in the Pacific at Pearl Harbor.  And there weren’t any oil facilities there. They would have to be built along with wharves, a shipping canal and the like.  The cost was estimated to run north of $200 million.  Unfortunately, the Navy lacked the requisite funds.  Following the end of World War I military budgets had been slashed as the public became disenchanted with the outcome of the war that was supposed to make the world safe for democracy but didn’t.  Fall’s solution was to lease the reserves to private companies and then divert a certain percentage of the royalties earned from the sale of the oil to the Navy.

The deal attracted controversy from the outset, even from some leaders in the military, who were upset that the interior secretary was involved in a decision involving their oil, but that wasn’t his fault.  The new secretary of the navy under Harding had asked Fall’s department, which oversaw millions of acres of public land, to take over control of the reserves, which were in danger (it was feared) of being drained by nearby wells.  Some also questioned the wisdom of selling oil that had been purchased expressly to provide the Navy with a ready supply in the event of war.  That, in hindsight, seems ludicrous.  The supply of oil in the United States was increasing every year. But at the time not everybody was confident the supply of oil would last, which was why the government had purchased the reserves in the first place.

But these complaints, though serious, weren’t the stuff of scandal.  To have a real, rock-ribbed, blood curdling scandal, something the dictionary says is defined by «an action or event regarded as morally or legally wrong and causing general public outrage,» you need something more.  You need a villain.  You need an Albert Fall.  If you were a novelist you couldn’t do better.  He had the misfortune to be born with a name that seemed to invite jokes once his demise began.  Fall.  It was too good to be true, like something Dickens would concoct.  Better yet, he was like the chef of scandals.  He seemed to know exactly the right ingredients that you need to make a dish that draws an outraged response.

First, as we’ve seen, he came up with the idea of selling the Navy’s oil, which was guaranteed to be controversial among military people who had taken comfort in the fact that the government was sitting on vast supplies.  Then he decided it would be a good idea to sell the oil leases secretly to friends without competitive bidding and without public discussion.  Then he decided to take «gifts» from these friends.  You can see how this didn’t look too good. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.  First, about those friends …

His friends happened to be two of the richest people in America:  Edward Doheney and Harry Sinclair.  Doheney was worth about 100 million dollars.  Sinclair was the founder of the multimillion dollar oil company that still bears his name.  Both were known for using their money to buy influence in Washington. Doheney’s dealings particularly smelled.  Recently, he had hired one Franklin Lane at a salary of $50,000 a year, a salary equal to what Woodrow Wilson earned just a few years earlier as president of the United States before the salary of the president was increased.  What merited this extravagance? Lane had been Wilson’s secretary of the interior and had useful contacts. Doheney bragged that he hired four of Wilson’s cabinet secretaries «for their influence.»

Inevitably, news of the land deals with Doheney and Sinclair leaked, immediately causing a ruckus among local oil men.  A Denver newspaper, fed information by a politician with oil holdings in Wyoming, began running frontpage stories about a land grab.  A New Mexico newspaper began reporting that Fall had recently started making major improvements on his  ranch, installing new wells and irrigation ditches, which raised questions.  Was Fall using his position in Washington to his personal benefit?  It turned out, he was.

Fall had decided — innocently, of course, he always claimed — to use his connections with Doheney and Sinclair to improve his situation.  It started with a visit Sinclair made to Fall’s ranch.  The two men, sitting in front of a warm fire, were discussing the Teapot Dome lease when Fall happened to mention that he sure wished he had some milking cows but unfortunately, he couldn’t afford them.  No worries, said Sinclair.  He had some he didn’t need.  When he went back home to New Jersey Sinclair sent Fall a barn’s worth of farm animals including six heifers, a bull, two young boars, four pigs, and an English thoroughbred.  Encouraged, Fall then thought, he later claimed, it would be a good idea to bring Sinclair in as a partner in his ranch, which hadn’t been doing too well.  So he reoganized his ranch holdings under a new company and supposedly sold a third interest to Sinclair, Sinclair paying for his share with two installments of bonds.  The first one was worth $198,000, the second $35,000.  Sinclair also ponied up $36,000 to cover operating expenses and made two other payments of $10,000 and $25,000.  Yet nowhere on any official document could you find Harry Sinclair’s name identifying him as a partner in the operation.  The reason is obvious.  Sinclair never was a partner.  The money was paid to help grease the oil deal, a deal that garnered Sinclair $17 million in instant profits after his company’s stock went up in price.  Fall kept the payments secret because they would look bad if disclosed (because they were bad).

Fall’s dealings with Doheney were also secret and just as brazen.  One day Doheney had his son go to their brokerage house, Blair Company, to pull out a cool $100,000.  In cash.  Then, in a scene that sounds like it came from a Hollywood movie, the young Delaney put the money in a black satchel and headed over to Washington D.C.’s Wardman Park Hotel on Woodley Road where Fall lived and handed it over.  Needless to say, the money wasn’t reported.  On his next trip back home Fall simply packed the money along with his suitcase and off he went.  In all Albert Fall’s dealings with his rich friends, Doheney and Sinclair, netted him a small fortune:  $404,000.

While Charlie Forbes was cleaning out the Veterans Bureau and Albert Fall was making bank with his buddies in the oil business, the attorney general, Harry Daugherty, was busy using his office to help select businesses escape prosecution.  The most egregious case involved the Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation.  Investigators had found that the company had failed to deliver aircraft bought and paid for during the war, defrauding the government of $2,267,342.  It was an open and shut case.  The company was supposed to deliver aircraft for the battle in France.  The company never delivered any.  Daugherty, however, decided not to prosecute.  This infuriated the lead investigator, who resigned.  What could possibly have been Dougherty’s reason?  He never explained.  But it may have been owing to his owning stock in the company.  He owned 500 shares when he took office.  Sometime during his tenure as attorney general he accumulated another 2,000.

That gives you an idea of Daugherty’s moral bearings.  But it barely begins to suggest the brazen breadth of his larceny.  A case which does involved the Alien Property Bureau.  This was an office set up during World War I to confiscate enemy property.  If you were German and you owned property in the United States the government claimed the right to take possession of it without compensation.  Of particular interest were companies involved in war-related industries such as metals. One of these companies was the American Metal Company.  Despite the name it was owned by a German family.  In 1917 the Bureau confiscated the company and sold it to buy Liberty Bonds.  This raised some $6 million dollars for the war effort, making it one of the bureau’s largest single acts of confiscation.  (Half a billion dollars in property was confiscated in all during the war.)

After the war the German family that had owned the company wanted to be compensated.  The American Metal Company wasn’t actually a German company, they claimed.  A month before war broke out with the United States, the family had transferred the ownership of the parent company to a Swiss outfit.  In their eyes this made the company Swiss.  This was arguable since they conceded that the family actually retained ownership of the company. But this wasn’t what was so remarkable about the case.  What was remarkable was that they didn’t have any paperwork to back up their assertion that the company had been sold and reconstituted as a firm based in Switzerland.  The transfer allegedly had been made by oral agreement.

On its face this was about as weak a case as was possible.  No paperwork?  No proof?  See you later.  But in Washington under Harding there were ways to overcome a bad case.  You just had to know the right people.  The German family knew this but didn’t know who the right people were or how to get to them.  So they asked around.  Somebody suggested they should go see John King.  It turned out he was exactly the right person to go see.  For King, a GOP political hack, knew Jess Smith and Smith knew everybody who counted in Harding’s Washington.  If you wanted to get things done, it was said, go see Smith.  It wasn’t, in fact, entirely true.  Smith gave off the appearance that he could get things done but often he couldn’t.  While he knew everybody he didn’t have them all in his hip pocket.  But he happened to have the one person who counted in this situation, his roommate at the Wardman Park Hotel (yes, the same hotel where Albert Fall had a suite).  His roommate was Attorney General Harry Daugherty.

In a short matter of time Smith set up a meeting for the family with the head of the Alien Property Bureau and himself.  One day later exactly the bureau decided the case in the family’s favor, awarding them an amount greater than the value placed on the company at the time it was confiscated.  The family would get their money back plus interest.  The payment was to be made in the form of checks and bonds.  The checks came to:  $6,453,979 and 97 cents.  The bonds were worth $514,350. One more step was needed, however.  The deal had to be approved by the United States government’s official approver in such matters.  This was Attorney General Harry Daugherty.  This turned out not to be a problem.  Two days later he affixed his signature to the document.   And that was that.

But that wasn’t the end of the story.  There was a coda.  To express their gratitude for the speed and size of the compensation package the German family decided their new government friends deserved a reward.  They gave King, the party hack, $391,300 in bonds and $50,000 in cash.  King, in turn, gave $50,000 to the head of the Alien Property Bureau, and $224,000 to Jess Smith, the man-about-town, who promptly put at least $50,000 into a mysterious joint account («Extra No. 3») which he and Attorney General Daugherty, his roommate, controlled.  No doubt more made its way to Daugherty through other means.

One day in the summer of 1923, as Harding was making his way west by train across the country on a long and arduous speaking tour, he conferred with his secretary of commerce, Herbert Hoover, whom Harding had invited along on the trip.  Hoover later recalled what ensued:

When we were a few days out, Harding asked me to come to his cabin. He plumped at me the question: ‘If you knew of a great scandal in our administration, would you for the good of the country and the party expose it publicly or would you bury it?’ My natural reply was ‘Publish it, and at least get credit for integrity on your side.’  I asked for more particulars. He said that he had received some rumors of irregularities, centering around Smith, in connection with cases in the Department of Justice. He had followed the matter up and finally sent for Smith. After a painful session he told Smith that he would be arrested in the morning. Smith went home, burned all his papers, and committed suicide.

Harding, troubled by what he had learned about both Smith and others (including Charlie Forbes, the official who’d fled to Europe), found sleeping difficult.  He complained that he wasn’t feeling well, forcing the cancellation of many of his scheduled appearances.  Nonetheless he carried on, traveling to Alaska, where he became the first president to visit the territory.  On his way back, as his train headed to San Francisco, exhausted and worn down by a job he protested he wasn’t qualified to hold, he laid down on his bed, his head jerked, and he died.

Harding passed away before the worst of the Teapot Dome scandals became public. At the time so few of the scandals had come to light that he remained a respectable figure.  Millions turned out to watch his funeral train go by.  His body lay in state in the Capitol Rotunda on the same catafalque that had held Abraham Lincoln’s.  His hometown in Ohio even made plans to remember him with a large 48 columned Greek-style memorial made out of white Georgian marble. Unfortunately, by the time it was ready, in 1927, the public had long since lost interest in him. Too much had happened.

Jess Smith, paranoid and afraid, committed suicide, of course.  Charlie Forbes, the fellow who stole the Veterans Bureau blind, resigned and ultimately was prosecuted after returning from Europe.  He spent eight months in prison.  Albert Fall, the secretary of the interior, took the Fifth when he testified at a Senate hearing and was tried for conspiracy.  He was sentenced to prison for a year.  He was the first member of a presidential cabinet to be convicted of a crime in connection with his official duties.  His business friends Sinclair and Doheney were also prosecuted, but protected by a phalanx of high-priced attorneys, managed to evade harsh penalties.  Though Fall had been found guilty of accepting a bribe from Doheney, Doheney himself was acquitted of giving it to him. Sinclair got six months in the D.C. jail for criminal contempt in connection with an attempt at jury tampering. This was on top of a three month sentence for failing to answer questions put to him by the Senate.  And Attorney General Daugherty?  After being forced to resign he was tried twice and acquitted twice. Harding’s girlfriend Nan published a memoir in which she laid out all of the lurid details of their affair.  She referred to their baby as The President’s Daughter, the title she gave her book.

Despite the scandal Ohio officials pressed for a grand opening of the Harding memorial in 1931.  They invited Calvin Coolidge, who’d succeeded Harding as president, and Herbert Hoover, who’d succeeded Coolidge and was now the incumbent.  Though Coolidge and Hoover had both served in the Harding administration, they agreed to accept the invitation only grudgingly.  Warren Harding had by then become the president presidents wanted to forget — as did the country.

Rick Shenkman, the founder and editor of the History News Network, is the author of Presidential Ambition. His newest book is Political Animals: How Our Stone Age Brain Gets in the Way of Smart Politics (January 2016).

 

Inside the Crazy Back-Channel Negotiations That Revolutionized Our Relationship With Cuba

Mother Jones    September/October 2015
 Inside the Crazy Back-Channel Negotiations That Revolutionized Our Relationship With Cuba
On a rainy day last December, President Barack Obama gathered a small group of senior officials in the Oval Office and placed a telephone call to Raúl Castro. Sitting on a couch to Obama’s left were National Security Council aides Benjamin Rhodes and Ricardo Zuniga, personal emissaries whose 18 months of secret negotiations were about to culminate in the first substantive conversation between the presidents of the United States and Cuba in more than half a century.

Obama later told reporters that he’d apologized to Castro for talking for such a long time. «Don’t worry about it, Mr. President,» Castro responded. «You’re still a young man and have still the time to break Fidel’s record—he once spoke seven hours straight.» After Castro finished his own lengthy opening statement, Obama joked, «Obviously, it runs in the family.»

Raúl Castro meets with President Obama on the sidelines of the 7th Summit of the Americas in Panama City, Panama in April, 2015. Estudio Revolucion/Xinhua/ZUMA

Despite the levity, both leaders understood the seriousness of their 45-minute conversation. «There was,» one White House official recalled, «a sense of history in that room.»

At noon the next day, the two presidents stunned the world when they simultaneously announced the dramatic breakthrough. Obama repudiated 55 years of US efforts to roll back the Cuban revolution, declaring that peaceful coexistence made more sense than perpetual antagonism. Both leaders described a prisoner exchange that had occurred earlier that morning. For «humanitarian reasons,» Cuba had released Alan Gross, incarcerated since December 2009 for setting up illicit satellite communications networks as part of a US Agency for International Development (USAID) «democracy promotion» program. Cuba also released Rolando Sarraff Trujillo, a CIA spy whom Obama called «one of the most important intelligence agents that the United States has ever had in Cuba.» In return, Obama commuted the sentences of the last three members of the «Cuban Five» spy ring—Gerardo Hernández, Antonio Guerrero, and Ramón Labañino—imprisoned for 16 years after they were caught infiltrating anti-Castro Cuban American groups and providing information that (the United States claimed) allowed Cuba to shoot down two planes flown into its airspace by an exile group, killing four Cuban Americans. (The other two members of the Cuban Five had been releasedearlier, having completed their sentences.)

 But the prisoner exchange was only the beginning. Obama promised to loosen restrictions on travel and trade, and authorize telecommunications companies to bring internet services to the island. For its part, Cuba pledged to release 53 political prisoners and engage with the International Red Cross and United Nations on human rights and prison conditions. Most importantly, the two presidents agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations. On July 20, Cuba’s foreign minister, Bruno Rodríguez, traveled to Washington to raise the Cuban flag over the former embassy on 16th Street; on August 14 Secretary of State John Kerry will travel to Havana to reopen our embassy in the sleek, modernist structure built for that purpose in 1953.

What brought about this radical change was a unique alignment of political stars: a shift in public opinion, particularly among Cuban Americans; a transition in Cuban leadership from Fidel to Raúl, followed by Cuba’s slow but steady evolution toward a market socialist economy; and Latin American leaders no longer willing to accept Cuba’s exclusion from regional affairs. Seizing the opportunity were a handful of dedicated US legislators, well-financed lobbyists, Alan Gross’ aggressive legal team, an activist pope from Latin America, and a woman hell-bent on getting pregnant.

But one factor trumped the rest: Obama’s determination. He was, one top aiderecalls, «a president who really wanted to do it.»

ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN

Obama’s push to break «the shackles of the past» began shortly after his reelection, when, according to one aide, he «told us we needed to design a play to run with Cuba.» By April 2013, Obama had chosen Rhodes and Zuniga to lead the negotiations. Rhodes had joined Obama’s 2008 campaign as a speechwriter and was personally close to the president. «All it takes is one Google search for these guys to know that Ben speaks to the president, and has daily access, and can be a trusted back channel,» explained a former White House official. Zuniga, meanwhile, had served in the US Interests Section in Havana (the embassy stand-in) and as the State Department’s acting coordinator for Cuban affairs.

Over the next 18 months, the two men met nine times with a small team of Cuban officials in various locales, from Ottawa to Rome. From the start, it was clear that before any discussion of normalizing relations could occur, both countries wanted their imprisoned citizens released.

But US officials believed that such a direct exchange would be politically toxic. Instead, they hoped their growing rapport would convince the Cubans to free Gross. As a show of good faith, they arranged for the wives of Hernández and González to secretly visit them. In exchange, the Cubans permitted Judy Gross regular visits with her husband, held in a military hospital in Havana.

«We thought this would lead to the release of Alan Gross,» one US official recalls. But the Cubans continued to hold out for the swap, even as the parole dates for two of their five spies neared. Eventually US negotiators realized their strategy was doomed. In May 2012, Clinton received a memo from her team that stated: «We have to continue negotiating with the Cubans on the release of Alan Gross but cannot allow his situation to block an advance of bilateral relations…The Cubans are not going to budge. We either deal with the Cuban Five or cordon those two issues off.»

The memo hit at an opportune time. Clinton and Obama had just returnedfrom the Sixth Summit of the Americas, where they’d been chastised by heads of states furious over the US stance on Cuba. «It was clearly an irritant and a drag on our policy in the region,» says Roberta S. Jacobson, assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs.

Clinton had previously pushed the White House to liberalize regulations on educational travel to Cuba, finally going directly to the president to bypass White House aides worried about political fallout. In the wake of the summit debacle, she instructed her deputy to assemble what one adviser called «the full monty» of potential actions to change Cuba policy. «I recommended to President Obama that he take another look at our embargo,» Clinton recalls in her memoir. «It wasn’t achieving its goals and it was holding back our broader agenda across Latin America.»

Following his reelection, Obama approached Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry about replacing Clinton as secretary of state—and immediately raised the prospect of a new approach to Cuba. Kerry was receptive. As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he’d been a vocal critic of the USAID democracy promotion programs that financed Gross’ secret missions to Cuba. Kerry had also long opposed the US economic embargo, and played a key role in normalizing relations with Vietnam—a triumph he hoped to repeat with Cuba.

Still, when a new round of secret talks began in June 2013, Kerry was not privyto them. Only a handful of US officials knew, among them Vice President Joe Biden, White House chief of staff Denis McDonough, and National Security Advisor Susan Rice. No one at the Pentagon was «read in.» Although Kerry was eventually brought into the loop, «we kept it fairly tight on our side, and the Cubans, I think, did the same on their side,» a senior US official said. «We didn’t want any wrench to be thrown in the gears that could complicate attempts to secure Alan Gross’ release.»

The effort at secrecy was aided by Canada, which allowed the two sides to meet in Ottawa and later Toronto. The Cubans’ top priority was still getting their spies back—particularly Gerardo Hernández, who, as the ringleader of the Cuban Five and the broader crew of spies known as the «Wasp Network,» was serving two life sentences. Zuniga and Rhodes came to the table with a more fluid approach. «We had no fixed vision of what an agreement would be,» recalls a White House official knowledgeable about the talks. Instead, they wanted to «try out different formulas» to explore what could be agreed on. «We never went in thinking there would be a grand bargain.»

But politically the White House was in a tricky spot. If all that came out of the talks was a prisoner exchange and a few travel and trade tweaks, Obama’s initiative would not register as a serious policy change. Lifting the embargowas in Congress’ hands, but restoring diplomatic ties was the one dramatic action he could take unilaterally.


«Look, I wasn’t even born when this policy was put in place,» he told the Cubans. «We want to hear and talk about the future.»


During the first negotiating sessions, the US team had to listen to the Cubans recite the long history of US depredations against the island, starting with the Spanish-American War in 1898. To old hands, it was the requisite throat-clearing to be endured before getting down to real business. But Rhodes had no prior dealings with Cuba and at one point interrupted the diatribe. «Look, I wasn’t even born when this policy was put in place,» he told the Cubans. «We want to hear and talk about the future

Historical disagreements were only the beginning. The US team wasn’t willing to talk about the USAID programs or Guantán­amo; the Cubans weren’t willing to discuss human rights or US fugitives hiding in their country. «There were a lot of dry wells for us and for them,» according to a White House official. Both sides were eager to talk about the prisoners, but a straight-up trade—Gross for the three remaining members of the Cuban Five—was still a nonstarter for the White House. The president had said repeatedly that Gross had done nothing wrong, was not a spy, and therefore could not be exchanged for spies. In the administration’s public portrayal of Gross, he was just a development specialist attempting to bring internet access to Cuba’s small Jewish community. To the Cubans, Gross was a covert operative engaged in a program to subvert their government, and the Cuban Five were patriots protecting their country against the far-right zealots of Little Havana.

To break the deadlock, the US negotiators raised the case of Rolando Sarraff Trujillo, who’d been a top CIA mole inside Cuban intelligence until his arrest in the mid-1990s. Sarraff had provided the United States with information that led to the prosecution of many Cuban spies, including Ana Montes, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s top Cuba specialist; State Department employee Walter Kendall Myers and his wife, Gwendolyn; and the Wasp Network—including the Cuban Five.

During negotiations in Toronto in January 2014, the Americans suggested that if the ailing Gross were released on humanitarian grounds, they would swap the three Cuban spies for Sarraff. But the Cubans did not want to give up Sarraff—a double agent they considered so treacherous they’d held him in solitary for 18 years.

Left: Alan Gross greets Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Sen. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.), Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) on Dec. 17, 2014. Right: Gross departs Havana with his wife, Judy Gross, attorney Scott Gilbert, and members of Congress. Lawrence Jackson/White House

Negotiations got even pricklier in May 2014, when the Obama administration announced it was swapping five Taliban leaders held at Guantánamo for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, a US soldier captured and imprisoned by the Taliban since 2009. The political uproar in Congress and the media was intense, especially after Bergdahl was reported to have deserted his post. From the US perspective, this made a similar trade with Cuba completely out of the question. The Cubans, however, figured that since Washington had traded five Taliban combatants for one US soldier, the White House would eventually agree to trade their three spies for Alan Gross.

It took months of negotiations for US diplomats to convince the Cubans that the only exchange the White House could abide would be trading spies for spies, namely the Cuban agents for Sarraff. Finally the Cubans relented, and talks turned to what one US official describes as «a bigger package»—including the restoration of full diplomatic relations.

A TICKING TIME BOMB

In defending the Bergdahl deal, Obama officials cited intelligence indicating his mental and physical health were deteriorating after five years of captivity. They faced a similarly dire situation with Alan Gross. More than four years after being arrested, Gross was despondent over the administration’s inability to obtain his freedom. At one point he lost more than 100 pounds. By December 2013, when the coauthor of this article, Peter Korn­bluh, visited him in the military hospital where he was held, he seemed determined to get out on his own—dead or alive. «I’m a ticking time bomb. Tick. Tick. Tick,» Gross warned during the three-hour visit, in which he alluded to a plan to break down the «flimsy» door of his cell and challenge the heavily armed guards on the other side. A few months later, in April 2014, Gross went on a nine-dayhunger strike. On his 65th birthday on May 2, he announced it would be the last he would spend in a Cuban jail.

When Gross’ terminally ill, 92-year-old mother, Evelyn, took a severe turn for the worse in late May, negotiations became urgent. Meeting in Ottawa in early June, the Cubans pushed for a quick prisoner trade, expressing their fear that Gross would kill himself when his mother passed away. US officials, meanwhile, worried that if Gross died in a Cuban prison, a change in US policy would become politically impossible.

Kerry reached out to Cuban foreign minister Bruno Rodríguez and proposed a «furlough» to the United States—Gross would wear an electronic bracelet to allow the Cubans to monitor his movements, and he would return to prison after his mother’s death. «Alan promised unequivocally that he would return to incarceration in Cuba after visiting his mother at the hospital in Texas,» his lawyer Scott Gilbert recalls, «and I offered to take his place until he returned. That is how important this was.»

But the Cubans considered the plan too risky. After Evelyn Gross died on June 18, 2014, Kerry warned Rodrí­guez that if any harm came to Gross while in Cuba’s custody, the opportunity for better relations would be lost.

Left: Alan Gross talks with President Obama onboard a government plane headed back to the United States. Right: Gross arrives at at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. Lawrence Jackson/White House

Gross was in «a difficult state of mind,» Gilbert recalls. As the summer progressed, he refused to meet with officials from the US Interests Section who routinely brought him care packages, and he told his wife and daughter that unless he was released soon, he’d never see them again. His lifeline was Gilbert, who pressed the Cubans to allow him to speak to Gross every day, and who traveled to Cuba 20 times to sustain his client’s morale.

STORK DIPLOMACY

Gross was also taking regular calls from Tim Rieser, a top aide to Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.). Rieser was instrumental in securing better conditions for Gross in return for one of the more unusual confidence-building measures in the annals of diplomacy—a long-distance effort to impregnate the wife of Gerardo Hernández, the jailed Cuban spymaster.

This idea was first conceived in early 2011, when the head of Cuba’s Interests Section in Washington met with the State Department’s Julissa Reynoso to deliver a diplomatic note stating that Cuba did not see «any solution» to the incarceration of Hernández and that his wife, Adriana Pérez, was nearing the age of 40. Cuba sought US support to «facilitate» her ability to get pregnant.


It was one of the more unusual confidence-building measures in the annals of diplomacy—a long-distance effort to impregnate the wife of Gerardo Hernández, the jailed Cuban spymaster.


After what she calls a «sensitive» meeting on the matter, Reynoso explored the possibility of a secret conjugal visit between Pérez and her husband, but efforts to arrange such a rendezvous «fizzled out» due to Bureau of Prisons regulations. Two years later, in February 2013, Pérez met with Leahy, who was visiting Cuba with his wife, Marcelle. In a Havana hotel room, Pérez made an impassioned appeal to the Leahys to help her find a way to have a child with her husband, who had been in jail for 15 years. «It was an emotional meeting,»Leahy remembers. «She made a personal appeal to Marcelle. She was afraid that she would never have the chance to have a child. As parents and grandparents, we both wanted to try to help her. It was a human thing. It had nothing to do with the politics of the two countries.» But it would.

Leahy asked Rieser to find a solution. A conjugal visit was a nonstarter, but there was precedent for allowing an inmate to provide sperm for artificial insemination. Eventually, Rieser secured approval and the Cubans flew Pérez to a fertility clinic in Panama.

Meanwhile, Rieser was pressing the Cubans to improve the conditions for Gross: «I wanted to make clear to them that we cared about the treatment of their people, just as we expected them to care about the treatment of ours.» The Cubans reciprocated, permitting Gross to be examined by his own doctors, giving him a computer and printer, and allowing him more outdoor exercise.

As Pérez’s pregnancy became obvious, the State Department asked the Cubans to keep her out of the public eye, lest her condition stir speculation that a US-Cuban rapprochement was in the works. «We had given our word to keep the pregnancy and all of the process around it a secret in order not to prejudice the greater objective, which was our freedom,» Hernández later explained. When he landed in Cuba, state television showed him being greeted by Raúl Castro and, to the astonishment of his countrymen, a nine-months-pregnant wife. Three weeks later, on January 6, 2015, their baby girl, Gema Hernández Pérez, was born.

Although Leahy’s «stork diplomacy» contributed to the success of the Cuba-US negotiations, even he was unaware of the secret talks underway. Meanwhile, he served as the unofficial leader of a group of senators and representatives who pressed Obama and his aides for change at every opportunity. «All of us had been pushing the president when we saw him at ceremonial functions for a few seconds—telling him, ‘You’ve got to do something on Cuba,'» recalls Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Mass.).

Leahy decided that to get the attention of the president, a former legal scholar, he’d have to flesh out the legal basis to release the Cuban spies. The senator’s staff collaborated with former White House counsel Greg Craig to draft a 10-page memo of options «to secure Mr. Gross’ release, and in so doing break the logjam and change the course of U.S. policy towards Cuba, which would be widely acclaimed as a major legacy achievement.» The document, dated February 7, laid out a course of action that would prove to be a close match with the final accord. «It was a damn good memo,» Craig says.

Still, it took until May 1 before Leahy, along with Sens. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) and Reps. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) and McGovern, finally met in the Oval Office with Obama, Biden, and Susan Rice. They urged Obama to press for Gross’ release and replace the policy of hostility with one of engagement. «You said you were going to do this,» McGovern reminded the president. «Let’s just do it!»

«We’re working on it,» Obama told them, but he gave no hint of the back-channel diplomacy then well underway.

«There was a bit of tension with the president. We’re pushing him, and he’s pushing back,» McGovern recalls. «We were pretty aggressive.» At the meeting’s end, the members were not very optimistic. «We were not reassured that this was going to happen.»

A NEW NORMAL

Three days earlier, a series of billboards appeared in the Washington Metro stations nearest to the White House and State Department. «Mr. President, it’s time to take action on Cuba policy,» read one. Another declared, «The American people are our best ambassadors. It’s time to allow all persons to travel freely to Cuba.» The ads, which generated significant media buzz, were sponsored by a new advocacy group, #CubaNow, which positioned itself as the voice of the younger, more moderate Cuban American community in Miami.

#CubaNow was the brainchild of the Trimpa Group, an unusual organization that matched deep-pocketed donors seeking to change policy with a political strategy and advocacy campaign. In 2003, for example, founder Ted Trimpa developed a lobbying strategy to mount a marriage-equality movement across the country financed by multimillionaire businessman Tim Gill.

Nine years later, in October 2012, Gill traveled to Cuba on a US-licensed tour with a wealthy friend, Patty Ebrahimi, who was born and raised in Cuba but left with her family a year after Fidel Castro seized power. Ebrahimi chafed under the restrictions of the tour imposed by US Treasury regulations. She couldn’t go off on her own to visit the neighborhoods of her youth, track down family friends, or see her old schools. «The idea that I could go anywhere else in the world, including Vietnam, North Korea, or Iran, without special permission from the US government but couldn’t go to Cuba without a license angered me,» she recalled. As she vented her frustrations to Gill in the lounge of the Saratoga Hotel in Havana, he offered a suggestion: «You should use your money to change the policy.» A few months later, he introduced Ebrahimi to Trimpa.

Gerardo Hernandez with his wife Adriana Perez after the birth of their daughter.

Gerardo Hernández with his wife Adriana Pérez after the birth of their daughter. Estudios Revolucion

After conducting a three-month survey of the political landscape, the Trimpa Group reported that «the highest level of decision makers within the Obama administration» wanted change—they just needed political reinforcement to push for it. After consulting with her husband, Fred, the former CEO and owner of Quark Software Inc., Patty gave the lobby shop $1 million to finance a campaign to embolden the White House.

«My decision to take up this work was an emotional one,» she later said. «We did it because we wanted to help,» Fred Ebrahimi noted. «We did it because we thought we could be effective.»

The Trimpa Group pulled out all the stops. It counseled Ebrahimi to make donations to key political figures such as Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) and Durbin—donations intended to gain access and «be in the room,» according to Trimpa’s strategic plan. The lobby shop hired Luis Miranda, who had recently left his position as Obama’s director of Hispanic media, and sought the blessing of Jim Messina, Obama’s deputy chief of staff, to launch a public campaign promoting a change in Cuba policy. The Trimpa team also met with key foreign policy officials. To all the players, the Trimpa Group insisted that there would be no political blowback for Democrats in Florida if Obama changed Cuba policy. To bolster that argument, they financed a series of opinion polls. One, conducted by an Obama pollster, John Anzalone, found that Cuban Americans in Florida—especially the younger generation—favored engagement. And the Atlantic Council conducted a national poll sponsored by Trimpa that found, as a New York Times headline would put it, that a «Majority of Americans Favor Ties With Cuba.»

The polls were intended to «show broad support for change,» «create a new normal,» and «give voice to the silent majority,» says James Williams, the political operative who oversaw the Trimpa Group’s efforts.

Williams also had the support of groups key to the Cuba debate, ranging from funding powerhouses (like Atlantic Philanthropies, the Ford Foundation, and the Christopher Reynolds Foundation) to policy shops (the Washington Office on Latin America, the Center for Democracy in the Americas, and the Latin America Working Group) to elite think tanks (Brookings and the Council of the Americas).

On May 19, 2014, this coalition released an open letter to Obama signed by 46 luminaries of the policy and business world, urging the president to engage with Cuba. The signatories included former diplomats and retired military officers—among them former UN Ambassador Thomas Pickering—and Cuban American business leaders like Andres Fanjul, co-owner of a Florida-based multinational sugar company. But the name that attracted the most attention was John Negroponte, George W. Bush’s director of national intelligence.

The same day, not coincidentally, the conservative US Chamber of Commerce announced that its president, Tom Donohue, would lead a delegation to Cuba to «develop a better understanding of the country’s current economic environment and the state of its private sector.»

Soon after that, the New York Times launched a two-month editorial series slugged «Cuba: A New Start.» The weekly editorials were the work of Ernesto Londoño, who talked to administration officials, Leahy’s office, and the Trimpa Group. «There was really no collusion or formal cooperation in what they were doing and what we were doing,» he told Terry Gross on Fresh Air. The Times simply saw an opportunity to push the policy it advocated forward. «We figured it was worthwhile to give it a shot.»

All these forces, in other words, were marshaled to push Obama through a door whose threshold he had already crossed.

DIVINE INTERVENTION

And let’s not forget the pope.

Even as the secret negotiations continued, members of Congress kept looking for allies to press Obama on Cuba, and provide him cover from attacks from the right. In a September 2013 meeting at Rice’s office, Durbin floated a new idea: What about getting the new pope involved? As the first pontiff from Latin America, Francis knew Cuba well. After accompanying Pope John Paul II on his 1998 visit to the island, Francis—then the assistant archbishop of Buenos Aires—had written a short book about the trip, Dialogues Between John Paul II and Fidel Castro. And the Vatican had credibility with Havana because of its consistent opposition to the embargo.

Raul Castro talks with Pope Francis

Pope Francis talks with Cuban President Raúl Castro during a private audience at the Vatican May 10, 2015. Gregorio Borgia/Pool/Reuters

All parties saw the wisdom of divine intervention. Leahy sent a confidential message to Cuban Cardinal Jaime Ortega, asking him to encourage the pope to help resolve the prisoner issue. Drawing on the close ties between Obama’s chief of staff, Denis McDonough, and Cardinal Theodore McCarrick of Washington, the White House also «got word to the Vatican that the president was eager to discuss this» at an upcoming meeting in March with the pope in Rome, according to Craig. And at a strategy meeting of the Cuba advocacy groups, Tim Phillips of the peace group Beyond Conflict suggested approaching Cardinal Seán O’Malley of Boston. «We knew that O’Malley was very close to the pope,» recalled Craig, who had ties to the Catholic Church hierarchy in Boston from his days as a foreign policy aide to Sen. Ted Kennedy. «O’Malley had spent time in Latin America, spoke Spanish fluently, had known the pope before he became pope, and had a relationship with the pope that was unusual, certainly much, much better than McCarrick’s.»

In early March 2014, a small group of Cuba policy advocates, including representatives of the Trimpa Group, Phillips, and Craig, met with Cardinal O’Malley in the rectory of the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Boston. «We explained the recent trends, the conversations with POTUS and others in the administration and Congress,» Phillips recalls, «and indicated this was a historic moment, and a message from the pope to POTUS would be significant in moving the process forward.» Craig brought a letter from Leahy urging the cardinal to focus the pope’s attention on the «humanitarian issue» of the prisoner exchange. Leahy personally delivered a similar message to Cardinal McCarrick, and arranged for yet another to be sent to Cardinal Ortega in Havana. There now were three cardinals urging the pope—as yet unaware of the secret dialogue between Washington and Havana—to put Cuba on the agenda with Obama.

Three weeks later, Obama met the pope in his private library, a marble-floored chamber overlooking St. Peter’s Square. There, they spoke for an hour under a frieze of Renaissance frescoes. Obama «told the pope that we had something going with Cuba and said it would be useful if he could play a role,» according to a White House official familiar with the meeting. A few days later, Francis summoned Ortega to enlist his help.

Over the summer, the pope wrote forceful, confidential letters to Obama and Raúl Castro, imploring the two leaders «to resolve humanitarian questions of common interest, including the situation of certain prisoners, in order to initiate a new phase in relations.» To safeguard his communications, the pope sent both letters via papal courier to Havana—with instructions to Cardinal Ortega to personally deliver the message into the president’s hands. Ortega then sent his top aide to Washington to advance his clandestine diplomatic mission. But arranging a secret face-to-face meeting with the president of the United States was easier said than done. Alerted to the problem, Cardinal McCarrick conferred with White House officials, who enlisted his help as a secret back-channel go-between. In early August, McCarrick traveled to Cuba carrying a note from Obama that asked Ortega to entrust McCarrick with delivering the pope’s letter to the White House. But Ortega’s papal instructions were to deliver the message himself. McCarrick left Cuba empty-handed.


To make sure the meeting did not leak, US officials kept Cardinal Ortega’s name off of the White House visitor logs. Meeting with the president on the patio adjacent to the Rose Garden, Ortega delivered the pope’s letter in which Francis offered to «help in any way.»


Back in Washington, McCarrick worked with McDonough to arrange a secret meeting for Ortega with the president. On the morning of August 18, Ortega gave a talk at Georgetown University—providing a cover story for his presence in Washington—and then quietly went to the White House. (To make sure the meeting did not leak, US officials kept Ortega’s name off the White House visitor logs.) Meeting with the president on the patio adjacent to the Rose Garden, Ortega finally completed his mission of delivering the pope’s sensitive communication, in which he offered to «help in any way.»

It was a convoluted process, but an unprecedented gesture. «We haven’t received communications like this from the pope that I’m aware of other than this instance,» a senior US official recalls. «And that gave, I think, greater impetus and momentum for us to move forward.»

OPEN TO CHANGE?

By late October, the pope had invited the negotiators to Rome. «It was less a matter of breaking some substantive logjam but more the confidence of having an external party we could rely on,» says a senior US official.

It was at the Vatican that the two sides hammered out their final agreement on the prisoner exchange and restoring diplomatic relations. Rhodes and Zuniga also noted Obama’s intention to ease regulations on travel and trade, and to allow US telecom companies to help Cuban state enterprises expand internet access. They acknowledged these initiatives were aimed at fostering greater openness in Cuba, though they delivered this message respectfully. Cuban officials said that while they had no intention of changing their political system to suit the United States, they had reviewed the Americans’ list of prisoners jailed for political activities and would release 53 of them as a goodwill gesture. The pope agreed to act as guarantor of the final accord.

Obama’s National Security Council met on November 6 to sign off on the details. Later that month, the negotiating teams convened one last time in Canada to arrange the logistics of the prisoner exchange.

On December 12, Zuniga called Alan Gross’ wife, Judy, to the Executive Office Building to tell her the good news. Four days later, on the eve of Hanukkah, Scott Gilbert called his client to tell him he’d soon be a free man. «I’ll believe it when I see it,» Gross replied.

He didn’t have to wait long: Early the next morning Gross was taken from his prison cell in Havana to a small military airport, where he was met by his wife, his attorney, and members of Congress who had worked to win his release. The prisoner exchange was choreographed so carefully that the blue and white presidential plane sent to bring Gross home was not cleared to depart Havana until the plane carrying the three Cuban spies touched down on a nearby runway.

Once in the air, Gross was given some of his favorite foods—popcorn and corned beef on rye—and took a call from Obama. After clearing Cuban airspace, he called his daughters to tell them simply, «I’m free.»

Obama called on Congress to rescind the embargo—a policy, as he said, «long past its expiration date.» But with Republican majorities in both houses and a presidential election in the offing, getting Congress to end the sanctions looks to be a lot harder than reaching an agreement with Havana. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), who has led the Republican tirades against the deal, says thepresident gave the Cuban government «everything it asked for» and got nothing in return. «I am committed to unravel as many of these changes as possible,» he added.

While Rubio and the rest of the old-guard anti-Cuba lobby fume, the process of normalization is moving forward. Obama officially removed Cuba from the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, and US and Cuban flags fly over the newly reestablished embassies in Havana and Washington.

But maybe the most symbolic moment came at the Seventh Summit of the Americas in April, when Obama and Castro met privately in person for the first time and reaffirmed their commitment to normalize relations. Although Castro prefaced his speech before the assembly with a 50-minute litany of US transgressions against Cuba, at the end his tone changed to conciliation and even warmth. «I have told President Obama that I get very emotional talking about the revolution. I apologize to him because President Obama had no responsibility for this,» Castro said, noting that nine other US presidents could have reached out to Cuba and didn’t. «In my opinion, President Obama is an honest man. I have read his autobiographies and I admire him and his life and think his behavior comes from his humble background. There, I said it.»

Obama chose not to revisit old bitterness: «America never makes a claim about being perfect. We do make a claim about being open to change. The United States will not be imprisoned by the past. We’re looking to the future.»

This article is adapted from the new, updated edition of the authors’ book, Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana, to be published in October, ©2015 University of North Carolina Press.

It was a touchy subject, but one we learned had already been broached following the devastating 2010 earthquake in Haiti, which led to unprecedented US-Cuban cooperation on disaster relief. Over the next two years, two top State Department officials—Hillary Clinton’s chief of staff, Cheryl Mills, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Julissa Reynoso—secretly negotiated with Cuban officials in Creole restaurants in Port-au-Prince, subterranean bars on Manhattan’s East Side, and a hotel lounge in Santo Domingo. US officials focused on freeing Gross, while the Cubans requested that the wives of Cuban spies Hernández and René González be allowed to visit their husbands in jail. (These women’s visas had previously been denied because they too were suspected of being covert agents.) The Cuban position «started with ‘Treat our guys better,'» says a US official with knowledge of the talks, and evolved into «‘We want them all home.'» By September 2011, the Cubans had explicitly proposed swapping the Cuban Five for Alan Gross.«JUST DO IT!»At noon, Obama announced the deal with Cuba to the nation: «We will end an outdated approach that, for decades, has failed to advance our interests. Neither the American nor Cuban people are well served by a rigid policy that is rooted in events that took place before most of us were born.» Raúl Castro was more restrained, focusing on the return of the three Cuban «heroes.» Normalization of diplomatic relations received just a single sentence, followed immediately by a reminder that the embargo —»the heart of the matter»—remained in place.

PETER KORNBLUH

Director, Cuba Documentation Project

Peter Kornbluh directs the Cuba Documentation Project at the National Security Archive in Washington, DC. He is co-author of Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana.

WILLIAM LEOGRANDE

Professor of Government

William LeoGrande is a professor of government and a specialist in Latin American politics and US foreign policy toward Latin America. He has written five books, including Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992. Most recently, he is coauthor of Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana.

The U.S. Occupation of Haiti: A Bibliography

U.S. Marines in occupied Haiti

U.S. Marines in occupied Haiti

July 28, 2015 marked the one-hundred year anniversary of the landing of U.S. Marines on Haitian soil. A number of organizations marked the occasion and, to conclude my own series on the U.S. occupation of Haiti, I would now like to present a bibliography of important works on that event. This list highlights not only books, dissertations, and articles that pertain to political relations between the United States and Haiti during that era but also to those that address the black intellectual response to U.S. imperialism in Haiti. It is by no means exhaustive, though. I welcome further suggestions for readings in the comments and also encourage readers to consult The Public Archive, Haiti: Then and Now, and The Haitian History Blog for additional resources about the occupation. Finally, scholars in a range of disciplines should look forward to a special issue of The Journal of Haitian Studies dedicated to the centennial of the U.S. occupation of Haiti. That issue is slated for a Fall 2015 publication.

Alexis, Yveline. “Nationalism & The Politics of Historical Memory: Charlemagne Peralte’s Rebellion Against U.S. Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1986.” Ph.D. dissertation., The University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2011.

Bellegarde-Smith, Patrick. In the Shadow of Powers: Dantés Bellegarde in Haitian Social Thought. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1985.

Blancpain, François. Haïti et les États-Unis: 1915-1934: Histoire d’une occupation. Paris, L’Harmattan, 1999.

Brissman, D’Arcy Morgan. “Interpreting American Hegemony: Civil Military Relations during the United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934.” Ph.D. dissertation: Duke University, 2001.

Corbould, Clare. “At the Feet of Dessalines: Performing Haiti’s Revolution during the New Negro Renaissance.” In Beyond Blackface: African Americans and the Creation of American Popular Culture, 1890-1930, edited by W. Fitzhugh Brundage, 259-288. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011.

Dalleo, Raphael. “’The Independence So Hardly Won Has Been Maintained:’ C.L.R. James and the U.S. Occupation of Haiti.” Cultural Critique 87 (Spring 2014): 38-59.

Davidson, Matthew. “Empire and its Practitioners: Health, Development, and the U.S. Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934.” M.A. thesis: Trent University, 2014.

Dubois, Laurent. “Occupation.” In Haiti: The Aftershocks of History. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012.

Gaillard, Roger. Charlemagne Péralte le caco. Port-au-Prince: R. Gaillard, 1982.

Ménard, Nadève. “The Occupied Novel: The Representation of Foreigners in Haitian Novels Written During the United States Occupation, 1915-1934.” Ph.D. dissertation., University of Pennsylvania, 2002.

Millet, Kethly. Les paysans haïtiens et l’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 1915-1930. La Salle,        Québec: Colectif Paroles, 1978.

Pamphile, Leon D. The NAACP and the American Occupation of Haiti. Phylon 47, no. 1 (1st Qtr., 1986): 91-100.

Polyné, Millery. “‘To Combine the Training of the Head and the Hands’: The 1930 Robert R. Moton Commission in Haiti.” In From Douglass to Duvalier: U.S. African Americans, Haiti, and Pan Americanism, 1870-1964. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010.

Plummer, Brenda Gayle. “The Afro-American Response to the Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934.”Phylon 43, no. 2 (2nd Qtr., 1982): 125-143.

Renda, Mary. Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

Schmidt, Hans. The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934.2nd ed. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995.

Shannon, Magdaline W. Jean Price-Mars, the Haitian Elite and the American Occupation, 1915-1935. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.

Suggs, Henry Lewis. “The Response of the African American Press to the United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934.” The Journal of African American History 87 (Winter 2002): 70-82.

A Guide to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Attacks

Seventy years ago, the United States committed one of the most horrific atrocities in military history. Why?

 
Jacobin   August 9, 2015
The atomic bomb exploding in Nagasaki, Japan. Corbis

The atomic bomb exploding in Nagasaki, Japan. Corbis

Seventy years ago today, the United States detonated a plutonium implosion-type atomic bomb over the Japanese city of Nagasaki, killing between 40,000 and 80,000 people.

It was only the second time an atomic weapon had been used in warfare. The first time had occurred three days before, when the United States dropped a uranium gun-type atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Between 90,000 and 170,000 people died in that attack.

It was one of the greatest wartime atrocities ever perpetrated. The United States political and military establishment unleashed all the destructive power of the most potent weapons ever created on two civilian populations of little strategic importance. It was a brutal show of force that announced the arrival of the new American superpower and helped establish the stakes of the Cold War.

As a State Department memo written during the Carter administration explained, “the Soviets know that this terrible weapon has been dropped on human beings twice in history and it was an American president who dropped it both times. Therefore, they have to take this into consideration in their calculus.”

The nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain two of the most shameful moments in US history. Perhaps because of this lingering shame, they are too often left understudied. Often they are dismissed as acts of simple naivety — as if President Truman were unaware of the murderous potential of his Space Age super-weapons — or alternatively as an act of wanton callousness, evacuating these events of their political content.

In this short primer, Jacobin briefly describes the attacks, their aftermath, and the continuing relevance of nuclear weapons on the global stage today.

Did the US have to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end the war?

No. There is no truth to the common argument that the United States military had to use nuclear bombs on Japanese civilians to end World War II.

American leaders at the time understood well that they had other options. In fact, Truman mentions this in his memoirs, recalling his worry that, should American atomic tests fail, the Soviet ground invasion of Japan would precipitate the Japanese surrender, thus amplifying Soviet influence in East Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US military had begun planning a detailed ground invasion of their own, a strategy deliberately developed to avoid the use of nuclear warfare in the Pacific.

But more importantly, Japan was profoundly isolated in the region and in the world following the surrender of Nazi Germany. The Japanese state had already begun to collapse, with military and executive bureaucracies in disarray. The Soviet declaration of war — which occurred on August 8, between the bombing of Hiroshima and the bombing of Nagasaki — so panicked Japanese Prime Minister Kantarō Suzuki that, when he was advised not to plan a military response to the imminent invasion, he reportedly replied, “then the game is up.”

Whatever cynical agenda motivated the American leaders’ decision to annihilate hundreds of thousands of Japanese lives with new-fangled apocalypse technology, it wasn’t out of an interest in preventing further suffering. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was geopolitical posturing at its most barbaric, a catastrophic display of military capability engineered to send a message to the Soviet Union and other powers unfriendly to global US hegemony.

It wasn’t about ending the war. It was about announcing American willingness to use doomsday weapons on civilian populations. In August 1945, President Truman and the American establishment held a gun to the head of the entire world. And that gun remains in place to this day.

The atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Japan. Library of Congress

The atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Japan. Library of Congress

What were the effects of the bombings?

At about 11:00 on the morning of August 9, Kermit Beahan — an American bombadier who would later describe the attack as “the best way out of a hell of a mess” — found a hole in the clouds above Nagasaki and dropped the atomic bomb. It took about forty-six seconds to fall. When it exploded there was an overwhelming flash of light, followed ten seconds later by a deafening roar.

Speaking to the Houston Chronicle years later, Beahan would describe the aftermath of the explosion, saying, “’I saw a mushroom cloud bubbling and flashing orange, red and green. It looked like a picture of hell. The ground itself was covered by a rolling black smoke.”

The temperature under the explosion has been estimated to exceed 3,000 degrees centigrade — hot enough to incinerate human bodies. Sharp heat rays carried enormous amounts of radiation, which were imperceptible in the moment but would have devastating health effects. The risk of developing leukemia has been estimated at 46 percent for those exposed to  atom bomb radiation.

The obscenity of the nuclear attacks is illustrated in vivid detail in the testimony of survivors, known in Japan as hibakusha.

Emiko Fukahori was only seven-years-old at the time of the bombing, which occurred as she played in a shady bamboo grove close to Nagasaki:

I was totally absorbed in playing when I heard the sound of an airplane (a B-29). I somehow immediately knew it was an enemy aircraft. … When the bomb exploded, the first one into the shelter was Sumi-chan, then me, and then a third child. The last girl was incinerated and died on the spot. When I was going into the shelter, I felt the heat on my back, so I escaped the fate of the third child by just a hair’s breadth.

When I left the shelter, the adults had been burnt all over their bodies, and were gasping for breath. The surrounding area had completely changed– all the large moso bamboo trees had been knocked down. A woman covered in blood was calling for help as she came up from below, which frightened me. …

Fukahori’s older brother also survived the explosion. But, like many who experienced the bomb’s lethal radiation, his health began to deteriorate soon afterward.

He started suffering nosebleeds about a week after the bombing. They called a doctor, and my aunt put a wash basin by his side and stayed up all night taking care of him. But the bleeding from his gums and nose grew worse, and he finally died on the 22nd.

Before he breathed his last, he complained that his stomach and legs hurt very much. I was sleeping next to him, and he told me to bring a knife because an atomic bomb was lodged in his stomach. I couldn’t bear to watch him suffer, so I got up to get him a knife, but my uncle scolded me.

My brother’s corpse had no blood at all. It was as white as a wax dummy. My mother died in Nagasaki at about the same time, and my sister and younger brother died weeping over her body. I was told they held the funeral for all three on the same day.

Horrific symptoms of this kind were widespread.

Tatsuichiro Akizuki was a young doctor at a Nagasaki medical center 1.4 kilometers from the explosion’s epicenter. At the time of the explosion he was working at the hospital, and recalls yellow smoke billowing in through the building’s collapsed stories. It didn’t take long for the wounded to begin approaching the hospital.

About 10 or 15 minutes later, throngs of wounded people streamed up the hill to the hospital. The people in the nearby fields and streets looked as if they had all been burned white, and they had somehow lost their clothes. They staggered towards us, heads in their hands, calling for help. The people who came later were different. Their faces were blackish and had swollen like pumpkins. You couldn’t tell the men from the women. They all stopped to wash off in the river, started walking again, and then stopped to wash off again. Then they all fell flat on their faces and stopped walking. There were a lot of blackened corpses by the river’s edge. …

There were corpses in which the heads had been split open, and intestines were spilling from their abdomens. Most of the others had burns–on their face and back, their legs and calves, or their chest and abdomen. The people who were in the fields and paddies turned around to look behind them when the flash from the bomb came, and they were burned on their face and back at the same time

He provided round-the-clock treatment to thousands of bomb victims, encountering symptoms he had never seen before and that he was entirely unprepared to treat.

Starting about the third day, patients turned black and had diarrhea. They told me that blood had come from their mouths, which had turned purplish. By the fourth or fifth day, I thought this might have been dysentery or peliosis. But some of those people had not been wounded in the bombing, and I began to get suspicious and had a sense of foreboding.

The effects of the bombing lingered long after the morning of the August 9, 1945. Amnesty International estimates that by the end of 1945, 70,000 people had died in Nagasaki as a result of the bombing. In the 40 years that followed, 24,000 more would perish as a result of radiation toxicity and burning.

On November 2, Japan signed the instruments of surrender, effectively surrendering control of the Japanese state and economy to the American establishment.

What did the American public think?

The unprecedented horror of nuclear warfare — so recklessly unleashed by the American executive without so much as a pale imitation of democratic decision-making or regard for human life — managed to cut through even the patriotic bravado of the World War II homefront. Though conservative elements of the public — and most of the military establishment — welcomed the use of the bombs and praised Truman’s choice to deploy such novel killing instruments, Americans were overwhelmingly disquieted by the attacks.

Even Truman felt the need to backpedal a little bit when the extent of the devastation became clear. Instead of the chest-pounding typical of wartime presidents, he offered a lukewarm statement that approaches, but stops short, of an apology — the political equivalent of a grimace and a shrug:

I realize the tragic significance of the atomic bomb … It is an awful responsibility which has come to us … We thank God that it has come to us, instead of to our enemies; and we pray that He may guide us to use it in His ways and for His purposes.

But even American Christian organizations — hardly known for their willingness to contradict the president or criticize the military — weren’t willing to concede this faux-theological justification for such careless destruction of human life. In 1946, the Federal Council of Churches issued a strongly-worded statement that read:

As American Christians, we are deeply penitent for the irresponsible use already made of the atomic bomb. We are agreed that, whatever be one’s judgment of the war in principle, the surprise bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are morally indefensible.

Internationally, the response was even graver. Unsurprisingly, the bombings found little support among the millions of people living in Third World nations who now witnessed the scale of US cruelty during wartime, and who imagined their own hamlets, ports, and cities in the place of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And a war-weary Europe was largely unimpressed with the careless savagery of the American military, having recently seen their own cities demolished by bombs while the United States mainland remained entirely untouched.

The human effects of the bombings were so shocking that almost no one could celebrate them uncritically without inviting criticism from the Left, Right, and center.

But, true to form, the jingoistic American enchantment with US military capacity proved strong enough to make hometown heroes out of some participants in the nuclear attacks, including the navigator of the Hiroshima bomber Enola Gay, who was uncritically celebrated in his small Pennsylvania town’s local paper as recently as last year.

Ground Zero in Hiroshima, Japan. US Army

Ground Zero in Hiroshima, Japan. US Army.

What effects have the bombings had on global politics?

Following the introduction of nuclear weapons to the arsenals of the world’s largest military powers, a strong international movement for nuclear disarmament emerged, lambasting global leaders as careless cynics who had put humanity on the path towards annihilation. With the horror witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki fresh in the minds of many, the movement quickly gained traction and became a real force in international politics, helping to encourage the passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 and contributing the commonly-used peace sign to the lexicon of popular political symbols.

In 1982, one million people demonstrated in New York City’s Central Park, demanding a bilateral end to nuclear arms testing in an effort to de-escalate the Cold War. It has been celebrated as the largest political demonstration in American history.

But despite this pushback, nuclear capability continues to be a potent bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiations. The United States occupies the ironic position of self-appointed moral gatekeeper of nuclear technology worldwide — as if the country’s spectacular demonstration of the bomb’s destructive potential in 1945 granted the US an historical right to determine who gets to have it and who doesn’t. And this has served to obscure the United States’ continued interest in developing increased nuclear capability and repeated flouting of its own treaties limiting nuclear weapons manufacturing.

Most recently, the international community has witnessed American saber-rattling in response to Iranian nuclear ambitions, and the specter of nuclear warfare has been used twice to justify US military interventions in Iraq.

How should we remember the bombings?

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki offer a powerful reminder of the savagery of war. And the unilateral decision of the military and executive branches to develop nuclear weapons and launch the devastating attack offers insight into the power mechanics of the US state.

But despite the richness of these political conclusions — and the vital importance of building towards a world free of the possibility of nuclear war — there are moments when all we can do is mourn.

We mourn the hundreds of thousands of lives lost in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as socialists and as human beings.

Jonah Walters is a researcher at Jacobin.

Lyndon B. Johnson-Remarks on the Signing of the Voting Rights Act (August 6, 1965)

“We Have Passed the Stage of Amateur Evil:” Scientists respond to the Atomic Bomb, August 6, 1945

A mother fled the flames with her child in her arms.

A mother fled the flames with her child in her arms. Yamada Ikue. Age at blast: 12, Image created at: 41(Photo: Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, MIT Visualizing Cultures)

On August 6, 1945, Eugene Cotton, a Lieutenant in the US Army Air Corps, wrote to his fiancée from his posting in California.

Dearest Mary,This morning I opened my eyes about 4 a.m. and found myself wide awake for no apparent reason. An odd feeling overcame me that something terrible had happened, and yet it seemed foolish to think so. Finally I went back to sleep and convinced myself that all was well. Then, when the news was broadcast at noon, I knew I had been right. The announcement of the new atomic bomb, and its use without warning, made me realize that we have passed beyond the stage of amateur evil. Man has openly begun to lay plans for his own destruction.

Cotton was one of hundreds of thousands who, having left service in the European theater of the war, were slated to take part in a massive invasion of the Japanese islands in late 1945 and early 1946. He was 23 years old, a recent college graduate with a degree in physics, and had undergone training at both MIT and Berkeley before joining the Army to do meteorological work in the Atlantic. The atomic bomb the United States dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 may have saved his life, but as a scientist, he was horrified by what he saw.

He was not alone. Much has been written about the political decisions made in those fateful days between the successful Trinity nuclear test in July 1945 and its deployment in early August, though it is clear that Truman himself was never particularly in doubt about what he would do. But the scientific community was split by the bomb. Even many of those physicists who had helped conceive and design it eventually came to oppose its use. Physicists like Albert Einstein, J. Robert Oppenheimer, and Leo Szilard – among many others – found their own beliefs challenged by the awesome responsibility of the bomb and its implications for future generations.

In August of 1939, Albert Einstein – acting on prompting from fellow physicist Leo Szilard – wrote a letter urging US President Franklin D. Roosevelt to consider the creation of a bomb based on the principle of nuclear fission. Einstein was a pacifist by nature, but feared that Hitler’s Germany, with its access to skilled physicists and intent on expanding its natural resources, would develop a fission bomb. Roosevelt largely ignored the letter until just before the country’s entry into the war in 1941, when he created an organization to attempt development of an atomic weapon. Einstein himself was too high profile to take part in the top secret Manhattan Project, however, and grew increasingly wary of it, especially after the bomb’s use in August 1945. In 1952, Einstein spoke out strongly against the arms race that his work helped precipitate, asserting that “[nations] feel moreover compelled to prepare the most abominable means, in order not to be left behind in the general armaments race. Such procedure leads inevitably to war, which, in turn, under today’s conditions, spells universal destruction.” Einstein later called his involvement in the Manhattan Project his life’s biggest regret.

Einstein was not the only major figure to turn away from what he created. Few were more intimately involved with the creation of the first atomic bomb than J. Robert Oppenheimer, the head of the lab at Los Alamos, New Mexico, the lab that actually created and tested it. Oppenheimer’s involvement during the program itself was energetic and enthusiastic; his fellow project members were often in awe of his work ethic and mastery of the project’s many details. He was an unabashed champion of the bomb.

And then he saw it go off.

Oppenheimer told different versions of what went through his head when he saw the first nuclear explosion, but in the mid-1950s he often claimed that a line from the Hindu Bhagavad Gita, “I am become Death, destroyer of worlds,” summed up his reaction to the sight. Over the five years after the Trinity test in New Mexico, Oppenheimer began to shift his support, pushing for international control over atomic weaponry, especially after fellow Manhattan Project member Edward Teller helped create a working theory for a hydrogen bomb. Indeed, Teller attempted to have Oppenheimer’s security clearance revoked in the 1950s because of his opposition to the hydrogen bomb project and the development of thermonuclear weapons. In later life, Oppenheimer tried to direct scientific inquiry away from the development of ever more advanced weapons and toward a more creative, productive nuclear science.

Of those who worked on the Manhattan Project, the one who most completely reversed his support for the atomic bomb was, ironically, the man who had first conceived of the concept of a nuclear chain reaction, Dr. Leo Szilard. Szilard was a Hungarian Jew and a refugee from the increasingly hostile atmosphere in Europe in the 1930s. Terrified of a bomb in the hands of Hitler’s Germany, Szilard was the one who pushed Einstein to write his fateful letter. Unlike Einstein, though, Szilard took part in the work at Los Alamos. There, he was generally seen as a disruptive influence, often at odds with the Project’s military head, General Leslie Groves. By the end of the war, Szilard was questioning whether the bomb should be used at all. He attempted to convince President Roosevelt that using the bomb would be a moral failing and might unleash an uncontrollable nuclear arms race, but Roosevelt died, leaving the decision to Truman. Following the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Szilard wrote extensively against the bomb. In a 1947 article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists entitled “Calling for a Crusade,” Szilard called science in general into question for pursuing “progress” without ethics. In 1949, he wrote a short story in which he imagined himself a war criminal in a future destroyed by atomic weapons.

Eugene Cotton, too, feared this in 1945. He worried that with the bomb, the country had set “a horrible pattern for the next half-century.” He blamed not science itself, but the scientists who took part in the project: “What makes me most fearful and ashamed is that highly regarded physicists have developed this thing, using the highest forms of our science. I can think of no greater disgrace than to have made possible such a weapon.” He called the scientists on the project “unaffected and unmoved” – an opinion formed from immediacy and youth, but not unsupported by evidence. He saw the events of that morning as the worst possible outcome of science: destruction in the place of progress, hubris over morality, technology as God.

Cotton concluded his letter to his wife, promising that he still had “much hope, for us and our generation.” In the end, he and men like him helped to provide that hope. Though the world certainly felt the weight of a looming nuclear war for the next half-century, it never did experience one, thanks in part to the regrets and warnings of Cotton and his fellow scientists.

Andrew Lipsett

Andrew Lipsett teaches United States History at Billerica Memorial High School in Billerica, MA. His interests include race, identity, and membership, and he blogs about history, memory, and memorialization at Graves of Note.

W. E. B. Du Bois to Malcolm X: The Untold History of the Movement to Ban the Bomb 

By Vincent Intondi

Zinn Education Project July 30, 2015

Coretta Scott King (R) with Women Strike for Peace founder Dagmar Wilson (L) in a march on the United Nations Plaza, New York City, Nov. 1, 1963. Image: © Bettmann/CORBIS, used with permission.

When the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. announced his strong opposition to the war in Vietnam, the media attacked him for straying outside of his civil rights mandate. In so many words, powerful interests told him: “Mind your own business.” In fact, African American leaders have long been concerned with broad issues of peace and justice—and have especially opposed nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this activism is left out of mainstream corporate-produced history textbooks.

On June 6, 1964, three Japanese writers and a group of hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors) arrived in Harlem as part of the Hiroshima/Nagasaki World Peace Study Mission. Their mission: to speak out against nuclear proliferation.

malcolmx_yuri_kochiyama

Malcolm X and Yuri Kochiyama

Yuri Kochiyama, a Japanese American activist, organized a reception for the hibakusha at her home in the Harlem Manhattanville Housing Projects, with her friend Malcolm X. Malcolm said, “You have been scarred by the atom bomb. You just saw that we have also been scarred. The bomb that hit us was racism.” He went on to discuss his years in prison, education, and Asian history. Turning to Vietnam, Malcolm said, “If America sends troops to Vietnam, you progressives should protest.” He argued that “the struggle of Vietnam is the struggle of the whole Third World: the struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism.” Malcolm X, like so many before him, consistently connected colonialism, peace, and the Black freedom struggle. Yet, students have rarely heard this story.

With the recent developments in Charleston surrounding the Confederate flag, there is a renewed focus on what should be included in U.S. history textbooks and who should determine the content. Focusing on African American history, too often textbooks reduce the Black freedom movement to the Montgomery Bus Boycott and the March on Washington. Rosa Parks and Dr. King are put in their neat categorical boxes and students are never taught the Black freedom struggle’s international dimensions, viewing slavery, Jim Crow, and the Civil Rights Movement as purely domestic phenomena unrelated to foreign affairs. However, Malcolm X joined a long list of African Americans who, from 1945 onward, actively supported nuclear disarmament. W. E. B. Du Bois, Bayard Rustin, Coretta Scott King, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and the Black Panther Party were just a few of the many African Americans who combined civil rights with peace, and thus broadened the Black freedom movement and helped define it in terms of global human rights.

W. E. B. Du Bois

W. E. B. Du Bois

If students learn about Du Bois at all, it is usually that he helped found the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) or that he received a PhD from Harvard. However, a few weeks after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Du Bois likened President Truman to Adolph Hitler, calling him “one of the greatest killers of our day.” He had traveled to Japan and consistently criticized the use of nuclear weapons. In the 1950s, fearing another Hiroshima in Korea, Du Bois led the effort in the Black community to eliminate nuclear weapons with the “Ban the Bomb” petition. Many students go through their entire academic careers and learn nothing of Du Bois’ work in the international arena.

bayardrustin_antinuclearrally

Bayard Rustin speaking at the 1958 Anti-Nuclear Rally in England. Image: Contemporary Films.

If students ever hear the name Bayard Rustin, it is usually related to his work with the March on Washington. He has been tragically marginalized in U.S. history textbooks, in large part because of his homosexuality. However, Rustin’s body of work in civil rights and peace activism dates back to the 1930s. In 1959, during the Civil Rights Movement, Rustin not only fought institutional racism in the United States, but also traveled to Ghana to try to prevent France from testing its first nuclear weapon in Africa.

These days, some textbooks acknowledge Dr. King’s critique of the Vietnam War. However, King’s actions against nuclear weapons began a full decade earlier in the late 1950s. From 1957 until his death, through speeches, sermons, interviews, and marches, King consistently protested the use of nuclear weapons and war. King called for an end to nuclear testing asking, “What will be the ultimate value of having established social justice in a context where all people, Negro and White, are merely free to face destruction by Strontium-90 or atomic war?” Following the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, King called on the government to take some of the billions of dollars spent on nuclear weapons and use those funds to increase teachers’ salaries and build much needed schools in impoverished communities. Two years later, receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, King argued the spiritual and moral lag in our society was due to three problems: racial injustice, poverty, and war. He warned that in the nuclear age, society must eliminate racism or risk annihilation.

cnd_letter_mlk_650pxw

Letter from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament inviting Dr. King and Bayard Rustin to their mass march. Click to read letter at the King Center website.

Dr. King’s wife largely inspired his antinuclear stance. Coretta Scott King began her activism as a student at Antioch College. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, King worked with various peace organizations, and along with a group of female activists, began pressuring President Kennedy for a nuclear test ban. In 1962, Coretta King served as a delegate for Women Strike for Peace at a disarmament conference in Geneva that was part of a worldwide effort to push for a nuclear test ban treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Upon her return, King spoke at AME church in Chicago, saying: “We are on the brink of destroying ourselves through nuclear warfare . . . . The Civil Rights Movement and the Peace Movement must work together ultimately because peace and civil rights are part of the same problem.”

Soon, we will commemorate the 70th anniversaries of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Not long after comes the anniversary of the 1963 March on Washington. Students will then return to school and to their history textbooks. However, most will not learn how these issues are connected. They will not learn of all those in the Civil Rights Movement who simultaneously fought for peace. But this must change, and soon. The scarring of war and poverty and racism that Malcolm X spoke of continues. It’s time that students learn about the long history of activism that has challenged these deadly triplets.

vincent_intondiVincent J. Intondi is an associate professor of history at Montgomery College and director of research for American University’s Nuclear Studies Institute. He is the author of African Americans Against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement(Stanford University Press, 2015).

America’s First Muslim Convert: Alexander Russell Webb

Webb1

In a post-9/11 world, there are a variety of representations of Islam. From the US President, to academics, to twenty-four hour news talking heads, many praise Islam as peaceful or condemn it as a religion of hate. What many forget is that this love-hate representation of Islam goes back to over a century. While the current series on Islam in America focuses on a variety of representations of Islam, positive and negative, this post focuses on one of the earliest proponents of Islam in America, the tradition’s first American convert, Alexander Russell Webb.

The Nineteenth Century was a period of unprecedented religious innovation within the United States. Traditions such as Mormonism, Spiritualism, Christian Science, New Thought, Theosophy, as well as small religious movements based on charismatic figures all flourished. It was also at this time that America started looking east and paying attention to the religions of India, China, and Japan. By the end of the century, the first American Buddhist organization was founded by Japanese missionaries in California. It was during this period when so many eyes were looking east that Alexander Russell Webb found Islam.

Born in 1846 in the Hudson River Valley in the state of New York, Webb grew up surrounded by great diversity of people and religious traditions. It was in Upper State New York that Joseph Smith, Jr. claimed to be visited by the Angel Maroni, thus founding Mormonism, and it was also here that the Fox Sisters heard spectral wrapping that led to the emergence of Modern Spiritualism. While Webb was brought up a Presbyterian, by the time he reached maturity and attended Claverack College in Claverack, New York, which promoted free thinking and intellectual rigor, he had been exposed to a variety of religious traditions. Later in life he claimed to lose his religion in his mid-twenties, but it is fair to say he became disillusioned with the faith of his childhood and became a seeker. Webb’s biographer, Umar F. Abd-allah, calls this Webb’s “Spiritual Vagabond” period.[1] As with most seekers, he read about and investigated other religions, usually by reading various texts. This came to a head in 1880-81 when Webb joined the Theosophical Society and converted, as so many Theosophists did, to Buddhism.

Webb2

The Theosophical Society, founded in 1875 in New York City, claimed that all religions derived from one ancient wisdom and thus all religions contained at least a portion of the truth. However, in the earliest years, the society promoted the view that Buddhism and Hinduism contained the truest forms of those traditions and thus Theosophists promoted these traditions, in opposition to Western traditions, especially Christianity. Webb became interested in these “Oriental” ideas and found a group of like-minded people who shared his rejection of Christianity and the materialism of Victorian America. At one point Webb traveled to India, the place where the Theosophical Society moved its headquarters, and met numerous Theosophists, some of which were Muslim. It was also within the context of Theosophy that Webb first learned about Mohammed and he began to study his history and the history of Islam. According to Theosophical sources, Webb gave a lecture in India about Mohammed’s orientalism explaining how it was compatible with Theosophical principles. Finally, Webb claimed that Mohammed had secret, esoteric teaching that only the privileged few knew.[2]

Webb began to correspond with a number of Muslims at this time from a variety of places. One important correspondence was with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, a controversial leader in Islam. He claimed that he was the fulfiller of the end times prophesies and that Islam was the final dispensation of the truth. While the correspondence was brief, lasting from 1886-1887, it was influential on Webb who seemed to decide that Islam was the best eastern religion to manifest the Ancient Wisdom of which Theosophy spoke. Webb writes to Ahmad, “I think I understand you to be a follower of the esoteric teachings of Mohammed, and not what is known to the masses of the people as Mohammedanism.”[3] Webb also corresponded with prominent American officials and through these connections was appointed Consul to the Philippines by the United States government in 1888.[4] It was during his time in the Philippines that Webb finally converted to Sunni Islam. After his conversion, his family who had also moved to Manila converted. Webb maintained his correspondence with prominent Muslim figures throughout India and the Middle East.

In 1892 Webb resigned from his position in Manila and traveled to India where he met up with Moulvi Hassan Ali and other Muslims to raise funds for American missionary work. Having been an American Consul afforded Webb many privileges as he traveled and he used these advantages towards furthering his cause. After a year of traveling throughout India seeking funds, Webb finally returned to America, arriving in New York City in February 1893. It was in Manhattan that Webb began promoting his faith, publishing a book entitled Islam in America. The purpose of the book, he claims is to “give to the English-speaking world a brief but accurate and reliable description of the character and purpose of Mohammed (pbuh), and a general outline of the Islamic system.”[5] He also published an English language newspaper called, Moslem World, promoting Islam and giving news of various kinds relevant to the religion. All these efforts to promote Islam in a positive light were funded by his supporters South Asian Muslim and Ottoman supporters, including the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II.[6] However, their support was intermittent and thus Webb often struggled to make ends meet.

Perhaps his most successful attempt to promote Islam positively and the event for which Webb is best known is his attendance as the only representative for Islam at the 1893 World Parliament of Religions.  The World Parliament of Religions took place in Chicago during the Columbian Exposition, the World’s Fair. During his speech, he criticized the bigotry against Muslims by Americans, noting how any Muslim who does wrong becomes representative of the whole religion. Webb also implored his audience to see the reason and logic behind Islam and to give it a fair chance by impartially studying it. Overall his efforts received positive, or at least polite responses, all except his mild defense of Islamic polygamy which was met with hisses and rebuke.[7]

Webb returned to New York City to continue his missionary work, but he made little progress and continued to struggle to secure funding for his mission. In 1901 he travelled to Turkey where he was awarded a medal by the Sultan for his missionary work. Eventually he relocated to New Jersey where he lived out the rest of his life promoting Islam to the best of his ability.

Webb grew up at a time of great religious change and innovation. Not only were new religions being founded, but religions from Asia were seen as viable alternatives to traditional forms of Christianity. America was no longer isolated by two oceans, its citizens and religious traditions were being exported and new religions imported. His adoption and promotion of Islam offers a great example of the ways Islam has been represented within the public over the last century. After the American Civil War, the United States began a new spiritual quest, looking for renewal and rebirth. In Webb, one strand of that rebirth begins. While he was far from successful in his efforts to spread his newfound faith, his tireless missionary work laid the groundwork for those that followed.

For more about Alexander Russell Webb see:

Abd-allah, Umar F., A Muslim in Victorian America: The Life of Alexander Russell Webb. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Seager, Richard Hughes, ed., The Dawn of Religious Pluralism: Voices from the World Parliament of Religions, 1893. La Salle: Open Court Press, 1993.

Footnotes

[1] Abd-allah, Umar F., A Muslim in Victorian America, 52.

[2] Abd-allah, Umar F., A Muslim in Victorian America, 59.

[3] Abd-allah, Umar F., A Muslim in Victorian America, 65.

[4] Curtis, Edward E., Ed. Encyclopedia of Muslim-American History, 554.

[5] Webb, Islam in America, 9.

[6] Curtis, Edward E., Ed. Encyclopedia of Muslim-American History, 554.

[7] Seager, Richard Hughes, ed., The Dawn of Religious Pluralism, 279.

About John L. Crow

John L. Crow is an Instructional Development Faculty at Florida State University’s Office of Distance Learning and a PhD graduate student in FSU’s Department of Religion. He has an extensive background in information technology and is academically trained in American Religious History and Western Esotericism. His interests, however, are wide ranging, dealing with technology related to on-line active learning, digital humanities, body studies, the intersection of science and religion, and the development of eastern religions within the west, particularly Buddhism in the West.