Feeds:
Entradas
Comentarios

Archive for octubre 2013

by Jeremy Kuzmarov

October 10, 2013
 

A U.S. Marine helicopter (a Huey, not a Black Hawk) over Mogadishu in 1992. Photo credit: Wiki Commons.

Last week marked the twentieth anniversary of the infamous Black Hawk Down incident where Somali militia fighters loyal to Mohammed Farah Aidid shot down two American helicopters using rocket-propelled grenades. Mobs then hacked the fallen pilots to death with machetes and dragged their mutilated bodies through the streets as trophies. To mark the anniversary, 60 Minutes aired a segment focused on efforts by two private American security contractors to recover remnants of the helicopter that had been shot down, while interviewing retired Special Forces operative who had survived the ordeal.

Like much mainstream media coverage of U.S. foreign policy, the program memorialized the deaths only of the Americans killed in the fighting. While the death of those young men was indeed tragic, what went unreported is the fact that the militia fighters who shot down the Black Hawk helicopters had been previously attacked and family members had been killed by U.S. forces. In rescue operations, American helicopter gunners and Special Forces fired into crowds, killing and wounding hundreds of Somalis, a third of them women and children, compared to eighteen American dead. Bill Clinton commented: “When people kill us, they should be killed in greater numbers.”

American military intervention in Somalia was officially designed to establish a “secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief” after clan warfare erupted following the overthrow of dictator Siad Barre. Unbeknownst to most Americans, the United States had helped to create the conditions that produced unrest, flooding the country with weaponry during the Cold War along with the Soviets. In 1988, Barre’s legions leveled the northern city of Hargeisa and killed 60,000 in an effort to suppress an Isaaq clan based rebellion. The U.S. assisted Barre with intelligence and shipped 1,200 M-16 assault rifles and 2.8 million rounds of ammunition, having provided over $1 billion in aid since his ascension in 1969. Pointing to the strategic interests driving U.S. policy, General Norman Schwarzkopf noted that The Red Sea, with the Suez Canal in the North and the Bab-el-Madeb in the South, is one of the most vital sea lines of communication and a critical shipping link between our Pacific and European allies.”

After Barre’s ouster, the opposition split into two factions, one led by Aidid, the former army chief of staff trained under American police programs. Africa Watch reported that the warring parties engaged in “wanton and indiscriminate attacks on civilians,” producing conditions of famine. On December 9, 1992, as the TV networks broadcast harrowing images of emaciated children, the lame-duck Bush administration launched Operation Restore Hope, in which 28,000 U.S. forces stormed Mogadishu in what Le Monde described as “the most media-saturated landing in military history.” Lives were likely saved, though food had already begun to get through by this time and relief specialist Fred Cuny noted a smaller operation in the famine triangle away from Mogadishu would have been more effective.

U.S.-U.N. forces were commanded by Admiral Jonathan Howe, a key figure in the capture of Manuel Noriega and William Garrison, a cigar chomping Texan with twenty-five years experience in unconventional warfare. Charging Gen. Aidid with war crimes for interfering with their mission, they bombed radio Mogadishu, possibly to prevent announcement of a peace deal between the clans. Pakistani soldiers subsequently fired on demonstrators, prompting counter-attacks by Aidid’s militias who killed 24 of them. The U.N. Security Council then authorized “all necessary measures to apprehend those responsible.” The U.S.-U.N. placed a $25,000 bounty on Aidid’s head and engaged in manhunt operations which culminated in the Black Hawk Down incident. War crimes were committed by American, Belgian, Canadian and French forces, who tortured prisoners, raped women, destroyed cultural symbols and shot missiles into clan elder meetings, a marketplace and the main hospital in Mogadishu. Americans taking the lead in fighting operations did not know enough about Somalia to “write a high-school paper about it,” according to journalist Mark Bowden. “Their experience of battle, unlike that of any other generation of American soldiers was colored by action movies. They remarked again and again how much they felt like they were in a movie, and had to remind themselves that this horror, the blood, the death, was real.”

As political scientist David Gibbs has pointed out, American envoy Robert Oakley had close relations with the Continental Oil Company (Conoco) which provided military intelligence and helped plan the logistics for the Marine landing. Its corporate compound was transformed into a defacto U.S. embassy. The Los Angeles Times reported that “industry sources said that the companies holding the Somali exploration rights are hoping that the Bush administration’s decision to send U.S. troops will also help protect their multimillion dollar investments there.” Early in the operation, Conoco made an agreement with Aidid that it would back him if he would grant Conoco exclusive rights to oil exploration. Aidid however did not want to barter away Somali resources, demanding large concessions, and so Conoco switched to backing rival Ali Mahdi. American foreign policy followed suit. Aidid subsequently urged his supporters to “turn against the Americans” and began waging urban guerilla warfare. Journalist Scott Peterson notes that the U.S. essentially handed Aidid the patriotic mantle of the Mad Mullah (Mohammed Abdullah Hassan), a nineteenth-century nationalist who had mobilized support against Italian and British occupiers.

The Black Hawk Down incident should provide a cautionary tale about military intervention and its often destructive consequences. Unfortunately, the public remains misinformed about U.S. foreign policy, in good part because they rely for information on TV shows like 60 Minutes which fail to dig beneath the surface to uncover the hidden motives driving U.S. intervention or analyze its effect on the subject population.

Jeremy Kuzmarov is J.P. Walker assistant professor of history at the University of Tulsa and author of Modernizing Repression: Police Training and Nation Building in the American Century (Massachusetts, 2012).

– See more at: http://hnn.us/article/153561#sthash.tFKAucYo.dpuf

Read Full Post »

by D. Andrew Austin and Mindy R. Levit

October 9, 2013

 

Photo credit: Wiki Commons.

The following is excerpted from the paper «The Debt Limit: History and Recent Increases,» published by the Congressional Research Service on September 25, 2013.

Origins of the Federal Debt Limit

Congress has always placed restrictions on federal debt. Limitations on federal debt have helped Congress assert its constitutional powers of the purse, of taxation, and the initiation of war. Between World War I and World War II the form of statutory restrictions on federal debt evolved into an aggregate limit that applied to nearly all the federal debt outstanding.

Before World War I, Congress often authorized borrowing for specific purposes, such as the construction of the Panama Canal. (76) Congress also often specified which types of financial instruments Treasury could employ, and specified or limited interest rates, maturities, and details of when bonds could be redeemed. In other cases, especially in time of war, Congress provided the Treasury with discretion, subject to broad limits, to choose debt instruments. (77) Some opponents raised concerns that granting the Treasury Secretary authority to issue debt could affect monetary policies, which might tighten credit conditions. Proponents contend that federal borrowing would not disrupt settlements on such monetary issues reached in 1878 and 1890. Such concerns became moot after the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913.

For example, the War Revenue Act of 1898 allowed Treasury to use certificates of indebtedness, which had maturities of a year or less, and were used for short-term borrowing and cash management, as well as long-term bonds. (78) For example, the 1898 War Revenue Act (30 Stat. 448-470) that funded Spanish-American War costs granted the Treasury Secretary the authority to have $100 million outstanding in certificates of indebtedness with maturities under a year, which were mainly sold to large investors, banks, and other financial institutions. The act also allowed the Treasury to issue $400 million in longer-term notes and bonds, which were made available to public subscription, allowing smaller investors to participate. Proponents of the act, however, made clear their intention to allow the Treasury Secretary substantial administrative leeway within those limits. (79)

World War I and the Liberty Bond Acts

Over time, the leeway granted the Treasury Secretary tended to expand. For example, the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, which helped finance the United States’ entry into World War I, dropped certain limits on the maturity and redemption of bonds. (80) The act also incorporated unused borrowing capacity authorized by the First Liberty Bond Act (40 Stat 35; P.L. 65-3) and other previous borrowing acts. (81) Separate limits for previous debt issues, however, were retained in the text of that act — an overall aggregated debt limit evolved later. Features of debt authorized by previous acts, such as the broad tax exemption for First Liberty Bond Act securities, remained intact.

Subsequent borrowing measures were drafted as amendments to Second Liberty Bond Act until 1982. (82) Setting debt policy by amendments to the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917 rather than through original statutes reflected changes in legislative drafting practices at that time. (83)

In the 1920s, Congress provided Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon with additional leeway in order to replace expensive older federal debt with cheaper new issues. Congress allowed Treasury to issue notes, a financial instrument issued extensively in the Civil War and rarely thereafter, and limited the amount of notes outstanding, rather than the sum of issuances, which gave greater Treasury flexibility to roll over debt. Savings certificates designed for small investors were also reintroduced. (84)

Aggregate Debt Limit Created in 1930s

In the 1930s, Congress moved towards aggregate constraints on federal borrowing that allowed the Treasury greater ability to respond to changing conditions and more flexibility in financial management. In 1930, Treasury Secretary Mellon, noting that Liberty bonds would become ready for refinancing in the next few years, argued that «orderly and economical management of the public debt requires that the Treasury Department should have complete freedom in determining the character of securities to be issued and should not be confronted with any arbitrary limitation» (85) Congress granted the U.S. Treasury greater flexibility in issuing bonds in 1931. (86)

In 1935, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau called for replacing a limit on bond issuance with a more flexible limit on the amount of outstanding bonds. This change underlined Treasury bonds’ role as a means of managing federal finances rather than securities tied to specific projects of wars. (87) Following that request, Congress then established a $20 billion limit on shorter-term debt and a $25 billion limit on outstanding bonds.

In March 1939, President Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary Morgenthau asked Congress to eliminate separate limits on bonds and on other types of debt. (88) The House approved the measure (H.R. 5748) on March 23, 1939, and the Senate passed it on June 1 (P.L. 76-201). When enacted on June 20, the measure created the first aggregate limit ($45 billion) covering nearly all public debt. (89) Combining a $30 billion limit on bonds with a $15 billion limit on shorter-term debt, while retaining the $45 billion total limit in effect, enabled Treasury to roll over maturing notes into longer-term bonds. This measure gave the Treasury freer rein to manage that would reduce interest costs and minimize financial risks stemming from future interest rate changes. (90) While a separate $4 billion limit for «National Defense» series securities was introduced in 1940, legislation in 1941 folded that borrowing authority back under an increased aggregate limit of $65 billion. (91)

Although the Treasury was delegated greater independence of action on the eve of the United States’ entry into World War II, the debt limit at the time was much closer to total federal debt than it had been at the end of World War I. For example, the 1919 Victory Liberty Bond Act (P.L. 65-328) raised the maximum allowable federal debt to $43 billion, far about the $25.5 billion in total federal debt at the end of FY1919. (92) By contrast, the debt limit in 1939 was $45 billion, only about 10 percent above the $40.4 billion total federabl debt of that time (93).

World War II and After

The debt ceiling was raised to accommodate accumulating costs for World War II in each year from 1941 through 1945, when it was set at $300 billion. (94) After World War II ended, the debt limit was reduced to $275 billion. Because the Korean War was mostly financed by higher taxes rather than by increased debt, the limit remained at $275 billion until 1954. After 1954, the debt limit was reduced twice and increased seven times, until March 1962 when it again reached $300 billion, its level at the end of World War II. Since March 1962, Congress has enacted 77 separate measures that have altered the limit on federal debt. (95) Most of these changes in the debt limit were, measured in percentage terms, small in comparison to changes adopted in wartime or during the Great Depression. Some recent increases in the debt limit, however, were large in dollar terms. For instance, in May 2003, the debt limit increased by $984 billion and in February 2010 the debt limit was increased by $1.9 trillion. (P.L. 111-139)

* * * * *

(76) Spooner Act of June 28, 1902 (32 Stat 481; P.L. 57-183)

(77) Marshall A. Robinson, The National Debt Ceiling: An Experiment in Fiscal Policy, (Washngton, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1959), pp. 1-6.

(78) The War Revenue Act was enacted June 13, 1898. Much of the legislative text of the act’s public borrowing sections (§32, 33) were drawn from the acts of June 30, 1864, ch. 172 §1 (13 Stats. 218) and of March 3, 1865, ch. 77 (13 Stats. 469).

(79) See House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 31, part 6 (June 9, 1898), pp. 5713-5728; and Senate debate on June 10, 1898, pp. 5732-5749.

(80) P.L. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288, enacted September 24, 1917. See H. J. Cooke and M. Katzen, «The Public Debt Limit,» Journal of Finance, vol. 9, no. 3 (September 1954), pp. 298-303. The Second Liberty Bond Act allowed purchases of government debt of allied (i.e., Entente) countries, which would have complicated limits on the final redemption of federal bonds issued to fund their purchase. Some federal bonds issued in the wake of the Panic of 1893 did not have maturity limits.

(81) The other acts were the Panama Canal measure (Spooner Act; P.L. 57-183), the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat 11; P.L. 61-5); and two emergency bond measures passed in March 1917 (39 Stat 1002 and 39 Stat 1021).

(82) In 1982, the debt limit was codified into 31 U.S.C. §3101 by P.L. 97-258. Subsequent changes in the debt limit have been drafted as amendments to 31 U.S.C. §3101.

(83) Middleton Beaman, a former Law Librarian of the Library of Congress, Columbia Law School professor, and advocate for the professionalization of drafting legislation, retured to Washington in 1916 to assist the House Ways and Means Committee, which originated the Liberty Bond acts and other borrowing and revenue measures. This arrangement was formalized in 1918, when the Legislative Drafting Service, the predecessor office of the modern Office of Legislative Counsel, was established. Donald R. Kennon and Rebecca M. Rodgers, The Committee on Ways and Means a Bicentennial History 1789-1989, H. Doc. 100-244, p. 258. See also, Middleton Beaman, «Bill Drafting,» Law Library Journal, vol. 7 (1914), pp. 64-71. For a critical view of legislative drafting in prior decades, see James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 3rd revised ed., vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1920), chapter XV on «Congressional Legislation.»

(84) Revenue Act of November 23, 1921 (42 Stat 227; P.L. 67-98). See also Paul Studenski and Herman E. Kroos, Financial History of the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 316.

(85) Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1930, p. 39. Available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/treasar/AR_TREASURY_1930.pdf.

(86) For details, see Kenneth D. Garbade, Birth of a Market, (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 2012), pp. 314-317.

(87) Ibid.

(88) New York Times, «President Urges Ending of Limit on Bonded Debt; Asks Congress to Facilitate Borrowing by Eliminating $30,000,000,000, ‘Ceiling’ Stands by Total Debt Top $45 Billion All Right for Now, Message Says — Yielding to Economizers is Seen,» March 21, 1939.

(89) P.L. 76-201. See also Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 84, part 6 (June 1, 1939), pp. 6480, 6497, 6501.

(90) This limit did not apply to certain previous public debt issues that compromised a very minor portion of the federal debt.

(91) Revenue Act of June 25, 1940 (54 Stat 516; P.L. 76-656) and Revenue Act of February 19, 1941 (55 Stat 7).

(92) U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, H. Doc. 93-78 (Washington, GPO, 1975), Series Y 493-504.

(93) For a list of changes in the debt limit between September 1917 and 1941, see U.S. Treasury, Statistical Appendix 1980, Table 32 entitled «Debt limitation under the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, beginning 1917.»

(94) Public Debt Acts of 1941 (P.L. 77-7), 1942 (P.L. 77-510), 1943 (P.L. 78-333), and 1945 (P.L. 79-48).

(95) U.S. Office of Management and Budget, FY2010 Budget of the U.S. Government: Historical Tables, Table 7-3. Increases in the debt limited potentially enabled by the Budget Control Act of 2011 are counted as one alteration.

D. Andrew Austin is an analyst in economic policy and Mindy R. Levit is an analyst in public finance for the Congressional Research Service.

– See more at: http://hnn.us/article/153551#sthash.S5ogBP1B.dpuf

Read Full Post »

Opinionator - A Gathering of Opinion From Around the Web

Maximilian in Mexico

By PHIL LEIGH
 
New York Times, October 4, 2013

On Oct. 3, 1863, a Mexican delegation arrived in the Austrian port city of Trieste to officially offer Mexico’s imperial crown to the 31-year-old Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, a scion of the Austrian branch of the Hapsburg royal family and the brother of the Austrian emperor, Franz Josef I.

For 300 years the family’s Spanish branch and its successors had, by virtue of its seat in Madrid, ruled over colonial Mexico and much of the Western Hemisphere. After Mexico won independence in 1821, it fell into a constant state of near anarchy; There were 75 government successions by the time the American Civil War started. Conservative Mexicans and wealthy ex-patriots longed for the stability that a European monarchy might provide, and some of them recalled wistfully the steady hand of the Hapsburgs.

Maximilian was interested for two reasons. The liberal-minded archduke felt he could improve Mexico. Perhaps more important, there was nothing for him at home: his brother was just two years older, and was looking forward to a long reign (in fact, he ruled until his death during World War I).

Still, Maximilian would never have ascended the Mexican throne were it not for yet another emperor, Napoleon III of France. Since Napoleon III’s famous uncle sold Louisiana to the United States in 1803, France had no major stake in the Western Hemisphere. With the advent of America’s Civil War, the French monarch sensed an opportunity to change that, with Maximilian as his puppet.

In early 1862, as America convulsed through the first year of its Civil War, France began placing troops in Mexico to collect customs duties on goods, in order to force the country to make payments on a defaulted debt to several European countries. But the Mexican government was too poor to concurrently make the payments and at the same time support the army of President Benito Juárez. Initially, soldiers from Spain and Britain joined the French, but were withdrawn once they realized Napoleon was scheming to establish a puppet monarchy. As a result, Maximilian would have no power without the presence of the 40,000-man French Army.

Napoleon had hoped to get Maximilian installed a year or so earlier, but he did not capture Mexico City until June 1863. Additionally, the archduke’s October ’63 acceptance of the crown was conditioned on “a vote of the whole country,” which was quickly achieved by gathering signatures under the glitter of French bayonets.

Still, Napoleon knew how drawn out the war was becoming and reasoned that President Abraham Lincoln would be too focused on suppressing the Confederacy to oppose him. The Monroe Doctrine would be temporarily impotent, while the future offered possibilities to render it permanently ineffective.

Although Juárez was forced out of Mexico City, he remained in the country opposing Maximilian during the entire American Civil War. Juárez quickly sided with Lincoln. Early in the war he granted the United States the right to land troops on Mexico’s west coast, where they could march rapidly into Arizona territory if needed to confront a possible Confederate drive westward. On doubtful authority the first Confederate minister to Mexico, John Pickett, countered by offering to support Mexico in the reoccupation of territories lost in the Mexican War, including the present states of California, Arizona, and New Mexico, if Juarez would cancel his deal with Lincoln.

Although Juárez declined, Washington realized that the Confederates could make a similar offer to Maximilian, turning the Mexican crisis into a proxy war. As one visitor to the archduke’s castle in Trieste wrote the Confederate minister in Paris,

Maximilian expressed the warmest possible interest in the Confederate cause. He said he considered it identical with that of the new Mexican Empire … that he was particularly desirous that his sentiments upon this subject should be known to the Confederate President.

The presence of a monarchy supported by a French army south of the border alarmed Washington and the far western states. In January 1864 Senator James McDougall of California proposed a Congressional resolution stating that French intervention in Mexico was “an act unfriendly to the republic of the United States.” It called upon the French to withdraw by March 15, and threatened war if they didn’t. But Lincoln wanted only one war at a time and had the motion sidetracked.

Nonetheless, three months later the House of Representatives unanimously approved a resolution that stated:

The Congress of the United States are unwilling … to leave … the impression that they are indifferent … [to] the deplorable events … in Mexico and … declare that it does not … acknowledge any monarchial government … in America under the auspices of any European power.

Although the Union’s concerns had validity, France wanted to avoid open warfare. In a Paris meeting before departing for Mexico, Napoleon, hopeful of territorial gains whichever side was victorious, convinced Maximilian to avoid endorsing the Confederacy until it won independence. As early as January 1863 the French consuls in Galveston and Richmond had been urging Texans to secede from the Confederacy..

After hearing about the French agitation in Texas, the Confederate Secretary of State, Judah Benjamin, instructed his Belgium minister to investigate. The man replied, “Mexico as she was previous to her dismemberment is the … cherished end at which [Napoleon III] aims.” Lincoln’s government captured Benjamin’s letter and asked its Brussels representative for his opinion. He confirmed that Napoleon III wanted Mexico to restore the borders applicable before the Mexican War. In short, he wanted Mexico to reclaim not only the Mexican Cession, but also Texas. Indeed, owing to its French traditions, Napoleon III believed that he might even be able to recover Louisiana. If all went as he hoped, France would once again have a major stake in the New World and the Monroe Doctrine would be meaningless.

The Confederacy reacted by expelling the offending diplomats, but Lincoln changed military priorities. After the fall of Vicksburg, Gen. Ulysses S. Grant wanted to lead an army reinforced by Gen. Nathaniel Banks against Mobile, Ala. A glance at a map confirms the obvious logic of the movement. Lincoln would not permit the advance, writing Grant, “in view of recent events in Mexico, I am greatly impressed with the importance of reestablishing the national authority in Western Texas as soon as possible.”

After a modest move against Brownsville and the Texas coast in November 1863, General in Chief Henry Halleck and cotton speculators urged a modification to the Union’s plans in the coastal Southwest that resulted in General Banks’s disastrous Red River Campaign in the spring of 1864. The goal was to capture the rebel stronghold at Shreveport, La., and then occupy the cotton fields of east Texas, while incidentally seizing up to 300,000 cotton bales (worth about $2 billion in today’s dollars) along the way. Unfortunately, even though Union forces outnumbered the rebels by more than two-to-one the Confederates turned back the federal offensive. Banks returned to New Orleans with fewer than 5,000 cotton bales, and the drive into Texas was halted.

Fortunately for the Union, the French and Maximilian were having a much harder time stabilizing their hold on Mexico than they had expected. After the end of the war, in an effort to help Juárez, Grant sent Gen. Philip Sheridan to the Rio Grande with an army of 50,000 men. Since Secretary of State William H. Seward did not want a war with Mexico or the French, he persuaded President Andrew Johnson to issue a ban on exports of weapons and ammunition. But Grant secretly ordered Sheridan to supply Juárez with matériel and weapons, including about 30,000 rifles.

Soon thereafter, Napoleon III announced a staged withdrawal of French troops, which left Maximilian nearly defenseless within two years. Juárez regained power in 1867, and promptly executed the naïve archduke.

 

Sources: “James J. Horgan, ““A Confederate Bull in a Mexican China Shop,” from “Divided We Fall: Essays on Confederate Nation Building,” John M. Belohlave, ed.; Henry Martyn Flint, “Mexico Under Maximilian”; Gene Smith, “Maximilian and Carlota”; Donald Miles, “Cinco de Mayo”; Robert Kerby, “Kirby Smith’s Confederacy”; Dean Mahin, “One War at a Time”; Frank Owlsey, “King Cotton Diplomacy”; Ludwell Johnson, “Red River Campaign”; G. J. Meyer, “A World Undone.”

disunion-phil-leigh-thumbStandardPhil Leigh is an independent Civil War historian and author. He is writing a book about wartime intersectional trade between North and South, “Trading With the Enemy.”

Read Full Post »

Political Posters in Castillo de San Cristobal - 06

The Untold Origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis

by Jack Coulhoun

History News Network, October 7, 2013

Excerpted from Gangsterismo: The United States, Cuba, and the Mafia, 1933-1966.

Jack Colhoun, “Aggressive U.S. Moves Against Cuba Loomed Large in Khrushchev’s Decision to Deploy Missiles to Cuba”

In Moscow, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev received fragmentary intelligence reports on Operation Mongoose. Khrushchev’s son Sergei writes, “Information came through secret channels about President Kennedy’s adoption of a wide-ranging plan, ‘Mongoose,’ to destabilize the situation in Cuba.” The younger Khrushchev adds, “Every day the Cubans expected a new invasion, this time not just by emigres but by the U.S. Army.”

The KGB was also picking up intelligence about large-scale U.S. military exercises rehearsing an invasion of Cuba. KGB Chief Vladimir Semichastny wrote in a February 21, 1962 report, “Military specialists of the USA had revised an operational plan against Cuba, which according to the information, is supported by President Kennedy.” The new KGB chief stated U.S. Army and Navy personnel would “be supported by military air assets based in Florida and Texas.”

In Washington, the Navy Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) issued planning directives for U.S. operational plans (OPLANs) for an invasion of Cuba in a February 14, 1962 telegram. OPLANs 314-61 and 316-61, joint Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps operations, were detailed plans for an amphibious landing of ground forces supplemented by air strikes. OPLAN 316-62 included a ground combat force of 150,000 troops. The Pentagon estimated that it would take ten days of heavy combat and 18,500 U.S. casualties to drive the Cuban revolution from power with an occupation of the island to follow.

In spring 1962, the United States conducted military exercises to test the readiness of its Cuba OPLANs with a series of military maneuvers in the Atlantic Ocean from North Carolina to the Caribbean Sea.

In April 1962, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev was in Bulgaria on a state visit. But his thoughts were thousands of miles away in the Caribbean. He worried that the United States was preparing to invade Cuba, and was preoccupied with defending the Cuban revolution.

The idea of deploying Soviet missiles to Cuba came to Khrushchev as he strolled along the Black Sea in Varna, Bulgaria with Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky. Malinovsky pointed to Turkey across the Black Sea, noting the U.S. Jupiter missile base there. Intermediate-range Jupiter missiles could reach targets in the Ukraine and southern Russia within a matter of minutes. Khrushchev asked why the Soviet Union did not have the right to deploy missiles to Cuba as the United States did in Turkey. He was convinced that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba would deter a U.S. invasion of Cuba. Back in Moscow, Khrushchev pressed Malinovsky again: “What about putting one of our hedgehogs down the Americans’ trousers?”

This time, however, Khrushchev made a strategic argument. He pointed out that the installation of missiles in Cuba would also augment the Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear force.

He elaborated, “According to our intelligence we are lagging almost fifteen years behind the Americans in warheads. We cannot reduce that lead even in ten years. But our rockets on America’s doorstep would drastically alter the situation and go a long way towards compensating us for the lag in time.” Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba would be capable of striking targets deep inside the United States, including New York and Washington.

The Kremlin was acutely aware of the margin of U.S. superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons. According to Anatoly Dobrynin, the USSR’s ambassador in Washington, the USSR had 300 nuclear warheads compared to a U.S. arsenal of 5,000 warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and B-52 bombers with an intercontinental range in October 1962. Khrushchev discussed his plan to deploy Soviet missiles to Cuba with only a handful of Soviet leaders.

Khrushchev consulted Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko about his missile deployment plan. “The situation forming around Cuba at the moment is dangerous,” Khrushchev said. “It is essential that we deploy a certain quantity of our nuclear missiles there for its defense, as an independent state.” Gromyko responded, “I have to say quite frankly that taking our own nuclear missiles to Cuba will cause a political explosion in the United States.” Khrushchev dismissed Gromyko’s warning. Instead, he sought the counsel of Anastas Mikoyan, a veteran member of the Presidium and his closest associate.

Khrushchev later wrote, “Comrade Mikoyan expressed his reservations.” Khrushchev continued, “His opinion was that we would be taking a dangerous step … This step bordered on adventurism. This risk lay in the fact that in wanting to save Cuba, we could be drawn into a very terrible and unprecedented nuclear missile war. That had to be avoided by every possible means, and to consciously provoke such a war would really be dangerous.”

Khrushchev would not be deterred. On May 24, 1962, the Presidium met to consider Khrushchev’s missile deployment idea. According to the minutes of the meeting, the Presidium gave “full and unanimous approval of enterprise ‘Anadyr’ (subject to receiving F. Castro’s agreement).” KGB officer Alexandr Alexiev was summoned back to Moscow from his post in Cuba. When Khrushchev informed him that he would return to Cuba as the new Soviet ambassador, Alexiev was puzzled, because he was not a diplomat. Khrushchev explained, “What is important is that you are friendly with Fidel, with the leadership.” He noted, “And they believe in you, which is the most important thing.”

Khrushchev added, “Comrade Alexiev, to help Cuba, to save the Cuban revolution, we have reached a decision to place rockets in Cuba.” He asked, “What do you think? How will Fidel react? Will he accept or not?” Alexiev said he thought Castro would reject the missiles because they would compromise the independence of the Cuban revolution. Khrushchev responded, “There’s no other way for us to defend him.” He continued, “The Americans only understand force. We can give them back the same medicine they gave us in Turkey. Kennedy is pragmatic, he is an intellectual, he’ll comprehend and won’t go to war…”

The success of Khrushchev’s [ill-fated] exercise in Soviet missile power was predicated on presenting President Kennedy with a fait accompli. The Soviet “hedgehogs” would be installed in Cuba while Washington was preoccupied with the November 1962 congressional elections. Khrushchev would tell Kennedy about the Soviet missile deployment after the elections, when the missiles would be fully operational. Khrushchev [was confident] that Kennedy would not launch U.S. military strikes against the missile sites, because he could not be sure of taking out all of the missiles. He reasoned that Kennedy would grudgingly accept the missiles in Cuba as an alternative to nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

In June, Alexiev returned to Cuba with a delegation from the Soviet Union, including Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, head of the Strategic Rocket Forces, and Politburo member Sharaf Rashidov. When the delegation met with Fidel Castro, the Soviets discussed the international situation and the possibility of a U.S. invasion of Cuba. Marshal Biryuzov asked Castro what he thought would deter U.S. military intervention. Castro replied, “If the United States knows that an invasion of Cuba would imply war with the Soviet Union, then, in my view, that would be the best way to prevent an invasion of Cuba.” Castro wanted a formal Cuba-USSR defense pact.

The Soviet delegation insisted that only Soviet missile power could prevent U.S. intervention. The Soviets said the missiles would also enhance the power of the USSR and the Socialist bloc of nations. Castro responded, “If making such a decision is indispensable for the socialist camp, I think we will agree to the deployment of Soviet missiles on our island.” But he wanted to consult with his closest colleagues before making a decision about the missiles.

The next day Alexiev met again with Castro, who was joined by Che Guevara, President Osvaldo Dorticos, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Blas Roca. Guevara stated, “Anything that can stop the Americans is worthwhile.” The Cubans approved the broad outline of the missile deployment plan. The details would be negotiated later in Moscow. The idea that Soviet missiles in Cuba would make the Socialist bloc stronger appealed to the Cuban revolutionaries. It also tempered their concern that the missiles would compromise the independence of the revolution.

Jack Coulhoun is an independent historian of the Cold War. He received his PhD from York University in Toronto in 1976. His work has been published by the Washington Post, Toronto Star, Christian Science Monitor, The Nation, The Progressive, National Catholic Reporter, In These Times, and Covert Action Quarterly. He was Washington bureau chief of the Guardian newsweekly from 1985 to 1992. –

See more at: http://hnn.us/article/153504#sthash.TjdAjtiq.dpuf

Read Full Post »

Stone and Kuznick at Illinois State University in January 2013.

Stone and Kuznick at Illinois State University in January 2013.

Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick: The United States «is the Roman Empire» [INTERVIEW]

by Satoko Oka Norimatsu and Narusawa Muneo

History News Network, October 7, 2013

Cross-posted from Japan Focus

The Japanese weekly Shukan Kinyobi and The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus  jointly interviewed Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick, co-authors of The Untold History of the United States, a 10-episode documentary series (broadcast on Showtime Network, 2012-13) and a companion book of the same name (Simon and Schuster, 2012), on August 11 in Tokyo. It was the eighth day of the duo’s twelve-day tour of Japan, right after they visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki to participate in the sixty-eighth memorial of the atomic bombing on August 6 and 9 respectively, and before they visited Okinawa, to witness the realities of the continuing U.S. military base occupation and resistance to it. Stone and Kuznick, relaxed with a few late-afternoon drinks between two large public events in Hibiya, Tokyo, talked about the importance of learning and teaching history, the “thread of civilization” as a people’s “weapon of truth,” to defend against the power of the American empire, whose image has been molded on the continuing distortion of history and glorification of past wars. This applies to Japan and its government’s denial of aggression in its past wars, too. The interview ranges widely over their five years of collaboration on the Untold History.

Oliver Stone, filmmaker and screenwriter, has won numerous Academy Awards for his work on such iconic films as Platoon, Wall Street, JFK, Born on the Fourth of July, Natural Born Killers, Salvador, and W. He and Peter Kuznick co-authored The Untold History of the United States, the 10-part documentary series broadcast on Showtime Network, and the book with the same title published by Simon & Schuster, 2012. Peter Kuznick is a professor of history and director of the Nuclear Studies Institute at American University.

Shukan Kinyobi and Japan Focus: At the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Vietnam War in 2012, Obama reflected on the war “with solemn reverence upon the valor of a generation that served with honor,” and initiated a thirteen-year program to “pay tribute to the men and women who answered the call of duty with courage and valor.” Why are the experiences of the Vietnam War being glorified now? Did the war not bring about disastrous outcomes, as you argue in your book?

Oliver Stone: There has certainly been a strong drift to the right both in the United States and now in Japan. The drift to the right started with Reagan, though some people would argue that it started with Nixon, and Johnson, after Kennedy was killed — you can argue that. The drift to the right accelerated under Reagan, and it was Reagan who was most aggressive in redefining the Vietnam War as, not a disgrace, but something to be proud of. He termed negativity toward the war as the “Vietnam syndrome,” which was quite strong, considering that only ten years before we had withdrawn from Vietnam and we were really lost. I think Reagan believed that he could revamp American society by giving it economic strength and historical purpose, as Abe is trying in Japan. You redefine the history, and you redefine the economy. Reagan starts it, and George H.W. Bush does it better. He is the one who suffered from the “wimp factor,” but after the Kuwait invasion in 1991 he announces that the “specter of Vietnam has been buried forever under the desert sands of the Arabian Peninsula,” and then this is backed by Clinton. So this is the tradition now. Obama recently made a statement on the sixtieth anniversary of the armistice of the Korean War that “the war was no tie. Korea was a victory.” He was praising the U.S. military extravagantly.

So, this is a different kind of syndrome in the United States. No matter what history says, the military is worshipped. If you look at Obama’s statement on the fiftieth anniversary of the Vietnam War, he does not really talk about the war when he says, “we reflect with solemn reverence, upon the valor of a generation that served with honor.” You can never question your soldiers’ valor. Many of the veterans who go to war want to feel that they served with honor, even if it was a losing cause or a bad cause. On the other hand, behind that is a revising of history where he is basically saying that the war in Vietnam was a noble cause. I think it was a lost cause; a bad cause. The battlefield of the future is the history. History, memory of history, and the correct memory of history is the slender thread of our civilization.

I know this in my heart, because if you think about it, in our own lives, previous lives, my life, your life, what do we have? Where are we right now? Every one of us has a history. We have loves, hates, affairs — we have gone through life and every single one of us has a say about history. Those people who remember history and have an awareness of themselves do better in life, generally speaking. They are able to evaluate themselves as they mature, they can change as I did, to evolve, if evolution comes from knowing who you are. So the very concept of denying your own past is lying at the greatest level. It goes to the heart of every individual and to the heart of a nation.

Peter Kuznick: The Vietnam syndrome is very important. The attack on the Vietnam syndrome began as soon as the war ended. Gerald Ford during his presidency said, “We have to stop looking to the past; we have to look to the future.” This was one week before the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, the end of the Vietnam War. The process began from that point, to forget Vietnam, to wipe it from history — the causes of Vietnam, and the consequences of Vietnam. In 1980, Commentary, a leading neocon magazine, edited by Norman Podhoretz, devoted an issue to the Vietnam syndrome. Conservatives understood at that point that unless they could change the perception of the American people about the Vietnam War, they could not intervene capriciously in other countries and expand what had become an American empire. So they made a deliberate effort to change the narrative about the Vietnam War, because Vietnam had become for most Americans by that point a nightmare. Some people saw it as a mistake, as an aberration, but many of us understood it as an extremely ugly example of an interventionist American policy that had been playing out around the world for decades. So the right wing made a systemic effort to cleanse history, because they knew that was essential to build the kind of empire that they wanted to attain, and, as Oliver says, Reagan pursued it most aggressively. But we saw it also with Carter. Carter starts his administration progressively, but by the end he had moved to the right and was talking about the nobility of the struggle in Vietnam. Reagan embraced it directly, as did Clinton who, in his student days, had actively opposed the war. If you look at what he says, it is the same as Ford, Reagan and everybody else: the nobility of the cause — the American troops were great, just because they fought and died, and you have to wave the flag for the American troops.

This was also essential for neocon proponents of “the new American century.” People behind George W. Bush again rewrote the history of Vietnam. Conservative obfuscation has been deliberate and systematic. Even in the naming. We refer to it in America as “the war in Vietnam.” We talk about “the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,” but we do not talk about the “American ‘invasion’ of Vietnam.” But that was what it was — a bloody invasion that began slowly and built up over the years, in which the United States used every kind of lethal power, except for the atomic bomb. We had free-fire zones in which we were able to shoot and kill anything that moved. It was a war of atrocities. People say that the My Lai Massacre was an atrocity, but dismiss it as an aberration. But if you study the actual history, read Nick Turse’s recent book, or look at Oliver’s movies, you see that Vietnam was a series of atrocities on a smaller scale. That is why the Vietnamese are surprised by the American focus on My Lai. They know that My Lais, though on a smaller scale, were occurring throughout the country with shocking regularity.

The Vietnam Memorial in Washington, D.C. is powerful and moving. It has the names of all the 58,286 Americans who died in the war. The message is that the tragedy of Vietnam was the fact that 58,286 Americans died. That is indeed tragic. Robert McNamara (Secretary of Defense 1961-68) came into my class and said he accepted the fact that 3.8 million Vietnamese died. The memorial does not have the names of 3.8 million Vietnamese or the hundreds of thousands of Laotians, Cambodians and others. The Okinawa war memorial tells a different story. It has the names of all the Okinawans, Japanese, Americans, and all the others who died in the Battle of Okinawa, and that makes a real statement about the horrors of war. The Vietnam memorial does not.

If the 250-foot long Vietnam memorial wall contained all the names of the Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians, do you know how long it would be? Over four miles! What a statement that would make.

But right now, there is a campaign to forget, and Obama participated in it when he welcomed the troops home from Iraq. Obama is the voice of the empire, and empire requires forgetting, cleansing, and wiping out the past about Vietnam, Iraq, Kuwait, Salvador, and even World War II. None of these stories have been told honestly and truthfully in the United States and that is why it is so important to fight over the correct interpretation of history; otherwise U.S. leaders are going to repeat the crimes and atrocities in much the same way that they got away with them in the past.

For over tem years since the dawn of the twenty-first century, the U.S. has engaged in the so-called “War on Terror.” It seems that the American evaluation of the war has been ambiguous, but how much of a sense of failure is there? Has nothing changed after all? What was this war about?

Kuznick: The “war on terror” is an absurdity from the start. It is a part of an Alice in Wonderland-like through-the-looking-glass experience in which you see the world turned upside down; you are in a world of absurdity. After September 11, 2001, the United States entered a world in which enemies were magnified into these terrifying powerful forces.

9/11 was a colossal fuck-up by the Bush administration. Minneapolis FBI agent Coleen Rowley was trying to warn the Bush administration that there were people learning to fly airplanes who had no interest in learning how to land. There were repeated warnings that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were planning attacks on the United States. Intelligence officials knew that an attack was imminent and they tried desperately to alert Bush to this. George Tenet, the head of the CIA, was running around Washington with his hair on fire, trying to get somebody to listen — Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, George Bush, Dick Cheney — and they all told him to get lost. They had more pressing matters to deal with. So first of all, 9/11 was a complete failure by the Bush administration, partly of intelligence, but mostly of leadership, and then instead of viewing it as what it was — a well-planned and well-executed operation, a crime against the American people committed by a vile group that needed to be brought to justice — they made it into a global War on Terror and pursued a neocon agenda that did more to harm the United States than Al Qaeda could have done in a thousand years.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, whom we are very critical of when he was Carter’s anti-Soviet National Security Director, nailed this right from the beginning. He said you cannot fight a war against a tactic. What is the real enemy? Bush said that they hated us for our freedom. What an absurd, lying statement that was! “They hate us for our freedom”! U.S. leaders knew that they had real issues. We do not agree with the Islamic extremists or countenance their tactics, but there were issues with the U.S. policy in Israel, the suppression of the Palestinians, and the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, their holy land. Those were the real issues. There is no justification for what they did. It was one of the series of terrorist attacks — the U.S.S. Cole, the Riyadh bombing, the bombings in Africa — this had been going on for some time. But Bush and Cheney decided to use this to their advantage, and the Project for the New American Century said in its 2000 report that it was going to take a long time for U.S. to remilitarize and increase defense spending in the way they want unless there was “a new Pearl Harbor.” The United States got a new Pearl Harbor, and then they cynically exploited this by playing on Americans’ fear that they lived in such a hostile and dangerous world surrounded by enemies with frightening capabilities. This mindset has continued and Obama bought in to this. Bush, Cheney, and Obama have pushed this to the point where we have the kind of surveillance state that was exposed by Edward Snowden.

Although war should benefit no one, the US government does not appear to change its war policy or fundamentally reduce the defense spending which is as much as 40 percent of the federal budget. Is war an inevitable agenda for U.S.? Does war continue because of the war profiteers within the U.S. administration?

Stone: I think it is a very good question. I remember as a history student as a boy, you know you always hear about the War of 1812, the Revolutionary War, then you hear about the war against the Creek Indians if you want to consider that a war, but it is ongoing war — battles going on with the Indians all the time. The Civil War, the Mexican War, and then a period of Reconstruction with no foreign wars, until the Spanish-American war of 1898. That was a long stretch. So the United States had a relatively austere record of war, although it was certainly aggressive. We invaded Canada in 1812 and we were repulsed by the British again. So by the time we come to World War I, we were really novices of war. I think the Civil War was extremely bloody, but World War I was like a new century, and America becomes different. A lot of American people recoiled in the aftermath of World War I, and I think that was part of the reason why we stayed out of World War II for so long. It was the strong feeling that we had been suckered by the British and French empires into World War I. Not to mention the role played by the Morgan Bank. People were really pissed off in the 1930s and understandably so. We do not overlook, but American history overlooks the Nye Committee, hearings led by North Dakota Senator Gerald Nye into war profiteering in World War I. I found that fascinating. I have read some of those hearings and felt really angry, because although everything Nye and other critics said was true, we drew the wrong conclusions, and by the time it really mattered in Spain for us to stand up to fascism, we did not. It is ironic how history works.

(To Peter) Do you want to continue on? (Kuznick: Absolutely. We have been so focused during this trip on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and U.S.-Japan-related issues that we haven’t had a chance to talk about these things.) Let’s talk about war now. Be creative. Let’s just talk about what war is.

Kuznick: Smedley Butler, highly decorated Marine Corps Major General said, “War is a racket.” [8] He said that he was “a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street, and for the bankers. … a gangster for capitalism.” He starts in the Philippines and then he goes through all the countries he led interventions into. He said he was a front man for Brown Brothers Harriman. The military was the arm of the bankers and the industrialists, because if we trace the history of the American empire since the 1890s, we see that it was the 1893 depression in the United States that was in some ways the beginning. After 1893, American leaders had two possible ways to go: one was to spread the wealth so that there would be enough consumers who could purchase American goods and spark the recovery from depression; and the other was to expand overseas in search of resources, cheap labor, and new markets. What did the United States do? It expanded overseas.

Stone: I am curious about that. When Henry Wallace becomes Secretary of Agriculture in the depression, he adopts a policy of recovery through scarcity. What does he do? He killed lots of pigs and cut the cotton crop.

Kuznick: That was a temporary action. He hated it. Recovery through scarcity went against the grain of Americans’ core beliefs. A similar approach was evident in the Natural Industrial Recovery Act. What they were trying to do was to reduce the surplus on the market in order to raise prices. They slaughtered those pigs, but distributed them to the American people so Wallace at least was feeding the hungry on an unprecedented scale….

Stone: So, the United States paid farmers not to grow. It’s crazy. (Kuznick: It’s crazy, and Wallace said so at the time.) There is one thing I want to say, and this is a very important point. Wallace understood one big thing in the world — food. If people grow food for the world, there will be peace. And I think that is so true, and that is so basic because, when you look at world history, the scarcity of food has driven so many wars. I cannot believe what I heard in Japan in these last weeks; people talking about starvation during war. Wallace understood it is absolutely necessary to produce enough to feed everyone so that people do not go to war over scarce food and resources. (Kuznick: For decades, Wallace’s hybrid corn fed the world.) One of the moving moments in history that Peter brought to my attention was that in 1940, Franklin Roosevelt wrote a letter to the Democratic Party that said, “The Democratic Party cannot face in two directions at once … you are either for Wall Street (money and profit), or you’re for people.” Roosevelt made it clear that Henry Wallace was his candidate and he would not run for his third term unless Wallace was nominated. It was a powerful letter, which the Democratic Party should read every four years and wake up, because they lost that vision.

Kuznick: I gave that letter to Ralph Nader and he quoted it in his book. In retrospect, that may have been a mistake. As Oliver said, the Democratic Party has lost its bearings today and tramples the legacy of Roosevelt and Wallace, and post-Cuban Missile Crisis John Kennedy. It now stands for surveillance; it stands for the tripling of the troops in Afghanistan; it stands for kowtowing to bankers. We would like to think the Democrats are progressive, but under the Clintons and Obama, they have devolved into more efficient managers of the American empire. They do not challenge the empire. Republicans are crude. Republicans try to impose the empire by force. Obama is smarter. He knows he can also impose the empire by deception (Stone: soft words). So he has figured out the way to institutionalize Bush policies and make them a permanent feature of American life. That is why Bush’s press spokesman, Ari Fleischer, recently said we are living through Bush’s fourth term. This is not true in certain aspects of domestic policy, but it is sadly close to the mark on foreign policy. And in certain ways, Obama is actually worse than Bush.

Stone: I believe in evolution. I understand why a country makes mistakes. I pray for my country every morning in meditation. I take at least half an hour in meditation. I pray for my country, and the world…. I wish… I wish people could… learn… to be sweet. Gentle.

The American empire does not seem to have lasting power, mostly because of its financial difficulty. But if you look at the recent subservience of the European Union in dealing with Edward Snowden’s case, the U.S .still seems to have great power and control. Where do you think the empire is going?

Stone: This is the reason why I am sticking around because it is a good story. There is tension. Okay? We do not know the outcome. No one in this room knows and even Obama does not know. That is the game. The game is, every day we engage all our political sensitivities and send our diplomats abroad and all the military. How do we stay who we are? That is what they think about. Or how do we think about the future? How do they plan for this? Do you realize that we wake up every day into this giant, gigantic worldwide Godzilla beast? How do we live with the monster? Every day we have millions of men going to work in the military, the national security complex everywhere in the world. We are a massive mobile empire, bigger than anything that anyone has dreamed of. That’s one side of the story. And then the other side of the story is the misperception that if we do not grow today, if we do not eat more, what is going to happen to us? The empire’s appetites are insatiable. That insecurity has to be responded to. It is like a dragon saying, “What am I going to eat today?” Do you understand how bad this can get? So for the dragon to say, “I don’t need to eat as many eggs and lions and trees today. I can maybe survive on less.” That is the tension of our times. That is why all those people like hibakusha and the peace activists, are bringing moral force into the universe — Buddhists, Catholics, all over the world. There is this huge energy that is emerging out there. Believe me, I feel it. There is an enormous struggle as Peter says, between the dragon with arms and we have only the truth as our weapon, and I find that to be the key issue of our days, and I am curious. So that is why I am sticking around, because, otherwise, I think I will die. If the bad guys win, I do not want to be around anymore.

Kuznick: The danger comes from having an empire with unlimited military strength but very limited moral vision and increasingly limited economic control; that creates the most dangerous situation of all. Dying empires can bring everything down with them. Countries can too. If Israel feels existentially threatened, it will almost certainly use its nuclear weapons. The United Sates has lost its moral authority and its philosophical vision, (Stone: to some people, not all) and the younger generation is losing its hope for a better future.

Stone: It is all those kids who cheered for Osama bin Laden’s death. The majority of Americans thought it was going in the right direction. By the way, there was a poll that said 51 percent of 18-29 year olds think the Vietnam War was a good thing.

Kuznick: However, if you look at the polls about nuclear abolition, the 18-29 year olds are in favor of it. (Stone: That is easy. Vietnam is not.) So what I am saying is that they are confused. They do not have a clear understanding of history. What I’m talking about is the position the United States is in, being armed to the teeth, being able to destroy the world but losing power, influence, and moral authority. We lost it at 9/11, our response to 9/11 with Abu Ghraib, with Guantanamo, the torture, the Patriot Act, massive surveillance, George Bush’s war policies…We see what we are ready to do now in the Asia Pivot. We are willing to militarize the Pacific in order to contain China. But the United States is getting relatively weaker as China and other countries are growing at a much faster rate. China spends three times as much of its GDP on infrastructure as the U.S. does. (Stone: That is about economics, only.) Yes, but militarily also. (Stone: But their military budget is still only ten percent of ours.) Well, we’re weaker economically. In 2011 per capita Chinese GDP was only 9 percent of that in the U.S., but that was double what it had been only four years earlier. So much of our economy is based on finance now; so much of it is based on speculation. The United States does not produce as we used to. (Stone: We produce movies.) We produce two things: movies and academia. (Stone: armaments.) I am saying we are losing power at this crucial junction when China is rising, India is rising, and maybe Japan is finding its footing again.

Stone: This is the same argument as when Britain was losing power because Germany was gaining in 1914, but do not underestimate Britain. We are the Roman Empire. I am interested in the Roman Empire because it didn’t succumb. Christianity was imposed by Constantine, and, all of a sudden, the empire extended itself for four, five hundred years. It had destroyed Jesus in 33 A.D. or thereabouts, Jerusalem in 70 A.D. It took Rome 230 years to embrace Christianity. Think about it, we may very well turn out like Rome did; to embrace some form of this new religion and we might find our way.

Kuznick: Exactly, we still have hope; many Americans hate the direction in which the country is heading and want to see a different future. And Obama represented that in the minds of American people and especially in the minds of young people during his first campaign. That is partly why I am so mad at him, because he took the dreams of those in the younger generation who believed in something — and he destroyed them.

Stone: Empire. Remember, no empire lasts. Peter says this empire in the U.S. can deny history and overcome history, and we pointed to Star Wars in our series — how cruel this can become, from space to destroy whatever is against you. We will become a tyranny. The question is can the tyranny last? (Kuznick: and I am saying no — not as a tyranny.) Germany lasted… in 1941, no one could stop Germany, what a great moment for Hitler and then, by 1943, he was starting to run. So no empire lasts. That is all I can tell you, but the Roman Empire has defied logic by lasting the longest because you can still be in Roman Empire in 800 A.D. and still have some semblance of civilization in Greece and places like that.

Kuznick: But our goal is to divert the United States, to change direction before it becomes an absolute tyranny. The United States does terrible things, but there are also other things going on there. We still have the freedom to make the kind of documentaries we made and write the books that we write. Don’t minimize the importance of that. People are not entirely repressed in the United States, though they are monitoring us, and they are physically capable of repressing us. There are a lot of people, even people in power and people in the military, who defy the idea that the United States should become a tyranny, a total national security state, the worst kind of dictatorship. We do not know which way the United States might go. My fear is that the United States, rather than going down, will bring down the rest of the world with it, but that is what we are trying to prevent. We are at a unique historical juncture. Our goal is to make sure that we have a future so that future generations can get it right, but the possibility is that we blow the whole thing up before that happens. Our mission is getting through this period of darkness to a point where there is a future. Oliver says that he is not expecting to see this in his lifetime, and, realistically, he might be right, but our goal is to make sure that there is a future.

Stone: I think that many people through history felt the same way. Everybody says it is a crisis now. I think in 800 A.D., if you lived on the borders of Greece or Turkey, you would feel the same way. Everyone creates their own crisis in their times so this is an old story; it’s a his-story. (Kuznick: But it’s a new story in one way. The United States has enough nuclear weapons to end life on the planet. In 800 AD, they could not end life on the planet. They could perhaps systematically go around and kill everybody, but that is not the same thing as a nuclear war.) That is cruel. When somebody comes to kill you, that is cruel.

Talking about cruelty, we saw the cruelty of the Japanese army in Nagasaki — exhibits of the Nanjing Massacre, military sex slavery, and Unit 731 at the Oka Masaharu Museum. The U.S. too, even after its use of the atomic bomb, used cruel weapons such as Agent Orange, depleted uranium weapons, cluster bombs, and drones. The nature of war is cruel, but in the case of the U.S., it seems rampant. Is there any historical significance in this cruelty of the United States?

Stone: I do not believe that the United States was as cruel as Germany and Japan were. I mean I was in Vietnam; I saw Agent Orange dropped on us many times. I still do not know. Maybe I am going to be a victim of it. I do not think about it that much, but I know people have claimed they had been. We saw the results with the Vietnamese. Agent Orange was the cruelest we became. Although we developed mustard gas in World War I, we never used it. The atomic bomb and Agent Orange were the worst. When Obama talks about Syria and he says that the red line for Syria is chemical weapons, what a fucking hypocrite! Why doesn’t he look at our own history? He probably would not even admit that we used chemical weapons in Vietnam. And we made a big deal about Saddam Hussein’s having used chemical weapons when we were trying to justify invading Iraq. (Kuznick: But when Saddam used them against the Iranians, we initially ran interference for him at the UN, preempting a resolution explicitly condemning the Iraqi use. He was our ally. And after he used them against Iraq’s own Kurdish people at Halabjah in 1988, the U.S. increased aid to his vile regime.) So who makes money off this? Dow Chemical profited immensely in Vietnam, but the students drove their recruiters off campus. But cruelty, no; cruelty is not human nature. There are always cruel soldiers in every country in the world, people who are racist, people who are stupid. But as a policy, the United States… take waterboarding. We do it, but we always back away from it, whereas you have to admit that the Germans and the Japanese wholeheartedly embraced cruelty for many years. If they had been winners in World War Ⅱ, we would be experiencing Unit 731 in Manchuria. (To Peter) Would you disagree with that?

Kuznick: We do not know. It is one of those unknowables, because there are other sides to Japan also. Japanese cruelty was extraordinary, and astounding, but we know that Americans were also very cruel to the Japanese. They executed the prisoners of war and knocked out their gold teeth with bayonets. We boiled their skulls in World War Ⅱ, and American soldiers sent them to their sweethearts. We cut off their ears. And we added some atrocities of our own — like firebombing over one hundred Japanese cities and the atomic bombings, for which there was absolutely no justification — morally or militarily — despite almost seven decades of official distortion and obfuscation. Warfare itself turns people and nations into beasts, not everybody, but enough people, especially when leadership encourages it. Then you see the massacre in My Lai. These soldiers were not monsters, these were the Boy Scouts, and these were the kids who made out on Friday night behind the parking lot (Stone: A lot of them were in Platoon). They did not start off as monsters. (Stone: They used to have a cliché in the U.S., “Give a kid a gun and you will see. He will become a killer.”) But America… as D. H. Lawrence said, “American soul is hard, isolate, stoic, and a killer/”

Martin Luther King, in his speech “I have a dream,” called for of a world without racism. How about a world without war? What kind of leadership is required to achieve that?

Kuznick: Martin Luther King’s dream was not just about racism. He was one of the earliest advocates of nuclear abolition in the United States. Martin Luther King and Coretta Scott King were deeply committed to nuclear abolition. They were profoundly opposed to war. King hated the Vietnam War. He waited to come out and denounced it, but he did very early, compared to the popular understanding. And the other leaders of the civil rights movement tried to stifle him. They tried to quiet him by saying, “You’ll undermine the civil rights movement if you talk about the Vietnam War.” But he said, “I have to do it.” So, it’s not unconnected. Martin Luther King knew that cruelty in one area is connected to the cruelty in another area and you have to have a holistic vision of the ways in which people are repressed. That is what we are trying to do — you cannot compartmentalize historically what happened in the 1890s or early 1900s and what is happening today.

We search for the patterns from the beginning, and that was the key to our Untold History project. That is why we try to cover such a broad period of time, because these patterns show that these were not aberrations. The patterns show that these are really intrinsically deeply grounded in the American psyche, American economy, American military, American culture, and American society. But we also wanted to show another side, because, like Japan, American history is a struggle for the American soul. In 1941, Henry Luce said that the twentieth century must be the American century, and a few months later, Vice President Henry Wallace replied that the twentieth century must instead be the “century of the common man.” Here are two fundamentally conflicting visions of what the United States should be, and this is what we are trying to show. King understood that, and King stood with Henry Wallace, John Kennedy, Franklin Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt, Eugene Debs, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Paul Robeson, Howard Zinn, and, at times, William Jennings Bryan — the progressive forces in American history.

Stone: The question I raise is about every leader that emerges. A leader has to last, and has to deal with power, and that was why Kennedy was special. Roosevelt was special. Roosevelt had polio. Kennedy was wounded in World War II, and also had Addison’s disease. I believe it is the comeback that makes the leaders. Nelson Mandela in prison, and Aung San Su Ki in Burma — comebacks.

Japan faces debate over historical issues such as the Nanjing Massacre and military sex slavery, and when we try to deal with these issues honestly we are called anti-Japanese. Do you get such reaction too as being called anti-American or unpatriotic? How do you deal with such criticism?

Stone: I think the strongest credential I can put forward would be, number one, my service in the military in Vietnam, which is hard for them to get around. John McCain can bluster all he wants, but at the end of the day, he was a bomber; he bombed people from the air and he knows that. I do not understand the man’s mentality, how, after being in the prison camp like he was, he can still have such anger and hatred in his heart for the perceived enemies of the United States, possibly soon including China. McCain is what I would call an unreconstructed, un-evolved soldier; many of them exist. I, on the other hand, feel good about my mission … because I served honorably. To be honest, I mean it was not an honorable war, but I served honorably within the confines of my own understanding of the war. And at the end of the day, I became a warrior for peace, which is what I am now, not a warrior for more wars, so I feel strong about that.

And number two, I think what is very important for me is that I did not speak out until I had made roughly eighteen feature films. I spoke as a dramatist, which is my profession. I am not a historian, and I do not pretend to be. I do not have the grounding in it, but I do care about history and I can dramatize it well. Now as I speak out as a documentarian with a background of having made movies, I get criticized very often for nonsense reasons, rubbish reasons. The way they threw it at me was that I made up history, and it took me a while to understand it. Many dramatists have used history before me and I do not apologize for doing historical drama. I never once claimed that I was doing a documentary, and I was not doing a documentary, never, and they put words in my mouth. Anyway, that is why I feel that I can talk strongly without feeling shame.

At the end of your book, you entrust hope to people. Americans are responsible for dealing with what is called “American exceptionalism,” but the responsibility also lies with people in Japan and the rest of the world. What can people of Japan and the world do in solidarity with American citizens in order to achieve the “century of the common people”, as Wallace said, and to confront and conquer the greed for power and control?

Kuznick: It needs to be an international effort along the lines you suggest. We are getting very positive responses around the world to what we are doing, in the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, Russia, Bulgaria, Israel … most countries understand the problems in the way we are laying them out because we are talking directly to Americans, but we are also talking to the peoples of the world. The corrosive nature of empire does not just affect the people in the United States, but people everywhere. We see hope in responses that we are getting everywhere, particularly among young people. We are trying to give them a different understanding of history, because we believe that history is the tool. While our enemies’ weapons are military weapons, our weapon is history, understanding, knowledge, and truth.

So the question is, what is the strength of honesty and truth versus the strength of cannons, bombers, submarines, and surveillance technology? That is the battle we are in. We have seen truth win out in certain situations, prevail over military force and that is what we are trying to do and that is a global effort. We think that people in Japan should repudiate AMPO along with the U.S. bases, take leadership in the fight for the abolition of nuclear weapons and start telling the truth about their own history. We want you to do that in solidarity with the people in the United States. We know that Japan tends to be a conformist society, rather than one in which people make waves, but after Fukushima, we saw the Japanese starting to organize and protest. That happened in the 1960s with AMPO and Vietnam, and it hadn’t happened in a long time on such a large scale. So we look to the Japanese, including the brave people in Okinawa, and we look to the people around the globe to join us in this effort. We think that the Untold History is a vehicle that everybody can rally around to, and it is not just about our untold history but it is for journalists like you, along with historians, to tell the untold history of Japan or the untold history of other countries, because we are all in the same boat where governments lie about the past. They lie because they know they can get away with it. But we are saying they cannot get away with it.

Satoko Oka Norimatsu is Director of Peace Philosophy Centre. She is a Japan Focus coordinator. Narusawa Muneo is an editor of Shukan Kinyobi, a weekly magazine established in 1993.

An abbreviated version of this interview in Japanese appeared in the September 6, 2013 edition of Shukan Kinyobi.
– See more at: http://hnn.us/article/153509#sthash.R91YLqEI.dpuf

Read Full Post »

CommunityNewsletter_0

Even Richard Hofstadter Would Be Amazed by Tea Party Extremism

by Robert Brent Toplin

History News Network – October 7, 2013

Back in the 1950s and 1960s, when new forms of right-wing extremism began to make an impact in American life, historian Richard Hofstadter published essays that drew attention to the “symbolic aspect of politics.” Hofstadter acted in the fashion of an amateur psychologist, attempting to make sense of “non-rational” factors. His judgments about the mentality of leaders and followers on the right, based on emerging social science research of the time, were highly speculative. Nevertheless, some of his observations still excite interest. Historians and pundits often refer to Hofstadter’s ideas about the “paranoid style.” Much-overlooked, however, is a sub-theme in Hofstadter’s writing. That discussion focused on the emergence of “fundamentalism” in American politics. Individuals who seek a broader understanding of the present political standoff in Washington may find Hofstadter’s judgments thought-provoking.

Richard Hofstadter recognized that evangelical leaders were playing a significant role in right-wing movements of his time, but he noticed that a “fundamentalist” style of mind was not confined to matters of religious doctrine. It affected opinions about secular affairs, especially political battles. Hofstadter associated that mentality with a “Manichean and apocalyptic” mode of thought. He noticed that right-wing spokesmen applied the methods and messages of evangelical revivalists to U.S. politics. Agitated partisans on the right talked about epic clashes between good and evil, and they recommended extraordinary measures to resist liberalism. The American way of life was at stake, they argued. Compromise was unsatisfactory; the situation required militancy. Nothing but complete victory would do.

A related outlook has appeared in recent fights over the budget and the debt ceiling. These days, many Republicans claim the stakes in current political confrontations are huge. They say Obamacare will ruin the country. It represents another incursion of Big Government. Washington is the principal source of our economic problem; it needs major downsizing. Barack Obama, champion of Big Government, is a terrible president. We must oppose him vigorously to save the free and prosperous society we all cherish.

As many journalists have pointed out, these hyperbolic claims do not pass the reality test. They represent gross exaggerations. Furthermore, Obama and the Democrats are not going to undermine the president’s signature achievement, the Affordable Care Act. Additionally, journalists warn that Republican threats to take the nation to the brink may cause another gigantic financial crisis.

These critics understand that the current fight in Congress is not 100 percent about ideology. Many GOP representatives and senators fear that they will lose their seats in a primary election if they do not satisfy diehard conservatives, especially Tea Party enthusiasts at the grass roots. Journalists also recognize that some moderate Republicans are willing to support a clean Continuing Resolution. They would agree to end the government shutdown if Speaker John Boehner would allow the entire House to vote.

Republicans have split on questions about strategy, but they have not divided significantly on matters of ideology. Most of them remain solidly opposed to the Affordable Care Act. They have defended that stand as a highly principled position. Representative Steven King, Republican from Iowa, asserted that Republicans were on the correct track “because we’re right, simply because were right.” Congressman, John Culberson, Republican of Texas, said he was holding firm in demanding major adjustments to Obamacare because he had been elected to defend “core principles.”

Culberson could just as well have said he was defending core beliefs, for that is an essential element in radically conservative politics today. With religious-like intensity, many in the GOP express their political faith. On economic questions, they view government as far too large, costly and encroaching in the lives of Americans. Important questions about the potential of government to advance the society’s goals receive scant attention in conservative rhetoric and in right-oriented media. Often conservatives couch negative judgments about government with fundamentalist-style certitude.

Obviously, political fundamentalism is not the exclusive outlook of partisans on the right. All political groups have the potential to act like True Believers. Liberals, too, often close their thoughts to contrary opinions. In the years since Richard Hofstadter’s death in 1970, however, many observers of American politics have noted that resemblances to fundamentalist religion appear especially in the thinking and behavior of militant conservatives.

In What’s the Matter With Kansas? (2004) Thomas Frank observed that, “Conservatives often speak of a conversion experience, a quasi-religious revelation.” Frank noticed that right-wing militants often try to “excommunicate” individuals in their movement who seem guilty of “this or that bit of heresy or thought-error.” Michael Lind, who worked inside the conservative movement before abandoning it, pointed out in 1996 that “American conservatives have adopted free-market fundamentalism, in its crudest forms, as their political religion.” In a similar way in 2004 Robert Reich detected a fundamentalist mentality in arguments about the economy. Conservatives believe “the free market has the same intoxicating quality that religion has to born-again Christians,” observed Reich. “Facts aren’t especially relevant. The perfection of the market has to be accepted as a matter of faith.”

These judgments do not imply criticism of pious Americans. “Faith” is a respected personal choice in matters of religion. But when a fundamentalist perspective applies to politics, compromise becomes extremely difficult. Political notions take on the character of orthodoxy — of accepted and unquestioned truths. Supporters of the faith often fail to exhibit the kind of critical and open-minded mentality that that is essential for the working of a vibrant and effective democracy.

The scholarship on fundamentalist religious thought has produced findings that seem relevant to present-day U.S. politics (and relevant to observations Richard Hofstadter made years ago). In major studies that examine diverse groups, including Christians, Jews and Muslims, Martin E. Marty, R. Scott Appleby, Gabriel Almond, and Karen Armstrong have discovered patterns that cut across groups. Fundamentalists often project a dualistic, Manichaean viewpoint. Judging disagreements in apocalyptic terms, fundamentalists characterize societal issues as vital struggles between the forces of light and darkness. Champions of a fundamentalist perspective call for uncompromising commitment to the faith.

These writers examined religious views, not political ones, yet a reading of important recent scholarship on conservatism suggests connections. In It’s Even Worse Than It Looks, Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein largely blame Republicans for dysfunction in Washington. The GOP has become “ideologically extreme,” they conclude, disregarding “conventional understanding of facts, evidence, and science…» In Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, From Eisenhower to the Tea Party, Geoffrey Kabaservice shows how champions of extreme conservatism squeezed out defenders of a more responsible and balanced kind. His book traces a rich American tradition of moderate conservatism. Unfortunately, the current GOP has lost sight of that tradition. “Political movements based on dogmatic, unthinking certitude may be fatal to treasured American values,” argues Kabaservice.

George M. Marsden, a prominent historian of fundamentalist religious movements in the United States, offered an “offhand” definition of a fundamentalist as “an evangelical who is angry about something.” A related political outlook in U.S. politics appeared in a poll by the Pew Research Center released in late September, 2013. The 41 percent of Republicans who said they were “angry” at the government was a far higher percentage than anger expressed by any other political or ideological group tested. A news story about the poll in the Washington Post concluded that the Republican base is “mad as hell at the federal government and by extension Barack Obama.” The article reported that angry citizens are eager to march, give money, and vote.

Here, then, is the significant marriage between practical politics and a fundamentalist-style political religion. Republican intransigence in clashes over Obamacare, budgets, and debt ceilings may reflect smart politics from the radical Right’s point of view. Militant conservatives in Washington can succeed in channeling the base’s anger while also boosting their political careers. They treat political fights in Washington like holy crusades and are generously rewarded for their militancy in conservative voting districts.

Ultras of the right may eventually fold in their battle against Obama and the Affordable Care Act, but their fundamentalist approach to politics is likely to remain an important characteristic of national politics. It will remain difficult to achieve progress when one party is especially influenced by leaders and supporters who treat compromise as an abandonment of core principles and who judge issues in the manner of a political faith. The nation’s leaders may find ways to squirm out the current crisis, but they will face continued challenges as long as a religion-like approach to conservatism remains prominent in Washington.

If Richard Hofstadter were alive today, he would probably be amazed to see that the fundamentalist style exhibited by a relatively small minority in the 1950s and 1960s has become a major force in the nation’s politics

Robert Brent Toplin, University of North Carolina, Wilmington (Emeritus), has published several books about history, politics, and film, including Radical Conservatism: The Right’s Political Religion.

– See more at: http://hnn.us/article/153514#sthash.mv5wTp7w.dpuf

Read Full Post »

Cuban Rebels

Cuban rebel soldiers cook a pig for dinner on January 1, 1896. Photograph by Hulton Archive/Getty.

A Useful Corner of the World: Guantánamo

PAUL KRAMER

The New Yorker

July 31, 2013

It was 1935, and the Guantánamo naval base had to go. So declared an American commission stocked with foreign-policy experts: the United States was pursuing less antagonistic relations with its southern neighbors, and an American base on Cuban soil, anchored by a lease without an end date, looked increasingly like an “anomaly.” Weren’t there enough defensible harbors on the United States’ own Gulf Coast, or on Puerto Rico? The commission wrote that the U.S. government should “seriously consider whether the retention of Guantánamo will not cost more in political misunderstanding than it is worth in military strategy.”

Where was the base? This was a trickier question than might first appear. It straddled both sides of lower Guantánamo Bay, roughly five hundred miles east and south of Havana, about as far from the capital as one could travel and remain in Cuba. The bay opened onto the Windward Passage, one of the hemisphere’s most trafficked sea-lanes, linking the Eastern Seaboard to the Gulf of Mexico, Central and South America, and, through the Panama Canal, the Pacific Ocean. In 1899, an American military planner, stressing the need for naval bases and coaling stations in Cuba, had called the island “an outer bar of the Mississippi.”

The terrain that rose above the bay—dry, sun-blasted hills, where cactus and scrub clung to outcroppings of barren rock—was hostile enough that Cuba’s Spanish rulers had taken their time colonizing the region. For centuries, Guantánamo had effectively been no state’s domain, a haven for pirates and slaves escaping both Cuba and Haiti, only a hundred miles across the Windward Passage at its nearest point. For them, Guantánamo had meant something like freedom.

The more perplexing question was where the base stood legally. By the late nineteenth century, U.S. commercial and military interests in Cuba and the wider Caribbean had deepened. When a Cuban uprising against Spanish control threatened to secure the island’s independence, American policymakers pursued military intervention, capitalizing on popular outrage at the mysterious explosion of the U.S.S. Maine, in Havana harbor, in February of 1898. In a nine-day battle for Guantánamo Bay, American soldiers, under Commander Bowman H. McCalla, and Cuban insurgents defeated the Spanish garrison. In June, the Cuban diplomat Manuel Sanguily wrote to a friend, “Now that they have seen Guantánamo, they will never renounce their control over it.”

He was not far off. The United States took possession of Guantánamo Bay through what might be called gunboat tenancy. While Cuba’s constitutional convention gathered in late 1900 and early 1901, Secretary of War Elihu Root listed provisions that “the people of Cuba should desire” for their constitution; these included granting the United States the right to intervene freely in Cuban affairs and access to land for naval bases. These demands went into the Platt Amendment, passed by the U.S. Senate on March 1, 1901, and submitted to the convention for adoption; the United States would withdraw its forces from the island only after the delegates incorporated it into their constitution. Cubans opposed the Platt Amendment in speech, pamphlet, and mass protest; Juan Gualberto Gómez, a delegate and a former general, charged that it would transform Cubans into a “vassal people.” Nevertheless, under pressure a divided convention adopted it.

The U.S. Navy moved quickly. Two 1903 agreements gave the United States control of forty-five square miles of land and water—a space about two-thirds the size of Washington, D.C.—for coaling and naval stations “and for no other purpose.” Rent was $2,000 a year, paid in gold; lacking a cutoff date, the lease was “for the time required.”

The terms were ambiguous from the start. Cuba retained “ultimate sovereignty,” for example, but the United States exercised “complete jurisdiction and control.” A second lease, signed in 1934, similarly embraced uncertainty. It raised the rent to $4,085, but provided no termination date. The agreement could be ended by American withdrawal or by a bilateral settlement, but not by Cuban action alone. The Navy had sprawled onto a thousand or so additional acres, but the new agreement did not say where they were: the base would continue occupying “the territorial area that it now has.”

At noon on December 10, 1903, the United States assumed “complete jurisdiction and control.” A marine brigade, five naval companies, and a few Cubans looked on as the Stars and Stripes was hoisted to a twenty-one-gun salute. The American Minister stayed home, as did high-ranking Cuban officials. The Atlanta Constitution noted that most Cubans “were not inclined to sanction by their presence an act which they chose to consider was unjustly imposed on them.”

Some Americans questioned the United States’ imposition of power beyond its borders. What would be the legal status of these newly conquered territories? Supreme Court Justice Melville Weston Fuller, dissenting in the 1901 Downes v. Bidwell case on the status of Puerto Rico, had warned that “if an organized and settled province of another sovereignty is acquired by the United States,” Congress would retain the power “to keep it, like a disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous existence for an indefinite period.”

Others were more sanguine. As Woodrow Wilson, who was the president of Princeton at the time, put it in an April, 1907, address, “Colonies must be obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the world may be overlooked or left unused.” The corollary to this imperial proposition: once you wrested turf from somebody else, you found something to do with it.

But during the next thirty years U.S. officials failed to make the Guantánamo base as useful as they had hoped. Congressmen wanted to spend naval funds on bases near their constituents. Fresh water had to be brought from Guantánamo City, hauled in railroad tanks to Navy barges, then pumped into storage tanks. “Here we are ensconced in Guantánamo Bay for ten years,” the American journalist Stephen Bonsal complained in 1912, “and we have not raised a finger to fortify what the Russians or the Japanese, or any other predatory people, would immediately convert into a great naval station and citadel and proudly christen ‘Mistress of the Caribbean.’ ”

It was not that the base went unused. It hosted naval exercises and drills, and it resupplied U.S. vessels. The roughly twenty-year U.S. occupations of both Haiti and the Dominican Republic commenced with invasions from Guantánamo. The base was also useful to thousands of Cuban laborers who earned their livelihood on its wharfs and in its machine shops and warehouses.

While the boundaries of the base were indefinite, it was, in the twenties and early thirties, clearly outside the precincts of Prohibition. Officers stocked up on alcohol from Cuban suppliers. Sailors crammed bars in Caimanera and Guantánamo City, seeking rum and economically vulnerable women; this was called “liberty.” For many, the base was a weird cocktail of dull heat, lassitude, and excess. Morally and geographically, it was, one visitor wrote, “on the fringes of things.”

Cubans march against American interference on Guantánamo. September 15, 1933. Photograph courtesy Keystone-France/Getty.

Cubans march against American interference on Guantánamo. September 15, 1933. Photograph courtesy Keystone-France/Getty.

The Second World War rescued the base. A hub in the United States’ Caribbean convoy system, by the mid-nineteen-forties, it was the second-busiest port in the Western Hemisphere, after New York. Franklin D. Roosevelt himself visited twice in two years. (Harry Truman also stopped by, seasick, in 1948.) The base acquired the nickname Gitmo, from the Navy call signal GTMO; sailors boasting of their access to Cuban women jested that it was not called “git’ mo’ ” for nothing.

But the buildup only sharpened the question of where Gitmo actually was. Did Cuban or U.S. law apply? The lease covered the mutual return of fugitives, but who would prosecute Cuban pilferers on base or brawling American sailors in Caimanera? Customarily, each state tried its own citizens but when, in September, 1954, a Cuban worker named Lorenzo Salomón Deer was accused of stealing $1,543.26 in cigarettes from the Navy exchange, he was imprisoned on the base by naval authorities and given no access to his family or a lawyer. It was, one Cuban union leader said, “as if he had been swallowed by the earth.” Deer was released, two weeks later, and charged his captors with beatings and other abuses. (The Navy’s Office of Industrial Relations conceded that Deer’s detention had been “excessive.”) “We could not conceive that in a naval establishment of the most powerful nation in the world, champion of democracy, things like this could happen,” read an editorial in a union bulletin, “and much less [that it would] use methods and systems of terror.”

The postwar years would be remembered by many of its more élite American residents as the base’s golden age: robust funding, ice-cream shops, bowling alleys, affordable servants. For many, Gitmo was Mayberry with iguanas. “Guantanamo Bay is in effect a bit of American territory, and so it will probably remain as long as we have a Navy,” Rear Admiral Marion E. Murphy wrote in a celebratory 1953 history. It was “inconceivable that we would abandon it.” A contemporary sailor’s song was less enthusiastic:

So, hurray for old Gitmo on Cuba’s fair shore
The home of the cockroach, the flea and the whore
We’ll sing of her praises and pray for the day
We’ll get the hell out of Guantánamo Bay.

These were also the years when American officials bolstered the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, who confronted a popular rebellion after July, 1953. Fidel Castro and his fellow-insurgents considered the base a tool of counterrevolution; its lease was invalidated by its coercive origin and would, in any case, be nullified when they triumphed.

But the revolution made use of the base, too. It was the source of American hostages that revolutionaries seized on several occasions. Base workers who sympathized with the revolt smuggled out bullets, spare parts, clothing, and gas. Once in power, Castro declined to profit from the base in at least one respect, proudly refusing to cash the United States’ annual rent checks. Still, he did not ban Cubans from working there; instead, he ordered them to convert their dollars into pesos right outside the gates. The enemy remained stubbornly—and conveniently—within.

After the Cuban missile crisis—when the Soviets aimed three cruise-missile launchers at the base from fifteen miles away—one novel use was considered: faking an attack against Gitmo as the pretext for U.S. military intervention into Cuba. One plan, Operation Northwoods, included orchestrated riots outside the main gate and sabotage in the harbor. In an October, 1962, meeting, Attorney General Robert Kennedy asked “whether there is some ship that, you know, sink the Maine again or something.” Gitmo was no longer on the fringes of things.

The US Armed Forcese destroyer Sullivan

The U.S. Destroyer Sullivan in Guantánamo Bay on November 13, 1962. Photograph by Robert W. Kelley/Time Life Pictures/Getty.

It was also, after 1964, not entirely a part of Cuba. That February, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted four Cuban fishing boats in American territorial waters in the Florida Keys. The authorities locked thirty-six crewmen in eight-by-ten-foot cells in a Florida jail. Cuba’s Foreign Minister, Raúl Roa, declared this an “act of piracy” and announced that Cuba was cutting off the base’s water. Gitmo’s commander, Admiral John D. Bulkeley, activated an emergency ration plan that stretched the base’s ten-to-twelve day water reserve. Lyndon Johnson, in his third month as President, pushed back. The majority of Cuban base workers were fired, and the base’s water was supplied by ship. Construction of a desalination plant began within two months; by July, the swimming pools were full. The Navy erected a sign above the dry pipeline: “GITMO WATER LIBERATED FROM CUBA AT THIS POINT.”

It was the decisive, almost final round in the base’s separation from the rest of the island. In late 1958, the U.S. Navy enclosed Gitmo in a perimeter fence. By late 1960, it had set a minefield that would soon contain over 50,000 mines, spread over more than 700 acres: the largest minefield in the world. Following the failed invasion of the island by C.I.A.-trained forces at the Bay of Pigs, in April, 1961, the Cuban government rimmed the base with its own wide trench of uncrossable Maya cactus, a barrier quickly dubbed the Cactus Curtain. Jetting in its food, transporting most of its laborers in from Jamaica, and later the Philippines—here, at last, was the Guantánamo base as citadel, at once insular and global.

Physical isolation defined the daily reality of naval officers, sailors, base workers, and their families. A base is usually a place of supply; Gitmo depended utterly on the outside world. Auto parts could take three months to arrive, so base personnel jerry-rigged “Gitmo specials” from scavenged parts. Fresh vegetables, nearly impossible to grow in Guantánamo’s parched soil, were flown in from Norfolk, Virginia. By the mid-nineteen-eighties, the base could generate three million gallons of desalinated water each day, but the plant ran on high-priced fuel. Gitmo residents drank the most expensive water on earth. As for “liberty,” it now meant a short flight to the brothels of Kingston and Port-au-Prince.

U.S. officials began realizing that Gitmo had outlived its strategic usefulness, having been rendered anachronistic by nuclear submarines and redundant by the Roosevelt Roads anchorage in Puerto Rico. In July, 1981, a report surfaced that the Reagan Administration might hand over the base—“an obsolete military facility,” in the words of one high-ranking official—if Cuba took back unwanted refugees. The base’s presiding officer had been downgraded from rear admiral to captain.

But the United States hung on. The reason was the Cold War. Gitmo’s main purpose in the late nineteen-seventies and eighties was ostentatious, technological muscle-flexing: showing Cuba and the Soviets that the United States still held sway in the Caribbean, in what one captain called a “visible manifestation of interest.” When, in August of 1979, American policymakers received reports (later proved inaccurate) of a newly arrived Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, they sent 1,800 marines in on three ships, simulating an assault on Gitmo using “inert ordinance.” The goal was to communicate America’s grit. “It’s crazy,” a young sergeant observed. “We’re invading ourselves.”

Then a new use for the base was discovered: the storage of people.

In September, 1991, a brutal coup overthrew the first democratically elected President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrande Aristide, and hundreds of thousands fled the new regime on the open sea. The George H. W. Bush Administration, fearing what an incoming wave of Haitians might do to Bush’s reëlection chances, sought a way to prevent Haitians from drowning and also from exercising their full rights to asylum hearings, a place under U.S. control but far from legal aid, where deportations to Haiti would be speedy.

The answer was Gitmo. By November, 1991, the U.S. Coast Guard was shipping Haitians to the base. By the following July, nearly 37,000 people were confined in makeshift tent cities ringed with barbed wire. Cuban officials’ objections to the base soon included its “concentration camp” on Cuban territory. Prisoners claimed that they were treated like animals, given rotting food, subjected to forced medical treatment, denied counsel. For the more than 26,000 people found by the I.N.S not to be migrating for “political” reasons, Gitmo was a ticket back to danger and, in some cases, death. For 267 Haitians granted asylum on political grounds but denied entry under a 1987 law that blocked them from immigrating because they were H.I.V.-positive, it was purgatory. “They were even harsher with us than with the others,” Yolande Jean, a democracy activist, recalled. The refugees at Camp Bulkeley—reserved exclusively for H.I.V.-positive refugees—burned their tents and hurled rocks at their captors. Many joined in a hunger strike.

HAITIAN REFUGEES

Haitian refugees behind a razor-wire enclosed camp at the Guantánamo naval base on December 29, 1991. Photograph by Bebeto Matthews/AP.

Activists in the United States protested the denial of the detainees’ rights. A team of students and professors at Yale Law School took their case, Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. Sale, to the U.S. District Court for New York’s Eastern District, where it was heard by Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr. They argued that constitutional protections applied to the base as an area under the “complete jurisdiction and control of the United States.” Lawyers for the government responded that Gitmo was simply “a military base in a foreign country” and “not United States territory.” Detainees there were “outside the United States and therefore they have no judicially cognizable rights in United States courts.” Judge Johnson was incredulous:

You’re saying, if I hear you correctly, that [government officials], assuming that they are arbitrary and capricious and even cruel, that the courts would have no jurisdiction because the conduct did not occur on U.S. soil? That’s what you’re saying?

The government’s lawyers concurred.

On June 8, 1993, Judge Johnson decided the case in the Haitians’ favor, condemning conditions at the refugee camp at Gitmo and ordering it closed. He insisted that due-process guarantees under the U.S. Constitution extended to the base: these included the right to a lawyer, to proper medical care, and to not be held indefinitely without charge. Otherwise, he told an I.N.S. attorney, the state possessed unchecked authority “to take, kidnap, or abscond, whatever you want to call it, take a group and put them into a compound, whether you call it a humanitarian camp or a prison, keep them there indefinitely while there has been no charge leveled against them and there is no light at the end of the tunnel.”

The camp was shut down, and the remaining detainees admitted to the United States. But the Clinton Justice Department found Johnson’s decision troubling, and pursued a deal with the Haitians’ legal team: the Administration would comply with Johnson’s orders and drop an appeal; in return, Johnson’s decision would be vacated from the record. The advocates agreed, fearing that an appeal would prolong their clients’ detention and might, ultimately, succeed. According to one official, the Clinton Administration wanted to preserve “maximum flexibility.”

A year later, the camps were back. A crackdown by Haiti’s dictators and Castro’s sudden granting of permission to depart Cuba encouraged tens of thousands of rafters to take to the water. The Clinton Administration took full advantage of Gitmo’s “flexibility.” At the peak of the exodus, in the summer of 1994, roughly 16,800 Haitians and 22,000 Cubans were held at the base, in separate, adjoining tent cities on the abandoned McCalla runway. There were more protests, hunger strikes, repressions. Gitmo was becoming a rights-less island within an island. For those who refused to coöperate, there was an exposed, open-air prison, consisting of forty small, chain-link cells.

Haitian and Cuban plaintiffs sued. The January, 1995, decision, in Cuban American Bar v. Christopher, by the Eleventh U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, rejected the logic of Johnson’s orders, and firmly situated Gitmo outside the United States and constitutional limits on state power. The court dismissed arguments that leased military bases abroad “which continue under the sovereignty of foreign nations” were functionally equivalent to land borders or ports of entry. Laws mandating asylum hearings, for example, “bind the government only when the refugees are at or within the borders of the United States.” Apparently, Gitmo was not at or within these borders.

The refugees were released the following year. The Cubans were permitted entry into the United States. The Haitians were involuntarily returned to Haiti, which U.S. military forces had, once again, invaded, reinstating the deposed and weakened Aristide. “The camps of Guantánamo are closing, but… Guantánamo Bay is a painful story that’s not over yet,” the Cuban refugee journalist Mario Pedro Graveran wrote in January of 1996. The tent cities were dismantled. The prison was left standing.

It was 1996, and Guantánamo was still, somehow, American ground. The United States’ possession of the enclave had survived apathy and revolution. It had been, indisputably, a useful corner of the world. Each time its hold had been shaken—by Cuban opponents, Americans worried by the base’s diminishing returns, the trouble of running it, the toll it took on global good will—new purposes had been found with unfailing ingenuity. As station and school, leverage and message, weapon and prison, Gitmo had been cast—intermittently, at least—as essential to the United States’ position in the world. After nearly a century of ambiguity, it was, for the time being, anyway, a space of American power that was juridically no man’s land. Who knew? Maybe there would be a use for that.

Paul Kramer is an associate professor of history at Vanderbilt University and the author of “The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines” (University of North Carolina Press, 2006). He also wrote the article “The Water Cure,” which ran in the February 28, 2008, issue of the magazine.

For more information on the history of the Guantánamo base, see the Guantánamo Public Memory Project; Caribbean Sea Migration Collection; “Guantánamo: A Working-Class History Between Empire and Revolution,” by Jana Lipman (University of California Press, 2008); “Guantánamo: An American History,” by Jonathan M. Hansen (Macmillan, 2011); “Guantánamo, USA: The Untold History of America’s Cuban Outpost,” by Stephen Irving Max Schwab (University Press of Kansas, 2009).

Read Full Post »

« Newer Posts