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DisunionIn the waning days of the Civil War, as a Northern victory became both obvious and inevitable, the Confederate government of President Jefferson Davis financed what it hoped would be a drawn-out war of attrition, with the intention of driving President Abraham Lincoln to the bargaining table. A large part of that strategy involved members of the South’s Secret Services, who hatched a series of plots against Union territory that featured Canada as their operations site and relied on an impressive network of hundreds of soldiers, agents and operatives. Their most ambitious plot? To burn New York City.

The South hoped to foment an uprising of disenchanted Northerners: Copperheads, the rabidly anti-Republican Order of American Knights and its subset, the Sons of Liberty. To this end, the Davis government sent weapons and money to ensure support in several of the North’s major cities. The plan was for this alliance to first make itself known in Chicago and New York City in early November 1864 – on Election Day. With the promised support of New York’s Democratic governor, Horatio Seymour; the former New York City mayor Fernando Wood; and the Illinois Democratic Congressman James C. Robinson, squads of handpicked Rebel operatives traveled from Canada to New York and Chicago, to rally their supporters.

According to the plan, several small fires were to be set, to distract the authorities while the Rebels and their Northern sympathizers seized each city’s treasury and arsenal and liberated Confederate prisoners of war – from Fort Lafayette in New York, and camps Chase and Douglas in Illinois.

Eight Rebels, all veterans, had been assigned to New York under the command of Col. Robert Martin, a hard-core combat officer. As Martin saw it, “The way to bring the North to its senses [is] to burn Northern cities.” Although the original plan had called for several small distraction fires, Martin planned to burn Gotham to the ground, and he determined to wait out federal troops under the command of Gen. Benjamin Butler. John W. Headley, a member of the team, later wrote that they were resolved in “our purpose to set the city on fire… and let the Government at Washington understand that burning homes in the South might find a counterpart in the North.”

The Rebels had secretly contracted a retired druggist to make 12 dozen four-ounce bottles of the volatile incendiary substance known as Greek fire. Headley later recalled that with their 144 bottles, “we were now ready to create a sensation in New York.” They planned to set fires in the various hotels, “so as to do the greatest damage in the business district on Broadway.” According to Headley, they agreed to begin the operation at 8 p.m., to give the hotel guests the opportunity to escape, “as we did not want to destroy any lives.”

But when the time came to actually bear arms, few stepped up. And, as had happened in earlier plots, word of the planned revolts leaked, all the way to Washington. Secretary of State William H. Seward sent a telegram to New York City’s mayor on Nov. 2, advising him of “a conspiracy on foot to set fire to the principal cities in the Northern States on the Day of the Presidential election.”

Shortly thereafter, thousands of federal troops marched into New York with General Butler, who established a perimeter around the city. The troops were supported by gunboats stationed at various points on the rivers surrounding Manhattan. Meanwhile, in Chicago, a former Confederate spy informed on the agents positioned there, and most of the ringleaders were captured. Ancillary plans for fires and rallies in Boston and Cincinnati were betrayed and abandoned as well. By Nov. 15, General Butler reasoned that New York was secure from sabotage, and marched his troops out of the city.

The New York raiders weren’t done, though. They got back together, and agreed to attempt their strike again in another 10 days, by which time two of their number had lost heart and deserted. The remaining plotters would each be responsible for burning four hotels. Each man was to place 10 bottles of Greek fire, wrapped in paper, in his coat pockets. At the appointed time, they would go from hotel to hotel, firing the rooms and escaping before the alarm sounded. They would meet again the next evening, and make their way back to Canada.

The scheme was a sound one. As The New York Times later observed, “The plan was excellently well conceived, and evidently prepared with great care, and had it been executed with one-half of the ability with which it had been drawn up, no human power could have saved this city from destruction.”

On Nov. 25, James Headley began his part of the operation in his room at the famous Astor House. He later described the event in great detail, illustrating how he “hung the bedclothes loosely on the headboard and piled the chairs, drawers of the bureau and washstand on the bed.” He covered everything with newspaper, doused it in turpentine and emptied a bottle of Greek fire on the pile. Immediately, the bed was aflame. Headley rushed out of the room, locking the door behind him. He followed the same method at the City Hotel, the Everett House and the United States Hotel. Looking back at the Astor House, Headley could see flames in the window of his room. By this time fire bells were sounding all over the city, “great crowds were gathering on the street, and there was general consternation.”

To Headley’s surprise, a fire had also been set in Barnum’s Museum, across the street from the Astor House. Apparently, Capt. Robert Cobb Kennedy had strayed from the plan. Kennedy, it seems, was a drinking man, and after firing rooms in three hotels, he paused for a libation in a local saloon. Inspired by drink, he wandered into Barnum’s, threw down a bottle of his Greek fire, and exited as the stairway became engulfed in flames. Panic ensued. There were 2,500 people in the museum, attending a play in its lecture hall. Miraculously, no one was killed.

The raiders had set fires in enough hotels to keep the alarm bells ringing and the firemen busy for hours. Pandemonium ruled in the streets – but the young plotters had made a crucial mistake. None realized that the incendiary liquid required oxygen to spread, and in their ignorance, they had closed the doors and windows of the various rooms in which they set their fires. The lack of oxygen made the fires easy to contain and extinguish; some merely went out on their own. In the open spaces where the liquid was thrown, such as Barnum’s Museum, the fires had a greater opportunity to spread. Over all, however, the plot resulted in costly but limited property damage, no loss of life, and a city that was singed but certainly still standing.Fort Sumter

The next morning, all of New York City’s newspapers ran front-page accounts of the raid, as well as physical descriptions of the raiders, the fictitious names they had used to register and the promise that they would all be in custody by the end of the day. Gen. John A. Dix, commander of the New York-based Eastern District, made it clear that any conspirators he caught would be tried by military court and hanged within hours. Incredibly, despite the intense manhunt being conducted throughout the city, Martin and his party were able to purchase tickets the next day and board a train for Albany, and from there to Toronto. All the saboteurs made it safely across the border.

Two days later, several New York detectives arrived in Toronto. With the attack on New York, Canada had ceased to be a bastion of certain safety, and some of the Rebels made immediate preparations to return home. All made it but one. Robert Cobb Kennedy was arrested by two detectives at a railway station outside Detroit. Kennedy was tried and convicted in New York, and on March 25, 1865 – just weeks before the cessation of hostilities – he was hanged at Fort Lafayette, in New York Harbor (built on an artificial island, Fort Lafayette was later demolished to make way for the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge). Kennedy was the last soldier of the Civil War to be executed. Before the hood was placed over his face, Kennedy tremulously sang an old Irish drinking song ironically titled, “Trust in Luck.”

Fort Lafayette in New York Harbor, where Robert C. Kennedy was executed.

Fort Lafayette in New York Harbor, where Robert C. Kennedy was executed.Credit Library of Congress

Reactions to the raid were universally harsh. All the Northern papers, including the Copperhead organs, condemned it. The Confederate government at Richmond disavowed any involvement. Even The Richmond Whig, which had once called for the burning of the city, now protested, “If there is any place in the North that ought to be spared, that place is New York.”

The failure of the raid, along with the widely negative response it engendered, all but ended the possibility of future operations out of Canada. Indeed, the entire Confederate secret war had proved an almost total disaster, doomed by inexperience, naïveté, bad luck and betrayal. As John Headley later recalled, “There appeared nothing to do now, since all our attempts everywhere had failed.” For the Confederacy, the end was scant months away.

Follow Disunion at twitter.com/NYTcivilwar or join us on Facebook.


Sources: Nat Brandt, “The Man Who Tried to Burn New York”; James W. Headley, “Confederate Operations in Canada and New York”; James D. Horan, “Confederate Agent”; Robert R. Mackey, “The Uncivil War”; Jane Singer, “The Confederate Dirty War”; Mason Philip Smith, “Confederates Downeast”; William A. Tidwell, “Come Retribution.”


Ron Soodalter

Ron Soodalter is the author of “Hanging Captain Gordon: The Life and Trial of an American Slave Trader” and a co-author of “The Slave Next Door: Human Trafficking and Slavery in America Today.” He is a frequent contributor to America’s Civil War magazine, and has written several features for Civil War Times and Military History.

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Nelson Rockefeller as a Symbol of a Bygone Era

Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller with President Gerald R. Ford in the Oval Office in 1974

Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller with President Gerald R. Ford in the Oval Office in 1974Credit Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Nelson A. Rockefeller’s four terms as New York governor are unlikely to make many remember him as a towering historical figure. If anything, his name may bring to mind the tawdry circumstances of his death, a heart attack in the compromising company of a much younger female aide. This came only a couple of years after his humiliating brief stint as vice president, during which President Ford ejected him from the 1976 ticket.

In the popular lexicon, “Rockefeller” survives as an adjective describing an extinct branch of the Republican Party and the now repudiated inflexible approach of the so-called Rockefeller drug laws. So the prospect of poring over 700-plus page biography, even by a historian as distinguished as Richard Norton Smith, is unlikely to generate much excitement. Aware of the uphill climb it faces, the marketing department at Random House included with the advance copy of the book a document titled “Fifteen Ways Nelson Rockefeller Still Matters.”

On His Own Terms: A Life of Nelson Rockefeller,” is nonetheless a compelling read, despite its dense material. The catalog of legislative and administrative maneuverings driving the dozens of policy initiatives that Rockefeller championed in Washington and Albany over decades becomes numbing after a while. But what makes the book fascinating for a contemporary professional is not so much any one thing that Rockefeller achieved, but the portrait of the world he inhabited not so very long ago.

The sheer magnitude of Rockefeller’s ambition across the domains of business, government and philanthropy and the unselfconscious ease with which he moved among these worlds stand in stark contrast with what would be even conceivable today. Rockefeller’s own diminishment in the final sad years of his life mirror the diminishment of the multiple realms in which he once held court. The result is as depressing as it is eye-opening.

New York State seems much smaller now than the place described in these pages. It was, after all, the most populous state until 1970. Today, it ranks behind not just California and Texas but, imminently, Florida. At midcentury, Mr. Smith writes, New York City alone had more representatives in Congress than the entire state of Florida. The city was not just a global hub of finance and media, as it still is today, but of manufacturing, as well. For half a century, Rockefeller transformed this teeming landscape both literally and metaphorically.

Midtown Manhattan has his fingerprints all over it.

Richard Norton Smith's new book is “On His Own Terms: A Life of Nelson Rockefeller.”

Richard Norton Smith’s new book is “On His Own Terms: A Life of Nelson Rockefeller.”Credit Todd Heisler/The New York Times

 

While still in his 20s, Rockefeller played a critical role in ensuring the success and defining the shape of Rockefeller Center. He used a combination of creative deal-making and arm-twisting to see that the “largest urban mixed-use construction project in the nation’s history” fulfilled its promise, despite the Depression. Partly as a result of his efforts, the landmark to the south soon became known as “the Empty State Building.” A frustrated architect, Rockefeller ultimately served as the center’s president and closely oversaw its form and construction.

To the north, the Museum of Modern Art, originally conceived by his mother while Rockefeller was in college, was realized in its current form through the sheer force of his will. To the east, the last-minute selection in 1946 of New York City over Philadelphia as the permanent site of the United Nations was entirely because of his intervention. This was achieved through a combination of his business deal-making skills, government connections from his time in the Franklin D. Roosevelt’s White House and State Department, as well as his family’s philanthropic largesse that acquired and donated the land.

The scope and scale of Rockefeller’s aspirations did not subside as he entered New York State’s highest office in January 1959. His lifelong practice of collecting the best and brightest minds – Henry Kissinger and Walt Rostow, for instance — came to prominence through the Rockefeller working groups. He tapped such thinkers regardless of their political bent, and they proved worthy in creating innovative practical solutions to pressing problems that often established the state as a thought leader.

To be sure, not all of these initiatives were winners. A headline after one particularly audacious budget was submitted – “Rockefeller Wants More of Everything” – suggests the downside of his enthusiasm. But along the way, his sense of optimism and urgency somehow won over a surprising number of disciples across the political spectrum.

Meade H. Esposito, the Brooklyn Democratic boss, at the 1974 convention in Niagara Falls.

Meade H. Esposito, the Brooklyn Democratic boss, at the 1974 convention in Niagara Falls.Credit William Sauro/The New York Times

 

One of the many aspects of Rockefeller’s story that inspires nostalgia is the extent to which he was able to reach across the aisle to pursue the common good. The Brooklyn Democratic boss Meade H. Esposito uttered breathless expletives when he first met Rockefeller and observed the sumptuous trappings of his Fifth Avenue home. The two, nonetheless, established an enduring working relationship that solved a seemingly intractable budget crisis.

Rockefeller was the ultimate establishment figure. Despite going out of his way to cultivate an everyman style when he campaigned and cajoled, no one was more aware of this fact than he. His college thesis was dedicated to a defense of the business practices of his grandfather John D. Rockefeller, whose Standard Oil Company epitomized the trusts that were busted at the turn of the 20th century. With the establishment moniker came a responsibility to protect and strengthen those institutions that define the establishment. His interest in and ability to simultaneously call on the public and private, the profit and nonprofit, sectors to pursue aspirational goals stemmed from this sense of self.

During a difficult moment in of one Rockefeller’s three failed presidential bids, a frantic aide begged him to call in the support of the so-called Eastern Establishment. “You’re looking at it buddy,” Rockefeller told him, “I’m all that’s left.”

One cannot read “On His Own Terms” without feeling that today’s cynicism about our private and public institutions is at least in part a function of the fact that there is no more establishment, at least as once conceived. So, for instance, when investment banks were private partnerships with a deep vested interest in their own reputations and the proper functioning of the financial markets, the public was comforted when a senior executive took a senior government position.

Today, however, the appointment of an executive from Goldman Sachs or JPMorgan Chase to a senior Treasury Department position is sure to lead to public outcry, Internet conspiracy theories and a tough confirmation hearing. That this public cynicism has been well earned does not mean that we are all not poorer for the fact that public institutions now make scant use of private sector expertise. The broader point, however, is that the very idea of an “establishment” leader with an institutional commitment to the durability of the overall economic and political ecosystem today seems almost quaint.

The private sector leaders that now capture the public imagination tend to be associated with insurgent businesses that use technology to upend the established order. Even in financial services, the landscape has come to be dominated by activists and hedge funds whose aim is to overturn or outsmart the incumbents.

The fact that today’s favored philanthropy of hedge fund billionaires is called the Robin Hood Foundation is reflective of just how schizophrenic our most well-heeled are about the “establishment” label. For all of his personal and professional failings, Rockefeller embraced the establishment role, mostly for the good. His story is a reminder of how much is lost when the most successful of us no longer think they have a vested interest in the success of the rest of us.

Jonathan A. Knee is professor of professional practice in business at Columbia Business School and a senior adviser at Evercore Partners

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The Nazis Next Door: Eric Lichtblau on How the CIA & FBISecretly Sheltered Nazi War Criminals

Democracy Now  October 30, 2014

Investigative reporter Eric Lichtblau’s new book unveils the secret history of how the United States became a safe haven for thousands of Nazi war criminals. Many of them were brought here after World War II by the CIA and got support from thenFBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. Lichtblau first broke the story in 2010, based on newly declassified documents. Now, after interviews with dozens of agents for the first time, he has published his new book, «The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler’s Men.»

Click here to watch part 2 of this interview.

Image Credit: flickr.com/pingnews

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Part 2: Eric Lichtblau on «The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler’s Men»

Democracy Now    October 31,  2014

We continue our conversation with Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Eric Lichtblau about his new book detailing how America became a safe haven for thousands of Nazi war criminals. Many of them were brought here after World War II by the CIA, and got support from then FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Click here to watch part 1 of this interview. Read the prologue to The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler’s Men.

AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. I’m Amy Goodman, with Juan González.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: We continue our conversation with investigative reporter Eric Lichtblau, author of a new book that unveils the secret history of how America became a safe haven for thousands of Nazi war criminals. Many of them were brought here after World War II by the CIAand got support from the FBI’s director, J. Edgar Hoover.

AMY GOODMAN: Eric Lichtblau’s book is called The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler’s Men. You can read the prologue on our website at democracynow.org.

Eric, we left the first part of the interview by you talking about those held in the concentration camps under the Nazis. Once the Allies won, the U.S. and Allies took over these camps.

ERIC LICHTBLAU: Right.

AMY GOODMAN: And the Jews and others were kept there, often under the supervision—if you could call it that—of the Nazi POWs who were put in these camps, as well.

ERIC LICHTBLAU: Right.

AMY GOODMAN: The people who had killed and murdered and maimed them.

ERIC LICHTBLAU: Right.

AMY GOODMAN: Can you take it from there and talk about General Patton and, ultimately, President Truman, as well?

ERIC LICHTBLAU: Sure, yeah, yeah. It’s a remarkable saga and a fairly shameful period in postwar history. We sort of think of the concentration camps, you know, being liberated at Dachau, at Bergen-Belsen, at Auschwitz, by the U.S. and Britain and Russia. But liberation for the survivors who were left in the camps meant staying in those same camps, behind barb wire, under armed guard. And remarkably, sometimes they were supervised by the same Nazis who had lorded over them when the Germans were still in charge.

And there was a report to Truman from the dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, a guy named Earl Harrison, that compared the camps to the Nazi concentration camps, except that, Harrison wrote, the only difference is we’re not exterminating the Jews. And General Patton, who ran the camps as the supreme Allied commander for the United States after the war, was furious when he read Harrison’s findings to Truman. And he wrote in his own journal—and I looked at these. I found the remarks so troubling and so jarring, I thought maybe at first they were a forgery, but it turned out to be true. He wrote in his own journal that what Harrison doesn’t understand, he thinks that the displaced persons in the camps are human, and they’re not. The Jews, he wrote—this is General Patton speaking—are worse than human, they’re locusts, and they have no respect for human dignity. And he recounted taking General Eisenhower, soon to be President Eisenhower, on a tour of the displaced person camps, and he said that Eisenhower didn’t really understand how loathsome the displaced persons were, and he thinks that they have some human dignity, when really they don’t.

Patton, it turns out, was not only a virulent anti-Semite, but also held the Germans in a weird sort of place of respect. I also tell the story in the book about, in those displaced person camps, Patton went to the holding cells for the German POWs, the German scientists, and he sought out one in particular, General Walter Dornberger, who oversaw the production of Hitler’s V-2 rockets, which had been phenomenally successful and destructive in bombing London and Antwerp. And Patton brings him out of the cell and says, «Are you Dornberger? Are you the guy who ran the V-2 program?» And Dornberger said to him, «Jawohl, Herr General.» And Patton pulled out three cigars from his pocket and handed them to the Nazi general and said, «Well, congratulations. We couldn’t have done it.» And it sort of epitomized this attitude that he had towards the Nazis. He even defied an order from Eisenhower at one point, General Eisenhower, and maintained the Nazis as supervisors in the DP camps, because he saw them as the most competent group that the Allieds had. So, I think you need to understand how horrific the conditions were for the survivors to understand how it was that so many Nazis made it into the United States.

AMY GOODMAN: Explain the—

ERIC LICHTBLAU: I think there was—yes.

AMY GOODMAN: —the V-2 factories, just to explain the significance of what happened—

ERIC LICHTBLAU: Sure.

AMY GOODMAN: —in these rocket factories.

ERIC LICHTBLAU: Sure. These rocket factories were basically torture chambers. These were places where 10,000 prisoners—not most of them Jews, but most of them POWs from France, Poland, Russia and elsewhere—were building on an assembly line—an assembly line of death, basically—hundreds of rockets each month for Hitler. And if they did not meet their quotas, if they did not work up to standards, if they were suspected of sabotaging the rockets, as some tried to do, they were hanged from a giant crane, and all the other prisoners would be gathered around to watch them. And those who weren’t intentionally killed, thousands of them died just from disease and malnutrition and exhaustion, kept in these horrible, horrible conditions literally inside a mountain in Nordhausen, where the factory was held.

So, this was the production facility that Dornberger and Wernher von Braun, who went on to become even more famous, ran. And there was a guy who—physically at the mountain factory, named Arthur Rudolph, who was the production head at the Mittelwerk Nordhausen plant, he came to the United States, along with Wernher von Braun and Dornberger and the others, and Rudolph became almost as famous, as one of the geniuses behind the Saturn space program. And their Nazi legacies were basically erased.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And, Eric, the government files and records that tell this story were kept, obviously, from the public for decades. Could you talk about the importance of those files finally being released to be able to put together this story?

ERIC LICHTBLAU: Sure, sure. Well, the CIA, especially, and other intelligence agencies really went to enormous lengths to conceal their ties to the Nazis. They had had all these relationships, beginning immediately after the war through the ’50s, the ’60, in some cases even the ’70s, with Nazi spies and informants and scientists. And they went to great lengths to cleanse the records of a lot of the Nazis who came to the United States, removing material that showed their links to Nazi atrocities. Now, I found cases even in the 1990s, believe it or not, where you had the CIA actively intervening in investigations. By the 1980s and 1990s, the Justice Department was going after a number of these guys, was trying to deport them, for their involvement in war crimes, belatedly, I think.

And the CIA—in the case of a Lithuanian security chief who was involved in the massacre of about 60,000 Jews, the CIA tried to kill that investigation in 1994 and ’95. And they told Congress, yes, this guy was a CIA spy for us, this former Nazi collaborator, but we knew nothing of his wartime activities, is what they said. And, in fact, in their own files, in their own postwar files, it showed that they knew that this Lithuanian was under—quote, «under the control of the Gestapo and was probably involved in the murder of Jews in Vilnius.» So, this was—again, this is not the 1950s we’re talking about; this is the 1990s, where people at the CIAwere actively trying to conceal their ties.

And some of these documents, as you suggested, only became available beginning in the 1990s, the late 1990s, when Congress ordered the declassification of war crime files. The CIA really resisted that at first. It took years for the historians to get at the war crime files. But beginning in around 2003, 2004, a lot of these files became declassified, and they really painted a pretty troubling picture.

AMY GOODMAN: But even the piece that started you on this journey, Eric Lichtblau, in 2010 was about a report coming out that had been censored right until most recently.

ERIC LICHTBLAU: Sure.

AMY GOODMAN: Explain why right through until these last few years the U.S. has refused to give this out? And the man who had campaigned to his death bed to have it released—it was aCIA report?

ERIC LICHTBLAU: True. No, it was a Justice Department report. But as you say, it was kept under wraps for about five years. It was written in the mid-2000s. And I first got onto this, and really what started the book was that I got a tip that there was this exhaustive internal report at the Justice Department that looked at the efforts to go after the Nazis, and the Justice Department was sitting on the report. They had refused to release this publicly for very mysterious reasons. And I was able to get a hold of it and did a story on that. And I think even before I finished writing the story, I thought, you know, the material was so rich and so troubling that I wanted to try and do a book on it, because it really—it exposed both the successes of prosecutors in later years in going after these guys, but also really the just perverse relationships that the government had with a lot of these guys going back to the 1950s and 1960s. And that was something that the Justice Department did not want out there publicly.

AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk about the anti-Semitism also of President Truman and then this issue of the scientists? What, 1,600 scientists were brought into the United States, many others, but at the same time, how many Jews were held in these camps, millions of them, not allowed to come into the United States? This is after the war.

ERIC LICHTBLAU: Right, right. You know, I think the anti-Semitism really did play a part in the immigration policies after the war, which had the dual effect of both keeping out Jews—I mean, there were documents that I looked at from Senate immigration lawyers who actively said they didn’t—they thought Jews were lazy and not hard-working enough and didn’t belong in America. And so, it was very difficult. Only a few thousand Jews got into the United States in the immediate aftermath of the war.

And you had something like 400,000 Eastern Europeans who, because of the, quote, «immigration quotas,» were allowed in in those years from places like Lithuania and Latvia and Estonia and Ukraine. And many of those, probably the vast majority of those 400,000, were in fact legitimate war refugees. These were people who were victims of Nazi occupation and were about to be taken over by the Soviet Union and were exiles. They really were. But among those 400,000 were many, many, probably several thousand or more, Nazi collaborators, and they came in with the group as—disguised basically as refugees and POWs. I mean, these were people who ran, for instance, a Nazi concentration camp in Estonia. There was—the head of that camp lived on Long Island for about 30 years. There were people who were prison camp guards. There were people who were the heads of Nazi security forces all throughout Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe. And it was very easy for them to basically fade into the larger group of war refugees and become Americans.

AMY GOODMAN: Well, Eric Lichtblau, we want to thank you very much for being with us

ERIC LICHTBLAU: Thank you. Appreciate your interest.

AMY GOODMAN: Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for The New York Times. The new book, out this week, The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler’s Men. You can read the prologue at democracynow.org. Thanks so much.

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Why Iran-Contra Proves We Were All Wrong to Think that Ronald Reagan Was Disengaged

James Graham Wilson

HNN  October 24, 2014

 

One unfortunate consequence of the Watergate scandal was the demise of the White House taping system. Historians of the post-Nixon era must settle for memoirs, diaries, interviews, private collections, and official records stored in the National Archives and printed in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Memories are selective, however; policymakers tend to win their own memoranda of conversations; and, no piece of paper can match a surreptitiously-recorded meeting with the president of the United States.

With the Ronald Reagan administration, minutes of the majority of meetings of two principals committees — the National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Planning Group (NSPG) — are available to researchers at the Reagan Library in Simi Valley, California, and are highly illuminating. Especially in the early years of that administration, Counselor to the President Edwin Meese, a longtime Reagan associate with no formal foreign policy brief, is the person steering the conversation. One might even regard Meese as the de facto National Security Advisor in 1981, since the person actually bearing the title that year, Richard Allen, reported to him.

Five years later, then-Attorney General Meese may well have saved Reagan’s presidency. On November 25, 1986, he took over a White House press briefing after his boss announced the resignation of National Security Advisor John Poindexter and the dismissal of NSC staffer Lt. Colonel Oliver North. Meese provided the results of an initial White House inquiry after newspaper reports surfaced of clandestine U.S. arms transfers to Iran and illicit support for Contras fighting against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The gist of the reporting was indeed true. Meese’s priority was, however, to protect the president. That meant directing the glare of the media and focusing the congressional spotlight on the diversion of funds from one account to the other — as opposed to whether Reagan had violated the Boland Amendment, which prohibited assistance to the Contras to overthrow the Sandinista regime; or the Hughes-Ryan Act, which required that he submit to Congress a presidential finding before authorizing covert action. Because few had ever touted Reagan as a detail-oriented micromanager, it was eminently plausible that the president had been unaware of rogue actions on the part of North, Poindexter, or former national security advisor Robert “Bud” McFarlane.

In his valuable new book, Iran-Contra: Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power, Malcolm Byrne takes aim at Meese’s version of the story. “In fact,” he argues, “the driving force behind both sides of the scandal was President Reagan himself.” Documentary evidence, he contends, shows that “Reagan was a forceful participant in policy discussions, not the cartoon image of utter detachment often portrayed, and provided the primary guidance and direction to his staff on policies close to his heart.” Among those policies were assisting the Contras and crafting ways to free the hostages in Lebanon. “The president approved every significant facet of the Iran arms deals,” Byrne goes on to say, “and he encouraged conduct by top aides . . . to subsidize the Contra war despite the congressional prohibition on U.S. aid.”

Byrne has been working to unearth the details and meaning of Iran-Contra practically since the scandal broke. In 1987, he edited The Chronology: The Documented Day-by-Day Account of Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras; in 1993, he co-edited with Peter Kornbluh, an annotated collection of primary documents, The Iran-Contra Scandal. In Iran-Contra, his first narrative account, he mobilizes earlier evidence in addition to a body of material stemming from Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests over the past twenty years. But he seems more interested in developing an argument than showing off everything he has found. One of Byrne’s many strengths as a writer is that he does not jam puzzle pieces where they do not belong. The subtitle and cover do not augur its becoming a permanent fixture at the Reagan Library gift store. Readers of all political stripes should nevertheless consider this book; aspirants to high office who seek to avoid mistakes would do well to read it.

Byrne’s stated purpose is to save the Iran-Contra affair from “consignment to historical irrelevance.” This is not what observers at the time might have anticipated. Watch any few minutes from the joint House and Senate hearings in late spring 1987, and Iran-Contra appears to have imperiled the survival of the Republic. Then again, the national mood that year was gloomy. West German and Japanese companies were outpacing American firms. Paul Kennedy’s declinist Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and Allan Bloom’s disquieting Closing of the American Mind topped bestseller lists. On October 19, “Black Monday,” the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than 20% in what remains the single worst single-day loss ever. All this came as Americans geared up for a brutal presidential election campaign.

Somewhere in the years that followed — be it the miraculous events of 1989 in Eastern and Central Europe, the smashing U.S. victory in Operation Desert Storm, or the collapse of the Soviet Union — Iran-Contra receded from view. It did not end for figures such as John Poindexter or Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams, who endured costly legal battles while Oliver North became rich. Nor was it over for Lawrence Walsh, the Republican former deputy attorney general whom Congress enlisted in late 1986 to untangle the facts. Democrats cheered when Walsh re-indicted former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on the eve of the 1992 election. Six years later, their enthusiasm for the Office of the Independent Counsel waned as the House of Representatives impeached President Bill Clinton for having a sexual relationship with a White House intern.

For some, the memory of the investigation eclipsed that of the Iran-Contra scandal itself. Congressman Dick Cheney of Wyoming had been the ranking Republican on the House Committee during the proceedings. On him it clearly left an impression. “If you want reference to an obscure text, go look at the minority views that were filed with the Iran-Contra Committee,” Cheney told reporters in 2005. “Nobody has ever read them, but . . . [they] are very good in laying out a robust view of the president’s prerogatives with respect to the conduct of especially foreign policy and national security matters.”

Presidential prerogative, of course, does not automatically determine presidential behavior. Capabilities differ from intentions. During the Watergate hearings, Senator Howard Baker, who replaced White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan in February 1987, famously asked the question: “what did the president know, and when did he know it?” In the case of Reagan and Iran-Contra, a more pertinent question remains: “what did the president decide, and when did he decide it?”

Shortly after Meese’s White House briefing, Saturday Night Live ran a skit featuring the late, great Phil Hartman as the Gipper. The scene begins with a doddering Reagan concluding an interview in which he apologizes for remembering so very little. No sooner has the reporter left the room than Reagan summons his national security team to bark orders at Ed Meese, Don Regan, and the rest of the gang. “[National Security Advisor Frank] Carlucci, you’re new, here’s how we run things. The red countries are the countries we sell arms to. The green countries are the countries where we wash our money.” The president is about to identify the blue countries when an aide interrupts to announce the arrival of the Girl Scout who sold the most brownies in America. “Damn! . . . This is the part of the job I hate!”

The Reagan who emerges from Byrne’s book did not actually command his national security team this way (also, he was surely thrilled to meet entrepreneurial girl scouts). But the Saturday Night Live skit is a great imagining of the president’s id. Reagan’s affinity for the Contras was disproportionate to whatever threat Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega posed at the time. More understandable is his devotion to an effort to free American hostages in Lebanon. One does not require recordings to understand Reagan. “Critics frequently lampooned him as disengaged from the policy process to the point of requiring cue cards,” Byrne writes. “There were grounds for this caricature on issues in which he had no deep interest, but on subjects he felt strongly about, such as the Contras or the hostages, it was inadequate.” Indeed, the president was “at his most impressive during crises” such as the extended hostage situation or the Achille Lauro hijacking in October 1985. He was willing to answer charges of illegality, as Weinberger later put it — just not the charge that “big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages.”

And yet, Reagan seldom acted decisively. In the summer of 1985, as the president recovered from cancer surgery, he listened as National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane floated the idea of reaching out, via a middleman, to “moderates in Iran” who purported to wield influence over the terrorist organization Hezbollah. “The president’s views were opaque,” Byrne writes. “When his aides disagreed, he often did not commit himself right away. As a result, each participant left the meeting with his own reading of where things stood. Shultz and Weinberger believed he opposed the idea; McFarlane thought he was inclined to go ahead.” In the months following this particular encounter, the secretaries of state and defense focused their attention on the phenomenon of Mikhail Gorbachev and the challenges it posed to U.S. strategic planning and arms negotiations. They picked their battles — frequently with each other — and probably hoped that McFarlane’s ambitions would lose momentum.

They did not. McFarlane pursued the Iran gambit even as he seemed to acknowledge his own physical and emotional exhaustion before resigning in December 1985. Reagan’s personal diaries, published in 2007, show that he knew about the transfer of arms to Iran by that month at the latest. His entry of December 7, 1985, reads: “had a meeting with Don R., Cap W. & Bud M., John P., Geo. Shultz & Mahan [sic] of C.I.A. This has to do with the complex plan which could return our 5 hostages & help some officials in Iran who want to turn that country from [its] present course & on to a better relationship with us. It calls for Israel selling some weapons to Iran. As they are delivered in installments by air our hostages will be released. The weapons will go to the moderate leaders in the army who are essential if there’s to be a change to a more stable govt. We then sell Israel replacements for the delivered weapons. None of this is a gift—the Iranians pay cash for the weapons—so does Israel. George S., Cap & Don are opposed—Cong. has imposed a law on us that we [can’t] sell Iran weapons or sell any other country weapons for re-sale to Iran. Geo. also thinks this violates our policy of not paying off terrorists. I claim the weapons are for those who want to change the govt. of Iran & no ransom is being pd. for the hostages. No direct sale would be made by us to Iran but we would be replacing the weapons sold by Israel. We’re at a stalemate.”

The above passage accords with the reasoning that Reagan provided after the scandal broke the following year. Few accepted the explanation of “no arms for hostages.” In the wake of the February 26, 1987 publication of the Tower Commission report, Reagan expressed regret. “A few months ago, I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages,” he told the nation on March 4, 1987. “My heart and my best intentions still tell me that’s true, but the facts and evidence tell me it is not.” True to form, Reagan the performer nailed this delivery.

Congressional hearings later that spring focused on whether the president had known that funds garnered from profits on arms sales to the Iranians had been diverted to the Contras whose support, again, Congress had restricted. Meese’s initial framing of Iran-Contra had paid off. In his own bravura performance, Colonel Oliver North claimed not to have shared with the president knowledge of the diversion. In this new book, Byrne acknowledges that he has found no “smoking gun” quality of evidence to contradict North on this claim.

And yet, as Byrne argues convincingly, Iran-Contra qualified as a concerted policy. It comprised shady characters such as the profiteering Richard Secord, the dubious Manucher Ghorbanifar, and the hapless Eugene Hasenfus, none of whom had any direct dealings with the president. The principals in the affair did, however; they acted in light of what they believe the president wanted. Ideology and fantasy played key roles. In the world of American conservatism in the 1980s, Oliver North was Brünnhilde to Ronald Reagan’s Wotan: the former proceeded according to the latter’s will in the absence of explicit orders.

Why were McFarlane, North, and Poindexter motived to take such risks? When it came to McFarlane, I think, the potential opportunity to pull off with Iran what Henry Kissinger had done with China was irresistible. For all three individuals, only a dramatic geopolitical reorientation could reverse the troubling Cold War strategic balance in the early to mid-1980s. Ultimately, Gorbachev’s reforms mooted these concerns. No one in Washington cared so much about Nicaragua after the Soviet leader cut the cord on revolutionary nationalism in the Third World. The contest between the United States and Iran, however, outlasted the sudden collapse of Soviet power from 1989-1991. As Malcolm Byrne demonstrates in his very fine book, the Iran-Contra affair belongs as a key chapter in that longer story.

James Graham Wilson works in the Office of the Historian at the Department of State. He is the author of “The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War“ (Cornell University Press, 2014). The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of State or the U.S. Government.

 

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What Union Soldiers Thought About the Civil War

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The New York Times  October 17, 2014

Several years ago, a thick sheaf of Civil War letters was discovered in an old barn in upstate New York. Most were sent by a Union soldier, Charles Freeman Biddlecom, to his wife, the former Esther Lapham. Now edited and published by Katherine M. Aldridge, who owns the barn, they provide a remarkably candid window into the outlook of an ordinary infantryman. They also caution us against exaggerating the affinity of common soldiers for the great causes — the Union and emancipation — that we now hold in such high regard.

Today we often remember Union soldiers as principled, articulate and ready to sacrifice their lives for something larger. The historians James McPherson and Chandra Manning each have written influential recent volumes articulating soldiers’ views: McPherson’s Union soldiers were “intensely aware of the issues at stake and passionately concerned about them”; they knew that they were playing roles in a transcendently important struggle, on which the future of the American nation would pivot. Likewise, the “commitment to emancipation” among Manning’s Union soldiers deepened and intensified as the war progressed. For them, “ideals like liberty, equality, and self-government” were not empty abstractions but core principles worth fighting to uphold.

The filmmaker Ken Burns spearheaded this heroic reassessment with his widely watched public television series on the Civil War in the early 1990s. Most memorably, Burns used the emotionally charged letter to “My very dear Sarah” from a Rhode Island infantryman, Sullivan Ballou, written in July 1861 just before the battle of Bull Run. Much as Ballou wanted to return to his loved ones unharmed and to see his sons grow to “honorable manhood,” he gave ultimate priority to his country. He and his generation owed a great debt to “those who went before us through the blood and sufferings of the Revolution.” He was “willing — perfectly willing — to lay down all my joys in this life, to help maintain this Government, and to pay that debt.” Untold millions of television viewers, alerted that Ballou’s iconic letter was his last, have listened intently to its dramatic rereading, complete with stringed instruments in the background, tugging at our heartstrings.

Ballou’s noble and stoic valedictory makes for splendid theater, but the messy realities of war swept into the Army countless men whose commitment to big causes was far more muddled and erratic – men like Charles Biddlecom, who lived as a farmer in Macedon, N.Y., just east of Rochester.

On the face of it, Biddlecom might have been a promising candidate for Burns’s honor roll. He was educated, he wrote vivid prose, he was older than the average (born in 1832) and he came from a region where slavery was deplored and enthusiasm for reform was widespread. So one might expect Biddlecom to have embraced the Union cause for all the right reasons. But in his letters, we find that he saw no purpose in the war and considered himself a helpless pawn in an enormous kill-or-be-killed chess match.

Biddlecom first enlisted in May 1861, as a volunteer in the 28th New York Infantry. Suspecting that the “fuss” soon would be over, he wanted to rout the “southern whelps.” But his health deteriorated, and he was discharged before he saw combat.

Two years later, however, in the summer of 1863, Biddlecom was called back. The war had grown to proportions unimaginable in 1861. He and many other “poor forsaken conscripts” were assigned to rebuild the depleted ranks of the 147th New York, which had been decimated on the first day at Gettysburg. The re-formed regiment was stationed in a dismal part of Northern Virginia, already scarred by three years of warfare.

As the army went into winter quarters, Biddlecom was sickened by dysentery, afflicted by lice and miserably lonesome and homesick. He and three other men lived in a “little dog kennel,” about four feet high. In his darker moments he predicted cynically that the war would grind on inconclusively for 20 years, because “Lincoln and his miserable crew” could never bring it to a successful finish. Biddlecom also second-guessed the decision to go to war in the first place. Much as he hated slaveholders, he mused that it might have been “better in the end to have let the South go out peaceably and tried her hand at making a nation.”

Biddlecom longed to go home to rejoin his family. Some men, he observed, had been discharged who were “not a bit more disabled than I am,” and he vowed to follow their example. By spring, as the prospect of renewed fighting came closer, the trickle of deserters fleeing into the nearby mountains from the 147th increased. Most nights two or three men quietly absconded to join the euphemistic “Blue Ridge Corps,” and Biddlecom predicted that the regiment stood to lose 150 men. In some ways he sympathized with the deserters — he agreed that no conscript should have to serve longer than nine months — but he could not see himself “sneaking off.”

In early May 1864, Biddlecom and his regiment were thrown across the Rapidan River into the terrifying caldron of Ulysses S. Grant’s Overland Campaign. Ten days of fighting in the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania left his division “terribly cut up,” with half his own company killed or wounded, and others missing. By early June, barely 100 of the 550 men in his regiment who had started the campaign remained fit for duty.

Biddlecom initially hoped that Grant could bring the war to a prompt end, but six weeks of inconclusive bloodletting rekindled his cynicism. He dismissed as “bosh” all talk about “great Union victories.” Reports about the “pluck and courage” of the Union Army were “the worst kind of exaggeration.” The Army was “worn out, discouraged, [and] demoralized.” He admonished his wife, Esther, to reject “newspaper hokum” that depicted ordinary soldiers as patriotic. Men would fight to preserve their reputations, but “as for men fighting from pure love of country, I think them as few as white blackbirds.”

What motivated Biddlecom to continue fighting? Certainly not the high ideals depicted McPherson or Manning. It was in part personal. Convinced that he was the “black sheep” of his family and that most of his kinfolk “never gave me credit for being much of a man,” he carried a chip on his shoulder. He wanted to make it clear that he was “not an absolute failure in all things.” He was determined not to disgrace his parents or stigmatize his sons by “showing cowardice.” But, he insisted, he was neither a “Union Saver” nor a “freedom shrieker.” He rejected all high-flown rationalizations for the war effort — “to hell with the devilish twaddle about freedom.”

As late as August 1864, Biddlecom believed that the men in the Army would vote “four to one” against Lincoln. He resolved to support the president’s opponent, George B. McClellan, on grounds that wasting “more blood and treasure in this war will be productive of more evil to the white race than it will be of good to the black race.” He was content to allow slavery to “die a peaceful death,” even if it required 50 or 100 years.

As Union prospects brightened and the election approached, however, Biddlecom reversed himself and spurned the “copperhead ticket.” Suddenly, the soldier who was no “freedom shrieker” embraced the war “for freedom, [and] for equal rights.” On Election Day in November he sounded entirely unlike his old self, as he pontificated that the contest would decide “the future of American civilization.” It pitted “Lincoln and the universal rights of man” against “McClellan and another compromise with the Devil.” He heralded the outcome for affirming that “freedom shall extend over the whole nation.” The “greatest nation of Earth” would not bow down to “traitors in arms.”

So Biddlecom’s pithy letters convey a mixed message. Until the autumn of 1864, he disdained all ideological rationalizations for the Union war effort. But he also was a team player, and his team appears to have broken strongly toward Lincoln. The army, he decided, was “a very good school for hot heads such as I was.” Home influences may also have played a role — after all, the men in his regiment came from one of the most intensely Republican regions in the country.

The patriotic prose that Charles Biddlecom penned in November 1864 would have delighted Ken Burns. But we dare not forget the long and circuitous journey that finally landed him among the charmed circle of those Union soldiers whose ideas square with modern sensibilities.

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Sources: Katherine M. Aldridge, ed., “No Freedom Shrieker: The Civil War Letters of Union Soldier Charles Biddlecom”; James McPherson, “For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War”; Chandra Manning, “When This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War.”


Daniel W. Crofts

Daniel W. Crofts, a professor emeritus of history at The College of New Jersey, is completing a new book, entitled “Lincoln’s Other Thirteenth Amendment: Rewriting the Constitution to Conciliate the Slave South.

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Okinawa: Why They Chose Death

Jonathan Mirsky

The New York Review of Books    October 23, 2014

A Japanese naval lieutenant surrounded by American soldiers in Okinawa, July 14, 1945. Keystone/Getty Images

Would the Japanese have surrendered without Hiroshima? For decades the question has lingered, as historians have challenged one of the most important American rationales for dropping the bomb. While we can never know what the Japanese would have done in other circumstances, the question comes freshly into view in Descent into Hell: Civilian Memories of the Battle of Okinawa, a remarkable new book based on Japanese eyewitness testimony from one of the bloodiest land battles of the war.

Two things jump out about this big book. One is that it is unusual to read extensive personal accounts of civilians on the enemy side who suffered in large numbers during World War II. The second is that, at least to judge by the inhabitants of Okinawa, many Japanese civilians, together with their emperor, were unwilling to surrender.

The huge US offensive in Okinawa—the only part of Japan where US forces fought on the ground—lasted eighty-two days in the spring of 1945 and cost about as many lives altogether as the atom bombs themselves. The US invading force of 1,050 ships carrying 548,000 men vastly outnumbered the 110,000 Japanese soldiers defending the island. But the Japanese held out with remarkable tenacity, and 77,000 Japanese soldiers and over 140,000 civilians would be killed before the US could declare victory. On the US side, more than 14,000 troops lost their lives, including 4,900 sailors felled by Japanese kamikaze—“divine wind”—suicide pilots, of which there were 3,050. As Hanson W. Baldwin, the New York Times war correspondent, described it, “Never before had there been, probably never again will there be, such a vicious sprawling struggle.”

I was thirteen at the time and recall my feelings of pride that American soldiers were yet again beating the fiendish, barely human Japanese. This was bolstered by the press and by super-patriotic films like Wake Island, in which Americans lost but only temporarily. Later, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a new belief took hold among liberal and leftist Americans: that the reasons given for dropping the bombs—among them, above all, that the Japanese would never surrender unless pulverized—were self-serving and false. Because of this new book I am thinking again.

The survivors’ accounts contained in Descent into Hell were originally gathered in the early 1980s by the Okinawan newspaper Ryukyu Shimpo, in which reporters discovered that these civilian wartime memories had been repressed in postwar Japan. Nearly thirty years later, the translator and Okinawan specialist Mark Ealey, together with Alastair McLauchlan, secured permission from the newspaper to use these testimonies as the basis of a new, English-language account of the battle from the eyes of Japanese civilians. In assembling this nearly five-hundred-page book, the translators have incorporated the testimony into a chapter-by-chapter account of the battle that includes their own extensive commentary and analysis, as well as notes on specific themes, maps, and a timeline of the battle itself. In an introductory essay, the former governor of Okinawa, Ota Masahide, writes that, “The Battle of Okinawa was distinct from all other battles in the Pacific War in that it was fought…with the majority of the resident civilian population still present.” According to Ota, “The horrific death toll and the fanatical resistance by the Japanese soldiers affected the thinking of the American leaders and was a significant factor leading to the decision to drop atomic bombs on mainland Japan.”

Out of a population on the island of 450,000, one third were killed and many more wounded. Many of those killed were young teenagers, totally untrained but keen to scout, carry ammunition, and to nurse. Others died in caves where they had sought refuge. Entire families were wiped out—whether by American shelling and bombing, by committing suicide, or by Japanese soldiers who feared they might surrender or were spies. The testimonies of those young people and their parents are detailed, unrancorous, and poignant.

“We wanted to be of use to the country as quickly as we could,” the sole survivor of a signal corps unit made up of teenage boys recalls. “We were consumed by a burning desire to offer our lives in defense of the nation. We had no fear of death whatsoever.” Another who was a boy at the time similarly describes the so-called “infiltration raids” in which he and his friends were sent to disrupt enemy lines: “Classmates dropped in front of my eyes, one after the other, launching those raids where death was the only possible outcome. They went on those raids simply to get killed. That’s how war is.” Some felt regret about their own survival. “I was envious of my school friends who died,” one Okinawan recalls. “I thought that it was just a matter of time before my number was up too….I really thought that it would be easier to die sooner than later.”

Another student remembers how those already sent to fight would write letters to friends saying they would “meet at the Yasukuni Shrine” on the mainland where people who died for the emperor were commemorated. “We always felt that, however grim things seemed, there was no way that our divine nation would lose the war….That’s because we were all more than happy to die for our country.”

Civilians returning from hiding places in the hills following the American invasion of Okinawa, April 17, 1945. Fox Photos/Getty Images

 

In some ways, the experience of the war seems to have been even more traumatic for young girls, who were enlisted as nurses to care for the wounded or even to deal with dead bodies in the most horrific circumstances. Many were given hand grenades by the military or phials of potassium cyanide by medical staff so they could take their own lives rather than risk capture. One, who dealt with the dead, says, “There were so many bodies out there that we weren’t able to carry out a proper burial. There were blowflies all over the swollen, bluish-black corpses. They no longer looked like human beings. But the thing that frightened me most was myself. It was as though I’d become some sort of hard-hearted person who couldn’t cry even when I saw a dead body. I felt that I’d turned into a cold human being.”

All we hoped for, one schoolgirl nurse says, was to “die in an appropriate manner.” Another recalls how ten of her classmates who were about to be captured by the Americans decided to commit group suicide with their teacher. “When I went over to look, I could see Mr. Taira lying on the ground surrounded by the girls, all lying limp and inert around him. Pieces of flesh were all around. The face of one of the third year students was just covered in blood. I remember that I was so shocked that it didn’t seem to register.”

So pervasive was the cult of self-sacrifice that several women say they had to be reminded that survival was important too: “Death is not the only way to serve your country,” one unit commander told the schoolgirl nurses under his watch. “I’ve got children your age and think of all of you as my children, so I can’t lead you to your deaths. You have been through an experience that children from other prefectures could not even begin to imagine.”

Throughout the terrific shelling and bombing of the island and gassing of the caves where civilians had taken refuge, the Americans called loudly on the Japanese to surrender. It was apparent from the outset that the US forces were overwhelmingly superior; survivors recall that enemy pilots’ faces could be seen. Paradoxically, for those that did get captured, the dreaded Americans seem to have taken care of their prisoners—military and civilian—relatively well. “I hated and feared those Americans,” one survivor recalls, “but they treated me with great care and kindness, while my classmates, my teachers, left me behind.”

Bolstered by Ealey and McLauchlan’s extensive research, Descent into Hell records that from the late nineteenth century, Japanese education became highly nationalistic and militarized. On Okinawa, students were commanded to show total devotion to the emperor and therefore to the nation, and during the war most Okinawans obeyed military orders as though they had been given by the emperor himself. Any form of coercive message from the Imperial Japanese Army, the translators write, was manifested in a determination to die rather than surrender—a determination heightened by what the soldiers told Okinawans, especially children: that the Americans would commit terrible depredations on anyone who fell into their hands. (The book suggests that Japanese soldiers were re-telling actual atrocities they had committed in China.) This explains why many civilians killed themselves after killing helpless but acquiescent members of their families. Such tale-telling by the military to encourage suicide was embarrassing enough years later for it to be edited substantially from history textbooks.

The result for Okinawa—and Japan—was cataclysmic. In early 1945, the Japanese prime minister had recommended that the war be brought to an end, but as Ealey and McLauchlin write, Hirohito believed that one last military success “would force the United States and its allies to offer peace terms that would allow Japan to maintain its national polity, which of course hinged on the status and institution of the emperor.“ Had the prime minister’s advice been followed, they observe, “there may never have been a Battle of Okinawa, or atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki.” Indeed. General Douglas MacArthur urged that the emperor’s status be preserved, and there is a memorable photograph of the two recent adversaries standing side by side in Tokyo not long after the war ended. Hirohito’s descendants have remained on the throne to this day. What we learn from this profoundly disturbing and enlightening book is that tens of thousands of misled Okinawans died for nothing.

Jonathan Mirsky is a historian of China and was formerly the East Asia Editor of The Times of London.
 (July 2014)


Descent into Hell: Civilian Memories of the Battle of Okinawa, translated by Mark Ealey and Alastair McLauchlan, has just been published by Merwin Asia and is distributed by University of Hawaii Press.

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President Barack Obama has lost his hold on a majority of Americans, according to recent polls. Though more than two years remain in his term, the popular appeal that propelled him to win the 2008 and 2012 elections may be beyond recovery.

It is sadly reminiscent of what President Lyndon B. Johnson experienced in the mid-1960s after winning the 1964 presidential election by one of the largest landslides in U.S. history.  This is not to suggest that history is repeating itself. There are too many differences between Johnson and Obama — both the men and their presidencies — to argue that. Yet, as Mark Twain said, history may not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.

In broad terms, though, LBJ and Obama share a record of pushing through bold domestic reforms, then losing momentum as foreign affairs blocked their progressive programs. With Johnson, it was largely foreign problems that stopped his forward motion. With Obama, it has been foreign and domestic developments.

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Johnson’s Great Society and War on Poverty programs generated strong conservative opposition to so broad an expansion of federal power. Johnson most likely wouldn’t even have been able to enact his stunning domestic reforms if not for President John F. Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963. This tragedy gave Johnson a martyr to invoke in his effort to pass the 1964 Civil Rights Bill, which forbids racial segregation in public accommodations and helped establish an anti-poverty agency that Johnson said JFK intended to create.

The two-thirds Democratic majorities that Johnson had in both the House of Representatives and the Senate after the 1964 elections allowed him to push through the Voting Rights Act, as well as Medicare and federal aid to education. Numerous other progressive reforms became law in 1965 and 1966, including two new Cabinet departments –transportation and housing and urban development.

By 1967, however, Johnson’s advocacy of additional reforms had fallen victim to the fighting in Vietnam, where the United States was losing close to thousands of combat troops every month, and doubts had arisen about the wisdom of fighting a war against insurgents in the Vietnamese jungles. The public  questioned why American sacrifices in Southeast Asia were essential to defeating Communist Russia and China in the Cold War.

The surprising North Vietnamese-Viet Cong Tet offensive in the winter of 1968 did much to create a Johnson “credibility gap.” He had been insisting the U.S. military could see the light at the end of the tunnel in Vietnam.

“How do you know when LBJ is telling the truth?” Johnson’s critics would ask. “When he rubs his chin or pulls at his ear lobes, he’s telling the truth. When he moves his lips, you know he’s lying.”

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Tet and the credibility gap helped end any prospect of renewed progressive advances in the United States and destroyed Johnson’s chances of winning another term. Vietnam crushed Johnson’s reform ambitions and hopes of a historical reputation as one of America’s great presidents.

Ironically, Johnson thought if he lost Vietnam it would kill his reform agenda. But it was the fighting in Vietnam that ruined all his progressive dreams.

Obama has had no single foreign-affairs frustration comparable to Vietnam. Historians will likely credit the Obama administration with more advances toward a more humane society. His signed into law his signature initiative, the Affordable Care Act, designed to provide health insurance to most of the more than 40 million uninsured; promoted equal rights for women, including equal pay for similar work; ensured equal treatment under the law for gays and lesbians; increased protections for the environment, and pressed for sympathetic treatment of illegal immigrants, especially the “Dreamers,” children brought to the United States by their parents.

The Obama presidency will likely be remembered as part of the country’s progressive tradition — dating back to President Theodore Roosevelt and continuing with the administrations of Presidents Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Johnson.

At this juncture, however, when Democrats look unlikely to take back the House or perhaps hold the Senate in the midterm elections, Obama’s progressive agenda seems to be stymied by both domestic and foreign developments.

At home, he confronts the aggressively conservative Tea Party movement. Its message has been consistently anti-government — and anti-Obama.

During one of the five dinners that Obama has held with a group of presidential historians (including me), I said the Tea Party is practicing classic “politics of resentment.” Though Tea Party adherents talk about being opposed to government debt and intrusion into people’s private lives, this is only the overt part of their opposition, I explained. Tea Party adherents are mainly white, middle-class citizens, angry at being elbowed aside by minority voters. Obama replied only that he saw something “subterranean” in their outlook.

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In many ways, though, these Tea Party conservatives are a throwback to the fundamentalists of the 1920s, who spoke out against blacks, Catholics, Jews and immigrants. The 1924 National Origins Act, strongly supported by small-town and rural Americans across the country, served as a roadblock to post-1870 immigrants, who flocked to America from Southern and Eastern Europe. When Johnson put through major immigration reform in 1965, tossing out the National Origins measure, he called the 1924 law “racist.”

Tea Party-inclined Republican representatives in the House have indeed played a large part in stopping Obama’s reform agenda. The Republican House majority has often made it impossible for the president to negotiate compromises on his proposals and virtually killed some legislative advances Obama hoped would expand his record of progressive reforms.

Even if the Republicans didn’t control the House, however, Obama’s foreign-policy problems would likely have made a bold reform program problematic. In May 2009, at the first of our White House dinners, three historians (full disclosure: including me) cautioned the president against expanding the war in Afghanistan or sending in additional ground forces.  History has shown the difficulty of combining guns and butter, we stated.

Consider: U.S. participation in World War I ended the Progressive movement; after Pearl Harbor, FDR said “Dr. Win the War” had replaced “Dr. New Deal;” President Harry S. Truman’s Fair Deal went a-glimmering with the Korean War, and LBJ’s Great Society came to a halt with Vietnam.

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Obama replied that he was not unmindful of what we were saying. But, he added, he had a problem with this argument. We took it to mean that though he had labeled Iraq a “mistake” and vowed to “remove” U.S. troops from there as soon as possible, he had called Afghanistan a “necessary” conflict and could not back away from it without paying a substantial political price or abandoning a foreign-policy judgment he still considered accurate.

Other foreign problems have also undermined Obama’s popularity. These include a red line in Syria that he never enforced, as well as an inability to influence events in Egypt or the fighting between Israel and Hamas. He also looks unprepared to deal with Islamic State’s challenge to the Iraqi government and other Middle East nations, and the Ebola crisis has driven his approval numbers lower. With only about 40 percent of the country now supporting him, it is doubtful that he could have led other bold reforms through even a more sympathetic Congress.

Like Truman, Johnson and Jimmy Carter before him, Obama now looks like he could end his presidency on a sour note. Yet he still has two years to recoup some of the lost political ground and find a formula that excites renewed enthusiasm for his leadership.

It is doubtful that Obama will end up with as poor a reputation as Johnson. Recent polls place Johnson third from the bottom in the rankings of public approval for the 10 last presidents — ahead of only Richard M. Nixon and George W. Bush. Obama will certainly do better than that.

The high hopes Obama initially brought to the White House, however, have been disappointed. He has again forcefully demonstrated that being president can be a hazardous enterprise.

PHOTO (TOP): REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst/LBJ Presidential Library

PHOTO (INSERT 1): President Lyndon B. Johnson shaking hands with a crowd in 1966. REUTERS/LBJ Presidential Library

PHOTO (INSERT 2): President Lyndon B. Johnson talking with Martin Luther King Jr. in the Cabinet Room of the White House in Washington, March 18, 1966. REUTERS/LBJ Presidential Library photo by Yoichi Okamoto

PHOTO (INSERT 3): President Lyndon B. Johnson signing Voting Rights Act of 1965.

PHOTO (INSERT 4): President Barack Obama speaks during a visit to the Denver Police Academy in Denver, Colorado, April 3, 2013. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

Robert Dallek

Robert Dallek is the author of two volumes on President Lyndon B. Johnson, «Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson in his Times 1908-1960» and «Flawed Giant 1961-1973.» He is also the author of «An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917-1963» and most recently «Camelot’s Court: Inside the Kennedy White House.» He is now writing a biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

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The Historical Roots of the Ebola Scare in the United States

HNN October 24, 2014

For many weeks, on television, in newspapers and magazines, and especially on the Internet, there has been a steady drumbeat of fear, panic, paranoia, misinformation, and ignorance about an Ebola “outbreak” in the United States. Perhaps most regrettable, has been the effort to politicize the illness and blame the “outbreak” on President Obama. Some have gleefully called the virus “Obola;” others have even charged that the administration deliberately introduced this African disease as a covert form of slavery reparations to punish white America for the crime of slavery. There have also been much more serious allegations that the government is covering up the frightening truth that Ebola is transmitted through the air as well as through contact with a patient’s bodily fluids; this view has been espoused by Senator Rand Paul, who told college students that “This thing is incredibly contagious” and the Obama administration “has downplayed how transmissible it is,» and echoed by political analyst George Will, who warned ominously against believing the medical and scientific experts. New Hampshire Senate candidate Scott Brown insists that an Ebola epidemic is coming, carried by arrivals from Africa and even by illegal immigrants with ties to ISIS crossing the Mexican border. It is common sense, he contends, for the public to reject the views of so-called experts.

Of course, there is no Ebola “outbreak” in the United States. Thus far three people have been diagnosed with Ebola in Texas and one in New York. There has been just one fatality, Thomas Eric Duncan, a Liberian national visiting his family in Dallas. The two nurses who came into direct contact with his bodily fluids have recovered. The lax medical protocols in Dallas that contributed to the illness of the two nurses have already been tightened so that the New York case is very unlikely to lead to additional infections.

Meanwhile, during the same period, some seven hundred American children and adolescents in 45 states and D.C. have been diagnosed with the Enterovirus, and at least two have died. That virus is easily transmitted, much like the common cold or the flu. It seems, according to the director of the CDC’s National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, “When people are anxious about a threat like Ebola, it doesn’t necessarily matter if they look at numbers, facts and probabilities. Because of the way our brains work, something rare and exotic is much scarier than something that’s familiar.”

Is it just “the way our brains work” or is something else at work here that has deep roots in the American past? Duncan’s family, with whom he stayed for several days after becoming ill, has now gone through the 21-day quarantine period. None contracted Ebola. But, an online news site immediately questioned whether the incubation period may really be longer than 21 days, and another proclaimed that Duncan’s family would still be burdened with the stigma of having been exposed to Ebola—a claim notably absent in the cases of the three white American doctors who contracted the disease in Africa but were successfully treated after returning to the United States.

Anyone familiar with America’s racial past will detect some disturbing parallels in these irrational if not hysterical fears: bringing to mind, for example, the 17th century conviction that blackness was a physical and moral curse that consigned Africans to the status of diseased outcasts who must remain permanently under white control; the 19th century defense of slavery as a “positive good” for blacks and whites alike; the popular early 20th century “scientific” literature which proclaimed “The Negro, A Beast;” and the defense of segregation as the last hope for preserving a pure and separate white America.

The response to the thus far much more serious Enterovirus has generally been muted and reasonable. But, what if that virus, rather than Ebola, had been brought to the United States from Africa? Would it now be politically exploited as the Onterovirus and linked to fears of a conspiracy at the highest levels of the government? If one looks at the photos of Thomas Eric Duncan’s family in Texas, what you see is a group of poor, scared, and isolated people who are learning that the stigma associated with Ebola is, at least for them, irreversible, in part because it is embedded in attitudes long associated with blackness itself in our nation’s history.

Sheldon M. Stern is the author of numerous articles and Averting ‘the Final Failure’: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings (2003), The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis (2005), and The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths vs. Reality (2012), in the Stanford University Press Nuclear Age Series. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1970 and was historian at the JFK Library in Boston from 1977 to 2000. 

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¿Por qué mirar una vez más el 1898?

Mario Cancel Sepúlveda

80 grados   24 de octubre de 2014
americanizacionescuela¿Por qué volver a mirar hacia el 1898? Después de 116 años de relaciones económico-políticas, intercambio cultural intenso y tras una conmemoración crítica de un centenario, la relación entre Puerto Rico y Estados Unidos debería estar bien digerida. La impresión que produce una mirada a ese largo periodo de tiempo es que Estados Unidos llegó para quedarse y que habrá que esperar, yo no lo veré, otro imperio invasor en el futuro para que Puerto Rico deje de ser americano. Me imagino que recordar el 1898 en un incierto año 2414, será lo mismo que pensar en el 1493: el hecho se reducirá al desembarco de un puñado de gente y una confrontación con una población de nativos agrestes. Es probable que la invasión de 1898 se reduzca a una nota al calce o un relato folclórico como ha sucedido con el 1595 o el 1797. Muy pocos le reconocerán relevancia a un asunto consumado y distante.Mirar hacia el 1898 fue casi un “deber moral” durante el siglo 20. La posibilidad de un centenario era atemorizante para algunos. La historiografía positivista crítica, la reflexión modernista y nacionalista, la ensayística de la década del 1930 y la reflexión académica de 1950, atravesaron ese Rubicón hace tiempo. La nueva historia social y la historiografía geopolítica de aliento caribeñista de las década de 1970 al 1990, ofrecieron unos contextos microscópicos y macroscópicos que habían sido pasado por alto por sus predecesores. La producción de la historiografía post-social, la que casualmente se denominó “novísima”, intentó con relativo éxito aproximaciones desde lugares inéditos como la cotidianidad y la discursividad, concentrando su indagación en las lógicas culturales de los invadidos y los invasores. Pero a fines de la década de 1990 y principios de este insípido siglo 21, el debate teórico y ¿generacional? resultó más atractivo que cualquier otra cosa. Los temas historiográficos se convirtieron en pretexto de discusiones teóricas. Y el asunto de “cómo se conoce el pasado” resultaba más relevante que “qué cosas se conocen del pasado”.Aquella anomalía propició una situación, desde mi punto de vista, extravagante y enriquecedora. Las tradiciones interpretativas modernistas y postmodernistas se vieron obligadas a coexistir. Hasta hace algunos años podía desayunar con un viejo intelectual de la “generación” del 1950, y tomar una carbonatada en un restaurante de comida rápida con un postmodernista.

En un curso general de historia de Puerto Rico en el Recinto Universitario de Mayagüez, luego de discutir con reserva las corrientes culturales que convergen en la noción de lo puertorriqueño (la problemática teoría de las “tres fuentes”) sugerí un asunto polémico. Pregunté si la presencia etnocultural anglosajona en Puerto Rico (antes y) después de 1898 debía ser considerada un componente (i)legítimo de la cultura puertorriqueña. Lo cierto es que lo sucedido alrededor del 1898 guarda, cierta correspondencia con lo que pasó después de1508. El 1898 fue un proceso de recolonización cultural y reconstrucción política. La anglosajonización y/o americanización, se constituyó en una promesa y un problema. Tanto en 1508 como en 1898, se desarrolló una relación asimétrica.

Una diferencia visible y vulgar entre el pos 1508 y el pos 1898, había sido la ausencia del mestizaje biológico masivo que caracterizó al primero: la separación racial, ineficaz en el siglo 16, funcionó en el siglo 20. A pesar del contraste entre el proceso de colonización y el de recolonización, hacia 1930 se aceptaba que la cultura anglosajona era un componente de relevancia del puertorriqueño común. Desde 1950 a esta parte, me parece innegable, la integración de modelos culturales estadounidenses ha avanzado sin cesar en el escenario del mercado y el consumo. La revolución de los medios masivos de comunicación y la revolución de la Internet, han servido para acelerar un proceso que no termina. La pregunta sobre el elemento anglosajón como una “cuarta fuente”, quedó, como era de esperarse, sin respuesta.

Mis lecturas de los comentaristas, cronistas e historiadores estadounidenses que produjeron materiales intelectuales sobre “our new possession” entre 1898 y 1926, tarea que elaboré con el Dr. José Anazagasty Rodríguez en dos volúmenes publicados en 2008 y 2011, me habían demostrado que la conciencia de la anglosajonidad en aquellos escritores era enorme. El imperialismo sajón y el 1898 eran la expresión del cumplimiento de un deber providencial. Aquel discurso de la anglosajonidad sirvió para articular una imagen despreciativa de la hispanidad que se dejaba “atrás” (en el pasado) con el propósito de legitimar una “ruptura” en nombre de la “modernización”. Convencer a los colonos de la validez de ese argumento no parecía complicado: los “nativos”, seres simples e ineducados, metáfora del “buen salvaje”, eran pura tabula rasa, naturalmente dóciles y fieles. A lo sumo, el puertorriqueño, identificado con el jíbaro y el indio, no era visto sino como la víctima de una hispanidad descuidada, inhumana y cruel, por lo que no podía señalarse como responsable de su pusilanimidad.

El problema de los comentaristas, cronistas e historiadores estadounidenses estaría en otra parte. Con las elites educadas locales la situación sería distinta. Los ideólogos separatistas anexionistas vinculados al 1898 en el estilo de Julio Henna y Roberto Todd, no tuvieron ningún problema en hacer suyo aquel discurso propenso a la anti-hispanidad del imperialismo benévolo. De igual manera, la imagen agresivamente antiespañola que dominaba los textos estadounidenses, convergía con la que poseían los ideólogos del separatismo independentista antes de 1898: Ramón E. Betances y Segundo Ruiz Belvis. Aquel conjunto de pensadores siempre han sido difíciles de convocar como modelos de hispanofilia, inclusive en el momento más feroz de aquella fiebre. La devaluación de la hispanidad también rindió un valioso servicio para las elites intelectuales liberales y autonomistas que, aunque esperaban mucho de España, miraban con asombro hacia Estados Unidos cuando se trataba de asuntos como la abolición, la economía y la educación. Salvador Brau Asencio y Francisco del valle Atiles son quizá el mejor modelo de ello.

Sin embargo, para quienes resintieron la invasión de 1898 y no llegaron a ver en la anglosajonidad un aliado en la ruta de la modernización, el desprecio anglosajón por la hispanidad acabó por transformarse en una injuria. La versión de la identidad nacional que aquellos sectores asumieron acabó en ver en la hispanidad, con sus virtudes y sus defectos, una condición sine qua non de la puertorriqueñidad. El nacionalismo político del momento de José De Diego (1914), José Coll y Cuchí (1923) y Pedro Albizu Campos (1930) representó un contrapunto interesante. Su análisis cultural y su revisión del pasado español a la luz de la modernización con la que se sueña, significó un contrapunto para la propuesta de los comentaristas, cronistas e historiadores estadounidenses.

Ante aquella glosa de la modernización que miraba con reticencia hacia el pasado, elaboraron otro relato de la modernización que miraba con reverencia hacia el pasado. Un elemento en común en ambos proyectos utópicos es que ninguno quería regresar al pasado. El progresismo y el liberalismo de ambas es evidente: lo que difiere es la función que se le adjudica a la hispanidad en el futuro imaginado.

Ambas utopías se apoyaban, debo reconocerlo, en una versión parcial y nebulosa del periodo ante bellum 1898. Frederick A. Ober (1899) y R. A. Van Middeldyk (1903), producen una imagen tan ilusoria y frágil como la de Brau Asencio (1903). El pasado que se vivió al lado del hispano (la nostalgia que producía el malo conocido), y el futuro que se aguardaba al lado del sajón (el optimismo que generaba el bueno por conocer), no diferían en un asunto. Al momento de precisar su tema central -la “nación”-, ambos la concebían como un apéndice o dependencia de otro. Bajo aquellas circunstancias, a nadie debe sorprender que el 1898 hubiese sido apropiado como una “frontera confusa”. En el caso de los estadounidenses, servía para completar el sueño de elaborar un imperio ultramarino donde cebarse materialmente y completar su obra civilizadora. En el caso de los puertorriqueños, significaría un tipo de año cero o un renacimiento que marcaba un antes y un después reconocibles. Las soluciones ideológicas a la “confusión” no fueron eficaces. El planteamiento de un problema de esa naturaleza siempre ameritará nuevas revisiones.

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